L'Impero con l'imperialismo

[pietro]

Un saggio di James Petras di critica alle teorie di Negri e Hardt .Da leggere!!!


PETRAS ESSAYS IN ENGLISH

October 29, 2001

Review essay on Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri

Empire with imperialism
James Petras
Empire (*) is a strange book. At a time when the U.S. is the only super
power, when
almost fifty percent of the 500 biggest multi-nationals are U.S. owned and
headquartered, and Washington is leading a war of intervention against
Afghanistan
(after previous interventionary wars in the Balkans, Central America
(Panama),
Carribean (Grenada) and proxy wars in Colombia (Plan Colombia) and earlier
Angola,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, the authors of this widely praised book tell us that
imperialism is a thing of the past. They argue that "Empire" is a
post-imperialist
phenomena in which power is dispersed, and no single nation can control the
"empire." Moreover they argue that "empire" is a positive advance in world
history
"The thing (sic) we call Empire is actually an enormous historical
improvement over
the international system and imperialism." After 413 pages of text and 57
pages of
notes the best the authors can do in discussing "!
empire" is to tell us that "In this smooth space (?) of Empire there is no
place of
power - it is everywhere and nowhere. Empire is an OU-Topia or really a
non-place."
(p. 190). Without a clear notion of the agents of "empire" nor its dynamic
in the
real existing imperial states and their corporations, we are told that
Empire is
imperial but not imperialist, that the U.S. Constitution is imperial and not
imperialist. From this they deduce (and we learn) that the U.S.
Constitution is
imperial because (in contrast to imperialism's project always to spread its
power
linearly in closed spaces and invade, destroy and subsume subject countries
within
its sovereignty) "the U.S. constitutional project is constructed on the
model of
re-articulating an open space and reinventing incessantly diverse and
singular
networks across an unbounded terrain. The contemporary idea of Empire is
born
through the global expansion of the internal U.S. constitutional project"
(p. 182).
In other words!
, this celebration of Empire, is also a celebration of U.S.
constitutionalism (the
idea to be exact) which is a model for "democratizing" the Empire. The study
disposes of classes and class conflict as outdated and imprecise, and
substitutes
the notion of "biopolitical production multitudes" - a term which is never
clearly
delineated and is without any historical or empirical specificity. Apart
from
"multitudes" there are no designated agencies for the announced but
unspecified
"revolution". The program of this novel revolution is not very different
form that
embraced by welfare state social democrats.
Much has been written about the "sweep of the book, its theoretical
grandeur".
Frederic Jameson, Hardt's colleague at Duke, calls it "the first great new
theoretical synthesis of the new Millenium." Hyperbole aside, few of the
literary
reviewers have commented on the lack of historical and empirical evidence to
buttress their innumerable and unsubstantiated assertions.
The authors argue early on that the intellectual origins the U.S.
revolution can be
traced to Spinoza and Machiavelli. Rousseau and Locke are given short
shrift,
despite their greater immediate relevance. Extended and tendencious
discussions of
sovereignty are interspersed with reductionist assertions which collapse or
omit
numerous variations. For example, in their discussion of totalitarianism
and the nation-state they argue "If Nazi Germany is ideal type of the
transformation of
modern sovereignty into national sovereignty and of the articulation in its
capitalist form, Stalinist Russia is the ideal type of the transmission of
popular
interest and the cruel logics that follow from it into a project of national
modernization, mobilizing for its own purposes the productive forces that
yearn for
liberation from capitalism" (p.110). I have quoted extensively in order to
illustrate the confused, illogical, unhistorical nature of the author's
broad and
vacuous !
generalizations. What empirical or historical basis is there for claiming
Nazi
Germany is the "ideal type"? National sovereignty pre-existed the Nazis and
continues after its demise in non-totalitarian settings. If Stalin's Russian
embodied "popular interest" why should anyone seek to be liberated from it?
"Cruel
logic" of "popular interests" is stuff from the ancien regime - hardly the
basis for
orienting the "multitudes" which the writers describe to be the new
agencies for
democratizing the world.
The authors engage in what George Saboul once referred to as the "vacuum
cleaner"
approach to history: a little of ancient history, a smattering of exegesis
of
elementary political theory, a plus and minus evaluation of post-modernism,
a
celebration of U.S. constitutionalism, a brief synopsis of colonialism and
post-colonialism. These discursive forays provide an intellectual gloss for
the core
argument dealing with the contemporary world: the disappearance of
imperialism; the
obsolescence of imperial states, nation states (and boundaries) and the
ascendancy
of an ill-defined Empire, globalization, and supra-national governing
bodies,
apparently resembling the United Nations.
Let us start with Negri's and Hardt's (NH) assertion of the decline of the
nation or
imperial state. Their argument for a state-less empire exaggerates the
autonomy of
capital from the state and parrots the false propositions of the free market
ideologues who argue that the "world market" is supreme. Contrary to NH, in
the
contemporary world, the national state, in both its imperial and
neo-colonial form,
has expanded its activity. Far from being an anachronism, the state has
become a
central element in the world economy and within nation- states. However, the
activities of the state vary according to their class character and whether
they are
imperial or neo-colonial states.
In recent years the centrality of the imperial state has been evidenced in
fundamental areas of political-economic, cultural and economic activity that
buttress the position of the imperial powers, particularly the U.S.
Crisis Management
Over the past decade several major financial and economic crises have
occurred in
various regions of the world. In each instance, the imperial states,
particularly
the U.S. state, have intervened to save the MNC, and avoid the collapse of
financial
systems. For example, in 1994, when the Mexican financial system was on the
verge of
collapse, then President Clinton intervened to dispatch $20 billion to the
Mexican
state to bail out U.S. investors and stabilize the peso. In the second
instance,
during the Asian crisis of 1998, the U.S. and European governments approved
an
IMF-WB multi-billion dollar bail-out in exchange for opening their
economies,
