Iraqi resistance forces continue to advance down the Euphrates towards Baghdad
IraqWar
October 17, 2004 - According to the Iraq resistance report of October 13-15 ( http://www.uruknet.info/?p=6352&hd=0&size=1&l=x ) , the resistance is pounding the US and puppet occupation forces on a 350-km front along the Euphrates, stretching west from Baghdad to Syria through the towns of Falluja, Ramadi, Hit, Rawah, 'Anah, and al-Qaim. The Iraqi partisans appear to be operating in military formations complete with rocket artillery and short-range antiaircraft batteries.
At al-Qaim, near the Syrian border, a US base was destroyed by heavy mortar and rocket fire on October 5-6 and partisans overran the "Iraqi National Guard" base on Monday, October 11 ( http://www.jihadunspun.com/intheatre_internal.php? ... ). Partisans infiltrated the base with the help of the so-called "National Guard," even driving in with some of the puppet forces' own Humvees to machine-gun the enemy. The town was essentially cleared of US and puppet occupation forces early Wednesday. Iraqi partisan units at al-Qaim then began moving east towards Rawah and 'Anah, aiming eventually to link up with those further west at Hit. Thsi suggests that partisan units will advance along the Euphrates cleaning up occupation forces and finally march on Baghdad.
At Hit, mid-way between the Syrian border and Baghdad, partisan forces battered US units in fierce fighting that raged through Monday night. 40 Marines were killed, 4 CIA operatives and 6 Marines were captured. Partisans admitted to losing 25 men and scores of civilians were killed when the US called in punitive airstrikes using cluster weapons. Thousands of bomblets were spread over the area, ensuring continued casualties among civilians in the weeks ahead. Despite sustained air strikes, Iraqi partisans remained in control of the town and continued to inflict heavy losses: 31 Marines killed and 4 Bradleys, an APC, and 2 Humvees destroyed on Wednesday alone, against 10 Partisans killed. The Mafkarat al-Islam correspondent reported that the partisan force at Hit also controlled Rawah and 'Anah, where the detachment from al-Qaim was expected.
At Ramadi, between Hit and Falluja, partisans weren't as successful as elsewhere, according to the islammemo.cc reports. 4 Marines were captured on October 5, the Marine HQ was attacked with 82mm mortars on the 8th and an urban battle erupted on Saturday the 12th, but the Marines responded swiftly, brutally, and with precision, taking a heavy toll both on resistance forces and on civilians.
Marine and supply convoys on the road along the Euphrates linking these towns were regularly attacked and destroyed. US logistics were once again exposed to withering attacks that must be depriving front-line units of supplies, fuel, and ammunition (although no first-hand reports are available). No lessons have been learned since the invasion, as the following story illustrates:
Army admits invasion plagued by snafus
David Zucchino, Los Angeles Times
Saturday, July 3, 2004
American soldiers who defeated the Iraqi regime 15 months ago received virtually none of the critical spare parts they needed to keep their tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles running. They ran chronically short of food, water and ammunition. Their radios often failed them. Their medics had to forage for medical supplies; artillery gunners had to cannibalize parts from captured Iraqi guns, and intelligence units provided little useful information about the enemy.
These revelations come not from embedded reporters or congressional committees but from the Army itself. In the first internal assessment of the war in Iraq, an exhaustive Army study has concluded that U.S. forces prevailed despite supply and logistical failures, poor intelligence, communication breakdowns and futile attempts at psychological warfare.
(...)
Within the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), which spearheaded the U.S. assault on Baghdad, "literally every maneuver battalion commander asserted that he could not have continued offensive operations for another two weeks without some spare parts," the study said.
(...)
The study, by the Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group at Fort Leavenworth, called ammunition re-supply problematic and said the medical supply system "failed to work." Engineers desperate for explosives foraged for abandoned Iraqi explosives and tore apart mine-clearing charges to use the explosives to blow up captured Iraqi equipment.
Many soldiers plunged into combat not knowing whether they had enough food or water to sustain themselves in punishing heat and blinding sandstorms. "Stocks of food barely met demand," the study said. "There were times when the supply system was incapable of providing sufficient MREs (meals ready to eat) for the soldiers fighting Iraqi forces."
Military intelligence provided little useful information about the deployment or intentions of Iraqi forces, the study concluded.
Most significantly, military planners did not anticipate the effectiveness or ferocity of paramilitary forces that disrupted supply columns and mounted suicide charges against 70-ton Abrams tanks. Some of those same forces, using tactics refined during the invasion, are part of the current insurgency.
The logistics crisis seems just as bad as, if not worse than, during the invasion, as withnessed by the mutiny of a supply platoon of the 34rd Quartermaster Company ( http://www.marinetimes.com/print.php?f=1-292925-45 ... )that refused to deliver fuel and water to Taji airbase just north of Baghdad from Talil in the south, over a route that would take them through Al-Latifiyah, where resistance activity continues to inflict massive casualties on US forces. The convoy was ordered to proceed without its usual armed escort of Humvees and helicopters, since all available ones were being used to save front-line units under attack. Similarly, the Chicago Tribune reported ( http://www.chicagotribune.com/servic...ered.intercept ) the desperate situation at the main US support base, the 14-sq-mile logistics supply area called Anaconda at Balad, northwest of Baghdad, mid-way between Baghdad and Tikrit. The base is under constant mortar attack because the 1st infantry division that is supposed to secure the perimeter is tied up fighting the resistance at Samarra.
At Falluja, the 1000-strong Marine force with heavy air support continued to snipe at and bombard the civilian population, cutting off refugees trying to escape the bloodbath with what it called a "dynamic cordon," ( http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6095119/print/1/displa ... ) i.e. ad hoc roadblocks whenever aerial reconnaissance spots someone on a road. Calling it a "cordon" was obviously helpful to the corporate yellow media that is trying to paint a picture of a force of 1000 "encircling" a city of 200,000 while being attacked at the same time from the rear. The Associated Press preferred instead to say that the Marines "loosened" the cordon ( http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=stor...iraq&printer=1 ). The Falluja Marines were practically cut off from Baghdad by intense resistance activity in al-Yusufiyah and al-Latifiyah, where US units attempting to link up with Falluja continue to suffer heavy losses in countless engagements.
As the "coalition of the willing" is breaking up, Tony Blair has caved to US pressure ( http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=60643 ... ) and agreed to send the crack Black Watch regiment with 56 Warrior armored vehicles to Iraq. This won't help the US to "free units for the Falluja assault," as reported by the yellow media, but will merely plug the holes left by the departing Sapnish units and US combat losses. In any case, it's not clear that the Black Watch can arrive in Iraq before the Iraqi resistance retakes Baghdad.
Recent announcements from both US and Baathist sources indicate that this front of the Iraqi theater is under the control of Baath commanders, the chief of staff being Mohammed Younis al-Ahmed, and the GHQ being in Syria:
Sources have told The Observer that Younis al-Ahmed - who has had a $1 million price tag placed on his head by the US - is one of between 20 and 50 senior Baath party figures based in Syria who, they believe, are involved in organising the guerrilla war against the US-led multi-national forces in Iraq and against the new Iraqi security forces.
The naming of Ahmed comes amid growing concern that hardline factions in Syria are providing protection for cells still loyal to the old Iraqi regime who were involved in organising the flow of money, people and material for fighters in Baghdad and the Sunni triangle. This is despite Syrian moves to tighten up its border with Iraq after complaints from Washington and London that arms and foreign terrorists were crossing into Iraq.
The intelligence officials believe the activities of the Syrian-based former regime members - who quickly formed into cells after the fall of Saddam - may be a considerably more significant threat to the interim government of Ayad Allawi than the more widely visible activities of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who has been behind a series of beheadings and suicide bombings.
Before the $1m bounty was placed on his head, Ahmed, also known as 'Khadr al-Sabahi', had been travelling between Syria and the Sunni triangle to direct fighting and disburse funds. More recently, however, say sources, he has remained in Syria, choosing not to risk capture by crossing the border.
The naming of Ahmed, and the allegation that he is basing himself permanently in Syria, seems designed to pressure the Syrian authorities to clamp down on the activities of ex-regime officials operating there.
Little is known about Ahmed save that he was a senior regional Baath party organiser with links to Saddam's feared internal intelligence service, and there is some suggestion he may have received training in Moscow at some point.
'The main organisational strength behind the insurgency is Baathist military intelligence types who enjoy safe refuge in Syria,' said one official. 'So although Syria has clamped down on the border, they have not done anything about the planners and organisers. We are talking about 20-50 people who have access to funds, who know how to organise and use existing networks and are adept at reforming into cells.'
Source: "Saddam aide in exile heads list of most wanted rebels," The Observer, October 17, 2004: http://www.uruknet.info/?p=6404&hd=0&size=1&l=x
A statement from a Baathist source corroborates this:
An Interview with A Leader Of The Baath and Resistance : http://www.uruknet.info/?p=6399&hd=0&size=1&l=x
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- It not out of bravado or out of pretension to say that the Iraqi Resistance is the legitimate daughter of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, and the principal element of this heroic Resistance is composed of Baath militants and Iraqi Army elements, Republican Guards, Security services, Saddam's Fidayyins and Alquds army. All these components as everyone knows refer to one political leadership, i.e. that of the Arab Baath Socialist Party. This is what our people knows, and this what the enemy of our people knows too. And because we don't want to occupy the whole scene, let's say there are other currents and organizations, which entered the Resistance battlefield through the gateway of the Baath. Yes there are national, Islamic and progressive forces, which fight with us in the great Liberation Battle. For these groups, we provide arms and training, funding, protection and data. We acted and we still do and from the very first day of the aggression to widen the circle of the popular and frontal participation in the Resistance field. A large national and unified Front exists fighting a sacred Battle for the freedom and the independence of Iraq.
Why don't you declare responsibilities for the military operations against occupying forces?
- We realized from the very beginning that this kind of political information could perturb the Resistance and facilitate the enemy effort to penetrate it. Thus our clear decision was not to waste time in this media game. Our objective is to get the enemy to endure the most losses possible and to hurt him in the objective to free the Land from the filth of Occupation. A year and a half later, it shows for the others and us that our position was correct. This has added more confusion into the ranks of the enemy, and deprived him from getting the data in spite all the powerful intelligence in his possession.
The most important conclusion that emerges from this information is that what is termed the "Sunni insurgency" is in all probability a Baathist strategy to retake Baghdad before the US-sponsored elections, thus allowing the predominantly Sunni Baathist cadre to avoid being swept aside by the Shia majority.
The interviewee also take pains to point out that while the Baath is the vanguard of the resistance, it also welcomes Wahhabi or Shiite groups like Tawhid wal-Jihad and the Mahdi Army, providing their motivations are patriotic ones. This is a continuation of Saddam's prewar outreach policy and as such bodes well for a post-liberation Baath restoration, although it will necessarily be something less than a parliamentary democracy.
http://iraqwar.mirror-world.ru/tiki-read_article.p ...




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