particularly South Korea, to foreign take-overs of basic industries. In the
Brazilian crisis in 1999 and the Argentine crisis in 2001, Washington
pressured the
IFI's to bail-out the regimes. Within the U.S. the threatened bankruptcy of
a major
international investment bank, led to Federal Reserve (central bank) inte!
rvention, pressuring a private bank bail-out. In a word, with greater
frequency and
with greater resources the imperial state has played a dominant role in
crisis
management, saving major investors from bankruptcy, propping up insolvent
MNCs and
preventing the collapse of currencies. More than ever the MNCs and the
so-called
"global economy" depends on the constant massive intervention of imperial
states to
manage the crisis, and secure benefits (buy-outs of local enterprises).
Inter-imperialist Competition
The competition between rival imperial powers, economic enterprises and
MNC's has
been essentially spearheaded by rival imperial states. For example, the U.S.
imperial state is leading the fight to open European markets to U.S. beef,
and U.S.
exports of bananas from South and Central America, while the Japanese and
the
European states negotiate with the U.S. to increase the 'quota' on a series
of
exports, including steel, textiles, etc. Trade and markets are largely
defined by
state to state agreements 'Globalization' is not only a product of the
'growth of
the MNC', but largely an artifice of state to state agreements. The
competition
between capitals is mediated, influenced, and directed by the state. The
markets do
not transcend the state, but operate within state defined boundaries.
Conquest of Markets
The state plays a pervasive and profound role in the conquest of overseas
markets
and the protection of local markets. In the first instance, the state
provides
indirect and direct subsidies to export sectors. In the U.S., agricultural
exports
receive subsidized water and electrical power, and subsidies in the form of
tax
relief. Secondly, the imperial state, via the IFI, pressures loan recipient
states
in the Third World, through conditionality agreements, to lower or
eliminate trade
barriers, privatize and de-nationalize enterprises, thus permitting U.S.,
European
and Japanese MNCs to penetrate markets and buy local enterprises. So-called
"globalization" would not exist if it were not for state intervention, nor
would the
markets remain open if it were not for imperial state military and electoral
intervention, political-economic threats or pressure and recruitment of
local
clients.
Imperialism takes many forms, but pursues similar goals: the conquest of
markets,
the penetration of competitors and the protection of home markets. The U.S.
has an
elaborate set of trade barriers in a wide range of product areas of
strategic
importance: auto imports are limited by quotas, as are sugar, textiles,
steel, etc.
A multiplicity of non-traditional constraints and informal agreements limit
export
countries from entering U.S. markets -- all negotiated on a state to state
basis. In
many cases, in its dealings with neo-colonial regimes, like Brazil under
Cardoso,
the U.S. state rejects reciprocity, demanding and securing the
liberalization of the
information industry while restricting Brazilian steel exports, on the
bogus pretext
of "anti- dumping" charges.
Trade Agreements
All the major trade agreements, liberalizing trade and establishing new
trade
regulations are negotiated by the states, enforced by the states and
subject to
state modifications. GATT, WTO, Lome, etc., which established the trade
rules and
framework for global trading networks were formulated by the states. In
addition,
bi-lateral as well as regional multi-lateral trade pacts, such as NAFTA,
LAFTA, etc.
are initiated by the state to open new markets for the multi- nationals. The
imperial state operates in synergy with its multi-national corporation. The
"expansion in markets" has nothing to do with multi-national corporations
superseding anachronistic states: on the contrary, most movements of
capital to new
markets depend on the state intervening to knock down barriers and in some
cases
destabilizing nationalist regimes.
Investment Agreements
New multi-lateral as well as bi-lateral investment agreements are
formulated at the
state level with the agreement and active participation of the MNCs. The
reason is
clear: the MNCs want state participation to guarantee that their capital
will not be
expropriated, subject to "discriminatory" taxes, or restricted in remitting
profits.
The state is the enforcer of investment guarantees, a crucial element in
corporate
investment expansion. In many cases, the imperial states use their
representatives
in the IFI to impose new investment codes as conditions for 'stabilization'
or
development loans.
Protection, Subsidies and Adjudication
The imperial states of EU impose powerful protective barriers for their
agricultural
products. The U.S. and European states heavily subsidize agriculture with
low rates
for electricity and water use. Research and development of new technology
is heavily
financed by the state and then turned over to the multi-nationals. At each
stage
prior to, during and after the expansion of MNC overseas into the
international
market, the state is deeply implicated. Moreover, where national
enterprises are
non-competitive, the imperial states invent pretexts to protect them from
more
efficient producers. Japan protects its rice producers, even though their
production
is ten times more costly to consumers. The U.S. provides huge subsidies to
agro-business exporters in the form of research, cheap water rates and tied
loans to
the purchase of U.S. grain exports. EU subsidizes the formation of its high
tech
industries.
Statism or neo-statism is the centerpiece of 'global expansion' of MNCs,
located in
the imperial states. The state has grown, its reach has been expanded, its
role in
the international economy is essential. The empty rhetoric of 'free markets'
promoted by conservative ideologues has been consumed and parroted by the
"globalist
left". While NH write about the declining role of the state, the Right has
been
active in promoting state activity to further the interests of the MNC's.
While NH
write of the 'globalization' of markets, the MNC's from the imperial
countries and
their states carve up the markets, enlarging their spheres of domination and
control.
Above all the imperial state is not simply an economic institution; the
overseas
expansion of the MNCs is heavily dependent on the military and political
role of the
imperial state.
Expansion of Political and Military Power of the Imperial State
The overseas expansion of the MNCs has been made possible by the
military-political
expansion of Euro-American imperialism via NATO and surrogate armies in
Southern
Africa, Latin America, and Asia. In Russia and (the former USSR) and
Eastern Europe,
client regimes have been sponsored and supported by the imperial states,
laying the
groundwork for the take- over of a vast array of strategic industries,
energy
sources, etc. The U.S. imperial state's triumph over the USSR provided the
impetus
for dismantling the welfare states in Europe and what pretended to be a
welfare
state in the U.S. The Euro-American wars in the Gulf and Balkans
consolidated the
imperial states' dominance and extended their influence over dissident
states. The
de-stabilization of the former Communist regimes, the destructive wars
against
nationalist and socialist regimes in Southern Africa, Latin America and
elsewhere
opened these regimes to neo-liberal policy prescriptions. Military !
expansion was organized by state apparatuses which accompanied and promoted
MNC
overseas expansion.
So called globalization grew out of the barrel of a gun - an imperial state
gun. To
further protect overseas capital, the U.S. and the E.U. created a new NATO
doctrine
which legitimates offensive wars, outside of Europe against any country that
threatens vital economic interests (their MNCs). NATO has been expanded to
incorporate new client-states in Eastern Europe, and new "peace associates"
among
the Baltic states and the former republics of the USSR (Georgia, Kazakstan,
etc.).
In other words the imperial state military alliances incorporate more
states,
involving more state apparatuses than before - to ensure the safe passage of
Euro-U.S. MNCs into their countries and the easy flow of profits back to
their
headquarters in the U.S. and West Europe.
The State and the Mass Media
While the mass media and its political-cultural propaganda crosses more
borders than
ever, ownership and control is highly concentrated in the hands of U.S. and
European
MNCs. The message is increasingly homogenous, and the source and
inspiration is
closely coordinated with policymakers in Washington, Berlin, London, etc.
Global
flows, imperial controls - that is the essence of the mass media today. The
mass
media MNCs look to the imperial states and officials to set the political
line as is
explicitly stated during the Afghan War and define the parameters for
discussion,
while they reap the profits.
In conclusion the imperial states, far from being superceded by the overseas
expansion of capital, have grown and become essential components of the
world
political economy. NH concept of empire mystifies the role of the imperial
state,
thus undermining an essential adversary, in the front lines of the defense
of the
privileges and power of the MNCs.
Hardt and Negri base their argument about a state-less, class-less empire
without
imperialism on the notion of a world market dominated by multi-national
corporations
(MNC) which, they argue, "must eventually overcome imperialism and destroy
the
barriers between inside and outside." (p. 234) These "global" MNCs have
turned the
nations and imperial states into anachronisms.
NH provide no data on the internal organization of the MNCs, no analysis of
the
decision-making structure, no discussion of their relations to states.
Theorizing by
fiat is a convenient way of evading inconvenient empirical studies.
Essentially
Hardt and Negri's argument is based on six unsubstantiated assumptions.
Assumption 1: MNC are global corporations which have no specific location
in any
particular nation-state. They form a new world economy divorced from
national
controls and are part of a new world ruling class.
This assumption is based on the fact that large scale corporations operate
in a
number of countries, they are mobile and they have the power to evade taxes,
regulations in many national jurisdictions. There are several conceptual and
empirical problems with this assumption.
First, the fact that MNCs operate in many countries does not detract from
the fact
that the headquarters, where most of the strategic decisions, directors and
profits
are concentrated, are located in the U.S., E.U. and Japan.
Secondly, mobility is based on strategic decisions taken by directors in the
headquarters in the imperial centers. These decisions depend on the
political and
economic conditions created by the imperial state and its representatives
in the
IFIs. Mobility is contingent on inter- state relations.
Thirdly, evasion of taxes and regulations, is possible because of deliberate
policies in the imperial states and their multi-national banks.
Non-enforcement of
laws against transfers of illicit earnings from the neo-colonial countries
to the
imperial countries is a form of state activity favoring large scale
transfers of
wealth that strengthen external accounts. The MNCs' flouting of
neo-colonial state
regulations is part of a broader set of power relations anchored in the
imperial,
neo-colonial state relations.
Assumption 2: The old nation-state governments have been superseded by a
new world
government, made up of the heads of the IFI, the WTO, and the heads of the
MNCs (p.
326). This is an argument that is based on a superficial discussion of
epiphenomena,
rather than a deeper analytical view of the structure of power. While it is
true
that the IFIs make many important decisions in a great many geographical
locations
affecting significant economic and social sectors, these decisions and the
decision-makers are closely linked to the imperial states and the MNCs which
influence them. All top IFI officials are appointed by their
national/imperial
governments. All their crucial policy guide lines that dictate their loans
and
conditions for lending are set by the finance, treasury and economy
ministers of the
imperial states. The vast majority of funds for the IFIs come from the
imperial
states. Representation on the executive board of the IFI is based on the p!
roportion of funding by the imperial states. The IMF and the WB have always
been led
by individuals from the U.S. or E.U.
Hardt and Negri's vision of IFI power is based on a discussion of derived
power not
its imperial states source. In this sense, international power is based in
the
imperial states not on supra-national entities. The latter concept grossly
overestimates the autonomy of the IFIs and underestimates their
subordination to the
imperial states. The real significance of the IFIs is how they magnify,
extend and
deepen the power of the imperial states and how they become terrain for
competition
between rival imperial states. Far from superseding the old states, the
IFIs have
strengthened their positions.
Assumption 3: One of the common arguments of globalist theorists like Hardt
and
Negri is that an information revolution has taken place that has eliminated
state
borders, transformed capitalism and created a new epoch (p.145) by
providing a new
impetus to the development of the productive forces. The claims that
information
technologies have revolutionized economies and thus created a new global
economy in
which nation states and national economies have become superfluous is
extremely
dubious.
A comparison of productivity growth in the U.S. over the past half century
fails to
support the globalist argument. Between 1953-72, before the so-called
information
revolution in the U.S. productivity grew an average 2.5%; with the
introduction of
computers, productivity growth between 1973-95 was less than half. Even in
the
so-called boom period of 1995-99, productivity growth was 2.5% about the
same as the
pre-computer period. Japan which makes the most extensive use of computers
and
robots has witnessed a decade of stagnation and crises. During the year
2000-01, the
information sector went into a deep crises, tens of thousands were fired,
hundreds
of firms went bankrupt, stocks dropped in value some 80%. The speculative
bubble,
that defined the so-called information economy, burst. Moreover, the major
source of
growth of productivity claimed by the globalists was in the computerization
of the
area of computer manufacture. Studies have shown that computer!
use in offices is directed more toward personal use than to exchanging
ideas.
Estimates run up to 60% of computer time is spent in activity unrelated to
the
enterprise. Computer manufacturers account for 1.2% of the U.S. economy
and less
than 5% of capital stock.
Moreover, the U.S. population census provides another explanation for the
higher
productivity figures - the 5 million illegal immigrants who have flooded
the U.S.
labor market in the 1990s. Since productivity is measured by the output per
estimated worker, the 5 million uncounted workers inflate the productivity
data. If
the 5 million are included the productivity figures would deflate.
With the decline of the information economy and its stock valuations it
becomes
clear that the "information revolution" is not the transcendent force
defining the
economies of the major imperial states, let alone defining a new world
order. The
fact that most people have computers and browse, that some firms have
better control
over their inventories does not mean that power has shifted beyond the
nation-state.
The publicists' claims about the "information revolution" ring hollow, as
the
investors in the world stock markets move funds toward the real economy and
away
from the high tech firms which show no profits and increasing losses.
Assumption 4: Related to the prior assumption, globalists NH argue that we
are
living in a New Economy that has superseded the Old Economy, of
manufacturers,
mining, agriculture and social services (pp. 3-21). According to the
globalists the
'market' creates new efficiencies produced by the new technologies and
ensures high
growth. The recession of late 2000-2002 certainly refutes the claims of the
New
Economy ideologues: the business cycle continues to operate and, moreover,
the cycle
is particularly accentuated by the highly speculative nature of the 'New
Economy'.
As it turns out, the 'New Economy' demonstrates all the features of a
volatile
speculative economy, driven by exorbitant claims of high returns. In the
absence of
profits or even revenues, it turns out that much of what was touted as a
'New
Economy' was a colossal financial swindle, where the high returns to the
early
investors led to financial ruin to the later investors.
The "new efficiencies" promised did not overcome the logic of the capitalist
business cycle. "Just in time production" was premised on stable and
continuous
growth of demand. The recession of 2000-2002, the sudden decline in demand,
led to
an accumulation of inventories among producers and sellers, and the
resultant
lay-offs. Cash-flow problems, increased indebtedness and bankruptcies
characteristic
of the "Old Economy" reappeared with a vengence.
It is clear that the so-called "New Economy" does not transcend capitalist
crisis,
in fact it is more vulnerable and has fewer resources to fall back on since
most of
its cash flow depends on speculative expectations of continuous high
returns. The
sharp decline in commercial advertising earnings on the web sites and the
saturation
of the computer market has led to a structural crisis for both producers of
hardware
and software, leading to a giant shake-down in the 'industry' -- the
exorbitant
'paper value' of the stocks have tumbled to a fraction of their value and
the major
Internet companies are struggling to survive, let along define the nature
of a 'new
capitalist epoch'.
Assumption 5: Globalist theorists like NH write of an 'imperial system' as
opposed
to imperialist states -(preface), as if one could not exist without the
other. The
'system' has no 'center' since all states have lost their special
significance
before the all powerful MNC who dominate markets. Systems approaches fail to
recognize the class and institutional power of nationally owned and
directed banks
and industries. Even more fatal, the systems theorists fail to link the
structures,
operations, legal codes and linkages between imperial states, the multi-
national
corporations and their offspring in the IFI's and the vast reach of their
power and
concentration of profits, interest, rents and royalties in the imperialist
countries. The 'system' is derived from and is sustained by the combined
forces of
the imperial state and its MNCs. To abstract from the specificities of
ownership and
state power in order to describe an imperial system is to lose sigh!
t of the basic contradictions and conflicts, the inter-state imperial
rivalries and
the class struggles for state power.
Assumption 6: NH operate at such a level of abstraction in defining the
configurations of power that they obscure the most significant variations in
regimes, states, and class configurations. As a result, they do not have a
very
convincing conception of socio-economic change. Their concept of empire
resembles
the world system approach. Instead of core, semi-periphery and periphery,
they write
of "empire" and "multitudes." This type of simplistic abstract
stratification of the
world economy and power, subordinates the dynamic of class relations to a
static
distribution of market shares. The abstract categories obscure fundamental
differences in class interests between nations in each category,
differences that
determine how market shares are distributed, the ownership of property,
living
standards, as well as differences between dynamic an stagnant countries.
More
fundamentally, by looking at market positions, the NH overlook the ubiquity
of the
state !
in preserving and challenging the relationship between states and economies
and
reconfiguring the world economy.
The Myth of the Third Scientific Technological Revolution
N and H's second major argument is that we are living in a totally new
epoch. A new
capitalism thanks to the third scientific technological revolution (TSTR).
Detailed
empirical studies on the 1990s economy has effectively refuted the argument
that IT,
fiber optics and biotechnology inaugurated a "new epoch of capitalism" by
revolutionizing the forces of production.
Japan which early on "robotized" its factories and engineered and applied
many of
the new IT products has been stagnant (average growth of about 1 percent
for the
past 11 years) and entering a deep recession in 2001). The U.S.
manufacturing sector
has been in negative growth since the end of August 2000 and continues for
12
consecutive months - the longest period of negative growth on record since
the end
of the World War. The recession is expected to continue for an uncertain
period -
estimates run from 1 to 3 years. The IT growth rates were negative
throughout 2001.
The prospects for an early recovery are dim as negative savings rates, huge
deficits, a strong dollar inhibit domestic or export powered growth. As
structural
and cyclical crises coincide it is highly likely that the recession will
continue
for some time ahead. The recession totally undermines the IT ideologues who
declared
that the "New Economy" has made the business cycle obsolete. In fact, t!
he IT companies have been the hardest hit in the current downturn. Over 80
percent
of the dot.coms are not profitable.
Secondly, the IT economy today is less competitive and more concentrated
than ever,
where a few giants have survived and many have failed. While thousands of
dot.coms
went under, the top 5 IT companies retained their position among the top 10
rankings
world-wide.
The productivity revolution - growth of 2.5% - was based on a short
interval of four
year (1996-2000) and was followed by a decline in productivity to a
negative 1.2%
during the first quarter of 2001.
The multi-billion dollar investment in IT drained investment from more
productive
uses, led to vast overcapitalization in one sector that had low returns and
little
spill-over effects. Moreover, the biggest boost for IT came from the Y-2
scam - the
hype of a system breakdown, with the onset of the new Millenium. Hundreds of
billions were spent on IT between 1996 through 1999 to avoid a dubious
project with
virtually no long term effects. No serious critical evaluation and
comparative
analysis was conducted between countries like Russia, China, Finland and a
few
others which spent a fraction of what was spent in Europe and North America
on Y-2,
without suffering a "catastrophic breakdown." This raises the question of
whether
the IT bubble was itself an artifact of a massive promotional fraud. In any
case,
the data base for IT claims of a productivity revolution are extremely
limited and
problematical.
A recent study by Paul Strassman, a leading critic of IT ideologues, based
on a
study of 3,000 European companies demonstrates no relationship between
investment in
computers and profitability. Thus the three basic claims of the IT
revolution, that
it has put to rest the business cycle, has generated a sustained
productivity
revolution and produces high profits are not in accordance with reality. In
fact,
the irrationalities of capitalism have been amplified by the IT bubble: the
business
cycle operates in full force, productivity tends to stagnation and there is
a
tendency for the rate of profit to decline.
A recent article by Robert Gordon which analyzes the increase in
productivity
(between 1995-99) raises serious doubts about the claims of the Hardt and
Negri of a
"new epoch." He argues that almost 70% of the improvement in productivity
can be
accounted for by improved measurements of inflation (lower estimates of
inflation
necessarily mean higher growth of real output, thus productivity) and the
response
of productivity to the exceptionally rapid output growth of the 3 ½ year
period.
Thus, only 30% of the 1% increase in productivity (or .3%) during the
1995-99 period
can be attributed to computerization of the so-called "information
revolution",
hardly a revolution.
According to Gordon's longitudinal study of technical progress covering the
period
between 1950-1996, the period of maximum technical progress as manifested
in annual
multi factor productivity growth was in the period between 1950-64, when it
reached
approximately 1.8%. The period of lowest multi- factor productivity growth
in this
century was during 1988-96, approximately .5% growth (a half of one
percent)!
A recent detailed empirical study by McKinsey Global Institute demonstrates
that the
sharp improvement in economic performance of the U.S. economy between
1995-2000 was
accounted for by just a handful of business sectors and was not principally
the
result of the surge of investment in information technology. The study
demonstrates
that in most sectors of the economy large increases in IT investment did
not produce
any improvement in productivity ( ). The study provides data which shows
that 53
sectors representing 69% of the economy contributed just .3% productivity
growth.
These 53 sectors accounted for 62 percent of the acceleration in IT
spending. Many
of them even experienced productivity deceleration. Among the sectors which
showed
accelerated growth, IT was only one factor among many.
It is clear that the innovations in the early and middle 20th century were
far more
significant sources of economy-wide productivity improvement than the
electronic,
computerized information systems of the late 20th century.
Computer manufacturers account for 1.2% of the U.S. economy and only 2% of
capital
stock (1997). While corporations spend substantial amounts on computers it
is
largely to replace old ones. There is no evidence to back up the NH claims
of a "new
capitalist epoch".
The claim of Hardt and Negri of a new capitalist era has no basis in any
purported
Third Scientific Information Revolution.
Biotechnology industry, along with IT and optical fibers were seen as the
three
driving forces of the New Economy. The biotechnology industry is over a
quarter of a
century old and it has yet to deliver a consistent flow of new treatments
and
profits. According to Arthur Levinson, Chairman and Chief Executive of
Genetech, the
biggest and most successful of the biotech companies - "there has been no
revolution
in medicine in the past 25 years." According to another CEO from another
biotech
company, Kevin Sharer of Amgen, of the billions of dollars invested in the
sector,
only 63 new drugs have been brought on the market. Market analysts point
out that
just 25 of the U.S.'s 400 plus bio-pharmaceutical companies will make
money. Most
groups founded over a decade ago have yet to achieve profitability. Most
biotechnology groups of the 1980s no longer exist. All the promotional
publicity
surrounding human genome sequences currently attracting more billions are
lik!
ely to be disappointed according to Levinson. Like the IT scam, the biotech
revolution attracted billions of dollars, deflecting investment from
productive
uses, while leading many down the road of bankruptcy.
In the 1990s President Clinton and Western European leaders, investors and
academics
saw a bright future for optical fibers - the third force in the "new
capitalist
epoch." Between 1999-2000, over 100 million miles of optical fiber were
laid around
the world as companies spent $35 billion to build Internet inspired
communication
networks. Today only 5% of the fiber on the ground is "on", but the
astronomical
costs of lighting and delivering it to the end user has led to a dramatic
decline in
investment in the communications industry. As in biotech, the collapse has
had an
impact on the rest of the economy: billions invested in telecommunication
companies
appears to be wasted. The drying up of capital investment is one reason
that the
economy has come to a stop. The giants in communication equipment like
Lucent
Technologies and Nortel have reported losses in the billions, Nortel
announced a $19
billion loss in the first quarter of 2001. In the first half of 2!
001 companies defaulted on $13.9 billion of telecommunication bonds
resulting in
investor losses of $12.8 billion. Once again the Technical Scientific
Revolution
ended up bursting like a speculative bubble.
U.S. and European "global supremacy" is built on 3 unstable and
unsustainable legs.
On one leg it rests on a highly vulnerable and speculative sector prone to
great
volatility and entering into deep recession. The second leg is the high
level of
transfers of profits, interest payments and royalties from their respective
colonized areas. In the case of Latin America alone over $700 billion was
transferred as payments to Europe and U.S. banks and multi-nationals from
1990-98.
The third leg of the empire is political power (including the power to
print money
to cover deficits) and the security that Euro-U.S. states provide to foreign
nationals who transfer funds, including billions illicitly secured from
their home
countries. Political power and the security of the imperial states depend
on the
acquiescence or consent of strategic economic sectors who are vulnerable to
free
market competition by rival imperial and non-imperial countries. For
example,
because of!
the strong dollar, U.S. steel corporations are having a hard time
exporting goods
or even competing in the U.S. market.
The problem for Euro-U.S. rulers is how to manage their empires in the face
of a
growing recession, a deflated IT sector and rising unemployment in economic
sectors
which are not competitive in the world market.
The New Imperialism: Alternative to "Empire"
Neo-liberalism was always a myth: the imperial states have never completely
opened
their markets, eliminated all subsidies or failed to intervene to prop up
or protect
strategic economic sectors, either for political or social reasons.
Neo-liberal
imperialism always meant selective openness to selective countries over
specified
time periods in selective product areas. Markets were opened by the U.S.
government
to products produced by U.S. affiliates in overseas countries. "Free trade"
in the
imperial country was not based on economic but political criteria. On the
other hand
Euro-U.S. policymakers and their employees in the IMF-World Bank preached
"market
fundamentalism" to the Third World: elimination of all trade barriers,
subsidies and
regulations for all products and services in all sectors. Imperial states'
selective
free market practices allowed their multi-nationals to capitalize on market
opportunities in target countries practicing market fundam!
entalism while protecting domestic economic sectors which included important
political constituencies. Conflict erupted when the two imperial rivals,
the U.S.
and Europe (both selective free marketers) attempted to pry open the
others' markets
while protecting important political constituencies.
With the advent of the triple crises of recession, speculative collapse and
intensified competition, the imperial countries have resorted to greater
state
intervention in a multiplicity of sectors: increased agricultural and other
state
subsidies - $30 billion in the U.S. in 2001.; increased resort to
interfering in
trade to impose "quotas" on imports (Bush's commitment to the U.S. steel
industry)
and intensified exploitation of Third World regions to increase the flow of
profits,
interests and trading advantages (the U.S. "Free Trade of the Americas"
proposal)
and war, military Keynsianism - as in the US attack on Afghanistan.
State managed trade that combines protection of home markets and aggressive
intervention to secure monopoly market advantages and investment profits
defines the
content of neo-mercantilist imperialism. Neo-liberal imperialism with its
free
market rhetoric and selective opening of markets is being replaced by a
neo-mercantilism that looks toward greater monopolization of regional
trading zones,
greater unilateral political decisions to maximize trade advantages and
protection
of domestic producers and greater reliance on military strategies to deepen
control
over crises ridden neo-liberal economies run by discredited clients and to
increase
military Keynsianism.
Just as the U.S. was the leader in developing its neo-liberal empire and
Europe was
a follower region so with regard to the transition to a neo-mercantilist
empire the
U.S. plays a leading role.
In substance, if not in style, the transition to neo-mercantilism began
during the
Clinton regime and became the dominant strategy of empire building during
the Bush
Administration.
During the Clinton era, the U.S. "shared" the takeover of Latin America
markets and
enterprises with the Europeans. For example U.S. banks, energy and
telecommunication
companies competed with Spanish multi-nationals in the buyout of formerly
public
enterprises and national banks. The Clinton regime however, sought to weaken
European and Japanese competition by signing the North American Free Trade
treaty
which privileged U.S. business in Canada and Mexico. Washington's success in
monopolizing the Mexican market contrasted with the relative decline of its
share of
newly privatized Latin American enterprises and markets.
Clinton's proposal to extend U.S. monopoly control via Free Trade Area of
the
Americas (FTAA) was given greater impetus by the Bush Administration -
particularly
at the Quebec summit of the Americas in April of 2001. The purpose of FTAA
is to
privilege U.S. companies and exporters operating in Latin America while
restricting
Latin American access to U.S. markets. While FTAA is presented as a
reciprocal trade
doctrine, the Bush Administration refused to concede any concessions
regarding the
so-called anti-dumping regulations which are habitually evoked to restrict
entry of
competitive Latin products which would take market shares from U.S.
companies.
Moreover "reciprocity" is a meaningless concept when the two trading
regions have
such vast inequalities in productive capacity and size in many economic
sectors and
when infant industries are forced to compete with established giant
enterprises. In
these circumstances "reciprocity" becomes a formula for U.S. tak!
eovers and the bankruptcy of Latin American enterprises. As we have seen
U.S.
enterprises in banking, energy, telecommunications, mining, and transport
industries
have a massive advantage which they have used to displace Latin American
competitors. FTAA will decisively obliterate what remains of the Latin
American
national economies and impose an economic decision-making structure which
will be
centered in the headquarters of the U.S. multi-national banks and
corporations.
Equally important the U.S. state will dictate the rules and regulations
that govern
trade, investment and patent laws which will reign in the Americas. This
will enable
the U.S. government to be in a position to combine protectionism at home,
European
exclusion in Latin America and free markets in Latin America.
A clear example of the protectionist elements of the neo-mercantilist
empire is the
White House promises to protect U.S. steel plants from overseas
competition -
including Brazil. In the first week of June (2001) the Bush Administration
launched
action (a Section 201 investigation into "unfair trading practices") to
protect U.S.
steel producers from overseas competition. Both Donald Evans the U.S.
Commerce
Secretary and Robert Zoellick the U.S. Trade Representative publically
defended
state intervention to protect uncompetitive U.S. steel producers form
"unfair
trade". The real reason for loss of competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing
is the
strong dollar and the higher operating costs in the U.S. As the U.S.
National
Association of Manufacturers stated in a letter to the U.S. Treasury
Secretary [the
current levels of the exchange value of the dollar were] "having a strong
negative
impact on manufacturing exports, production and employment." The letter
noted !
the U.S. dollar had risen 27% since early 1997 thus "pricing products out
of markets
both at home and abroad."
The strong dollar however, is a favored strategy of the powerful financial
sector of
the U.S. and vital in maintaining the vast flow of overseas capital into
the U.S. to
finance the ballooning merchandise trade deficit.
Laundering illicit funds by major U.S. banks is an important source of
external
flows to the U.S. Estimates by a U.S. Senate subcommittee run from $250 to
$500
billion a year. Like the earlier mercantilist empire which depended in part
on
sharing the booty of its pirate predators the neo-mercantilist economy
thrives on
corrupt rulers who pillage their economies and transfer their illicit funds
to
Euro-American empires. The strong dollar is one of the attractions of
predators and
corrupt rulers. It is no surprise that the Bush Administration has
significantly
weakened its support for an international initiative tightening financial
regulation
to fight money laundering except for "terrorist" funds.
Mercantilist imperialism in which the imperial state combines protectionism
at home,
monopolies abroad and free trade within the empire is thus the chosen
strategy for
maintaining empire and sustaining domestic political support at a horrible
cost to
Latin America and to the dismay of its European competitors. In pursuit of
the
neo-mercantilist empire, Washington must increasingly rely on unilateral
decisions
and policymaking. By its monopolistic nature neo- mercantilism depends on
excluding
competitor allies and maximizing trade advantages via unilateral state
decisions.
The Bush Administration's unilateral rejection of the Kyoto agreement, its
unilateral decision to proceed with the new missile programs in violation of
existing agreements, its increased subsidies to U.S. agriculture, its
unilateral
declaration of war against Afghanistan and its attempt to accelerate the
FTAA are
examples of unilateralism at the service of neo- mercantilist empire
building.
The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington have led to Washington
carpet-
bombing of Afghanistan in the best imperialist traditions, Negri and Hardt,
notwithstanding, even as conditions on world markets deteriorate. The
alliance
building strategy particularly with the E.U. has not modified Washington's
pursuit
of hegemony. On the contrary, the alliance is built on E.U. subordination
to U.S.
military command and monopolization of all decisions pertaining to the war,
even to
a greater extent as was the case in Kosova. What is striking in the early
phases of
the U.S. military intervention is the degree to which its war demands were
totally
accepted by the E.U., Russia, China and some Middle Eastern Arab regimes
without any
explicit quid pro quo. Needless to say, the Afghan intervention and the
powerful
role of the imperial state in defining the issues, alliances and political
circumstances for market transactions hammers another nail in the coffin of
stat!
eless empires and strengthens the argument for a theory of a new
mercantilist style
of imperialism.
Mercantilism, with its heavy emphasis on monopoly profits, unilateral
action and
particularly state intervention to favor business interests against
external rivals
has historically been accompanied by armed conflicts and large military
expenditures. Contemporary neo- mercantilism is no exception. Accompanying
FTAA is a
major increase in U.S. military expenditures in Latin America, new military
bases,
the colonization of air space, shore lines, and rivers and estuaries. Plan
Colombia,
the Andean Initiative and related military expenditures to militarize the
frontiers
of Ecuador-Colombia and Panama-Colombia involves over $1.5 billion and
hundreds of
U.S. military operatives. The subcontracting of Latin American military
officials,
paramilitary forces and U.S. mercenaries is an integral part of the
protection and
expansion of neo-mercantilist empire-building. The was in Afghanistan has
led to
vast increases in military expenditures (100 billion), greater prote!
ctionism and military threats on all sides. Imperialism and Empire are
indeed doing
well - only the "multitudes" are suffering.
After reading "Empire" it is no surprise that reviewers for Time and The
New York
Times welcomed the book. "Empire" in line with general globaloney theory
argues that
globalization is a progressive movement in history as imperialism is
abolished by
intellectual fiat and the systemic alternatives are embodied by an amorphous
multitude which lacks any of the tools of analysis and political
organization
identified with contemporary revolutionary struggles. The book's citation
of potted
quotes from a sweeping array of thinkers provides the formal trappings for a
celebration of U.S. constitutionalism - at a time when its leaders are
bombing
Afghanistan into the stone age, after sending Iraq and Yugoslavia into the
iron age.
"Empire" is a sweeping synthesis of the intellectual froth about
globalization,
post-modernism, post-Marxism, all held together by a series of
unsubstantiated
arguments and assumptions which seriously violate economic and histori!
cal realities. "Empire's" thesis of post imperialism is not novel, it is
not a great
theory and it explains little of the real world. Rather it is a wordy
exercise
devoid of critical intelligence.
(*) Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000)

[Tovarish]

Scusa Pietro, ne esiste una traduzione italiana?
Se sì, da quale editore è pubblicato?

Ciao compagno!

[pietro]

Non penso comunque se la trovo la posto subito!

[Livio]

IMPERO O IMPERIALISMO?
La domanda di una interpretazione complessiva dei processi di globalizzazione sembrava aver trovato una risposta in Impero di Michael Hardt ed Antonio Negri, divenuto nel corso dell’estate scorsa un best seller internazionale. Il concetto di un impero unico, senza contraddizioni interne, che estende il suo dominio mondialmente, è stato però contraddetto dagli avvenimenti della guerra contro l’Iraq, che hanno dimostrato l’esistenza di profonde contrapposizioni tra i centri di espansione del capitale internazionale, in particolare tra il nocciolo duro franco-tedesco della UE e gli USA, riproponendo l’attualità di una lettura basata sulla “desueta” categoria leninista di imperialismo. Malgrado ciò, di recente Hardt ha ribadito che non si possono riproporre schemi di interpretazione che andavano bene per i secoli scorsi e che va individuato quanto c’è di nuovo, ignorando nella maniera più categorica i contrasti interni all’impero, niente di più che mere diatribe.
Ma che cosa è per Hardt il nuovo? Questo “…è da identificare nella struttura a rete e nell’estensione globale, transnazionale dell’impero.”1 e nonostante gli USA esercitino una supremazia “E’ tuttavia anche vero che questa configurazione a rete esige che tutti i suoi nodi operino in sinergia. Gli USA (…) si trovano costretti ad operare in concerto con entità sovrannazionali come le multinazionali, il Fondo monetario internazionale o la Banca mondiale.”2 Quel che Hardt sembra ignorare è che le multinazionali con cui gli USA agiscono di concerto sono quelle americane, specialmente quando ci sono le riserve petrolifere irakene da sfruttare ed i contratti per la ricostruzione da assegnare e che FMI e banca mondiale sono largamente egemonizzati dagli USA. Del resto, la difesa degli interessi francesi e russi in Irak è stata portata avanti dai rispettivi Stati nazionali, quegli organismi che in Impero si giudicano come residuati del passato. La realtà è che non solo gli Stati esistono e costituiscono gruppi in competizione tra di loro, come dimostra l’oggettiva alleanza, in opposizione agli USA, tra l’asse franco-tedesco e la Russia, con la Cina per ora in posizione defilata, ma stanno anche attraversando una fase di rafforzamento dei loro apparati sia militari che civili. Quella che va individuata è la distinzione tra Stati deboli e disgregati e Stati forti e disgreganti, per l’appunto gli Stati imperialisti. Lo stesso apparentemente egemone neoliberismo è stato applicato in forma integrale soltanto in paesi subordinati come l’Argentina, di fatto disgregata e depredata dai vari imperialismi. Al contrario, diversi paesi imperialisti, come gli USA, già paladini del neoliberismo, non hanno disdegnato l’intervento diretto dello Stato nell’economia attraverso il protezionismo, gli alti dazi doganali, ed il sussidio ad interi settori industriali. Da ciò sono derivate vere guerre commerciali, che, però, mal si conciliano con l’ideale negriano di uno “... spazio liscio su cui possono correre flussi non codificati e deterritorializzati”3, in contrapposizione ad uno spazio striato dove i capitali sono canalizzati e codificati, tipico del “vecchio” imperialismo.
A ben vedere, il concetto di Impero appare come la riedizione della vecchia teoria kautskiana del super-imperialismo (1915), secondo cui la lotta tra capitali finanziari nazionali viene sostituita dallo sfruttamento generale del mondo da parte del capitale finanziario unificato in unico grande trust. Nella versione corrente, tale teoria viene aggiornata, combinandola con la più recente teoria delle reti, mutuata dalla realtà organizzativa delle grandi imprese capitalistiche, senza considerare come in queste le reti non siano altro che l’articolazione territoriale di centri dirigenti molto forti e gerarchizzati.
L’elemento di fondo, rispecchiato dalla contrapposizione degli Stati, che impedisce la realizzazione di un super-imperialismo, è la natura stessa del modo di produzione capitalistico, caratterizzato dalla non uniformità dello sviluppo economico delle sue varie frazioni. Una crescita equilibrata è, dunque, impossibile sia al livello delle singole aziende, sia a quello dei singoli Stati. Ciò che vediamo nei vari settori industriali, dove aziende più dinamiche soppiantano e mettono fuori mercato altre aziende, magari assorbendole, avviene anche al livello degli Stati e, dal momento che i rapporti di forza economici mutano continuamente, l’equilibro del sistema risulta necessariamente instabile. Quando questo si spezza, deve essere ricomposto o mediante le crisi come nell’industria oppure mediante la guerra su di un piano più generale e politico. Ne è dimostrazione la storia del XX secolo, nel corso della quale la leadership economica dell’Inghilterra fu messa in discussione dallo sviluppo industriale incomparabilmente più veloce della Germania, portando così allo scoppio della I guerra mondiale. Questo scontro, giunto a conclusione con la fine del II conflitto mondiale, doveva vedere, invece, il prevalere di un altro imperialismo emergente, quello statunitense, sviluppatosi a ritmi ancora più sostenuti, che, scalzato ogni altro concorrente, ha mantenendo per mezzo secolo una leadership economica, che oggi appare incrinarsi seriamente, a favore di altre frazioni del capitale internazionale più dinamiche.
Fu dall’osservazione di quanto stava accadendo all’inizio del ‘900 che Lenin elaborò la categoria di Imperialismo. In realtà, il termine di imperialismo si affermò alla fine degli anni ‘70 del secolo scorso per descrivere la politica espansionista del governo britannico di Disraeli. Il nesso tra economia e politiche espansive venne esplicitato per primo dal fabiano Hobson, che rintracciò le cause dell’imperialismo nella necessità di trovare sbocco all’eccesso di capitale e di merci, prodottosi a causa della ineguale distribuzione del reddito tra le varie classi sociali. In questo senso l’imperialismo, anziché essere necessaria conseguenza dello sviluppo del capitale in senso monopolistico, veniva attributo alle scelte soggettive dei circoli economici britannici dominanti.
Differentemente, la categoria leninista di imperialismo – illustrata nell’opuscolo popolare L’imperialismo, edito nel 1916 - non è meramente riconducibile ad un aggregato di politiche espansionistiche, né ad una politica facoltativa che si può fare o non fare, ma fa riferimento ad un tutto organico. L’imperialismo non è una politica di aggressione o militaristica, bensì è una determinata formazione economico-sociale, ovvero la concretizzazione, in un dato momento storico, dei rapporti di produzione e sociali capitalistici. A questa forma economica corrisponde un sistema di relazioni internazionali in cui ci sono paesi periferici, dal punto di vista dello sviluppo capitalistico, e paesi centrali o imperialisti, in lotta tra di loro per la spartizione dei mercati e delle risorse e che presentano caratteristiche specifiche nella loro struttura economica e sociale.
L’imperialismo è definito dalla concentrazione della proprietà dei mezzi di produzione in poche mani attraverso la formazione di monopoli, dalla connessione tra banca ed industria, che forma il capitale finanziario come settore dominante del capitale complessivo, dal prevalere dell’esportazione di capitali su quella di merci, e dalla spartizione del mondo sia al livello dei vari complessi capitalistici sia al livello delle varie potenze. L’elaborazione leninista è in realtà uno sviluppo dell’analisi di Marx, che identificava, come principali conseguenze dello sviluppo capitalistico delle forze produttive e del suo procedere attraverso cicliche crisi di sovrapproduzione, la concentrazione della proprietà in mani sempre più ristrette e la spinta verso l’espansione degli investimenti di capitale all’estero, che avrebbe condotto alla creazione di un mercato capitalistico mondiale.
La realtà degli ultimi 10-15 anni non solo conferma la prevalenza degli elementi imperialistici, ma ne rivela persino un accrescimento, in discontinuità col rallentamento subito nella seconda metà del ‘900. Tale ripresa si intreccia, condizionandolo, al virtuale completamento del processo di globalizzazione, arrestatosi proprio a ridosso del primo conflitto mondiale. Forse è per questo che gli autori di Impero commettono un errore prospettico, concentrandosi esclusivamente sulla globalizzazione, ovvero sulla estensione dei rapporti di produzione capitalistici a livello mondiale, ed ignorando le specifiche condizioni della competizione imperialistica in cui viene attuata, conseguenza inevitabile della non uniformità del processo generale di sviluppo.
Domenico Moro

Nota bibliografica

1: M. Hardt, La guerra dell’impero è verticale. La pace è una rete globale, “Carta”, n.8 6/12 marzo 2003, p.34
2: ibidem
3: M. Hardt, A. Negri, Impero, Rizzoli, Bergamo 2002, p. 309