Arsenale Nucleare Italiano

[Italiano]

ci manca solo il nucleare così dopo gli usa veranno a democratizzarci.
ahhahahah

Sono già venuti a democratizzarci...nel 1943 e non mi risulta che se ne siano mai andati...

[ART]

Ho letto che di fronte alla possibile rottura del tabù sull'uso dell'atomica da parte degli USA e dall'aumento degli stati nucleari (vedi Iran), Germania e Giappone stanno facendo qualche pensierino sull'arma nucleare e anche alcuni paesi in via di sviluppo (vedi Brasile) ci stanno pensando.

Se la proliferazione nucleare diventasse incontrollabile, l'Italia potrebbe dotarsi di un arsenale atomico proprio (non le bombe USA in italia) per autodifesa? Abbiamo le capacità tecnologiche per produrre testate e missili balistici? Ci verrebbe permesso dagli americani di essere dispensati da un trattato di resa ormai vecchio di 60 anni?

Secondo voi?

La Germania non sta pensando niente del genere, il brasile ha abbandonato i programmi nucleari circa 20 anni fa e niente, almeno per ora, lascia presagire a un ripensamento.

Quanto all'ultimo punto è perfettamente inutile stare a parlarne: soltanto in un libro di fantapolitica l'Italia si potrebbe dotare di armi nucleari se anche i governi di destra si mettono a massacrare il ministero della difesa.

[Lorenzo]

Quoto ART, la situazione è proprio questa.

Miles Insulae

[Lorenzo]

Sul nucleare brasiliano:

Brazil pursued a covert nuclear weapons program in response to Argentina's program. It developed a modest nuclear power program, enrichment facilities (including a large ultracentrifuge enrichment plant and several laboratory-scale facilities), a limited reprocessing capability, a missile program, a uranium mining and processing industry, and fuel fabrication facilities. Brazil was supplied with nuclear materials and equipment by France (which supplied reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities) and the US. The country has a dependable raw material base for developing atomic power engineering, highly skilled scientific cadres have been trained, technologies for enriching uranium have been obtained, and there are several nuclear research centers.

Brazil's nuclear capabilities are the most advanced in Latin America; only Argentina has provided serious competition. Brazil has one nuclear power plant in operation (Angra I) and two under construction (Angra II and III). Its nuclear-enrichment program is multifaceted, with the military services involved in separate projects: the navy, centrifuge enrichment; the air force, laser enrichment; and the army, gas graphite enrichment.

The history of Brazil's nuclear programs can be traced back to the early 1930s, with the initial research in nuclear fission. Much of that early research was conducted at the USP (University of São Paulo), some by scientists who had been contracted from abroad. By the mid-1930s, Brazil had discovered vast deposits of uranium. In 1940 President Getúlio Vargas signed an agreement with the United States for cooperative mining, including mining for uranium and monazite. During the 1940s, Brazil signed three additional agreements with the United States. In exchange for monazite, the United States transferred nuclear technology.

President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-61), a pro-Vargas politician, sought to develop indigenous nuclear capabilities by appointing a Congressional Investigating Committee (Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito--CPI) to examine United States nuclear ties with Brazil. The CPI urged Brazil to adopt an independent nuclear posture. As a result, Kubitschek in 1956 created the IPEN (Institute for Energy and Nuclear Research). Kubitschek's successor, Jânio Quadros (president, January-August 1961), continued the independent nuclear policy, which was based on natural uranium, as did his successor, João Goulart (president, 1961-64).

As part of that independent nuclear policy, the CNEN (National Nuclear Energy Commission) was created formally on August 27, 1962. The CNEN is under the direct control of the Strategic Affairs Secretariat (Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos--SAE) of the Brazilian presidency. According to the 1988 constitution, the CNEN is responsible for the orientation, planning, supervision, and control of Brazil's nuclear programs.

Despite Brazil's search for autonomy in the nuclear sphere, it continued to receive technical assistance from the United States. In 1957 Brazil built the first of two nuclear research reactors in São Paulo, with United States support under the Atoms for Peace Program. That program had its origins in the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration (1953-61). Under the program, the United States agreed to share nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, but retained ultimate control over the processes. A second reactor was developed in Belo Horizonte in 1960. In 1965 Brazil built its first indigenous research reactor in Rio de Janeiro. The United States supplied the medium-grade enriched uranium for the reactor.

Based on the success of these research reactors, plans were made for a nuclear reactor to produce electricity. In 1968 the CNEN and Eletrobrás were tasked with building a nuclear power plant at Angra dos Reis, Rio de Janeiro State. Three years later, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation agreed to supply the technology for the power plant, and construction of Angra I began. However, Brazilian authorities were dissatisfied with the Westinghouse accord, because it barred the transfer of United States nuclear technology to Brazil, made Brazil dependent on United States uranium for the reactor, and required that all Brazilian nuclear facilities be safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Many experts have questioned the cost-effectiveness of Brazil's nuclear power plants. The Angra I power plant cost US$2 billion to build, and it began to operate commercially in 1983. When Angra I is in full operation, it produces 20 percent of the electricity used in the city of Rio de Janeiro. From 1985 through 1993, however, Angra I was turned off more than thirty times because of technical problems and legal challenges, earning it the nickname "firefly." Furnas Electric Power Plants, Inc. (Furnas Centrais Elétricas S.A.--Furnas), the state company that administers Angra 1, lost US$100 million in operating costs in 1993 alone because the plant was closed down most of the year. The plant is expected to be torn down in 2009, at a cost of US$200 million.

Angra II, under construction since 1977, was projected to be ready by 1993, but in early 1996 its completion date was still uncertain. The construction of Angra II had cost at least US$4.6 billion through 1993, and it was estimated that at least an additional US$l.5 billion would be necessary to complete the project. Various experts projected that the total cost of the plant construction would exceed US$10 billion. Still in its early phases of construction, Angra III cost US$1 billion through 1993. On October 18, 1994, President Itamar Franco (1992-94) requested that US$400 million in funding that had been allocated to Angra III be transferred to Angra II. Given the severe budget constraints, the construction of Angra III and additional power plants appear doubtful.

Within Brazil's Congress, a CPI looked into the Parallel Program. Members visited numerous facilities, including the Institute of Advanced Studies (Instituto de Estudos Avançados--IEAv) at the Aerospace Technical Center (Centro Técnico Aeroespacial--CTA) in São José dos Campos. They also interviewed key players in the nuclear program, such as João Figueiredo (president, 1979-85) and retired Army General Danilo Venturini, the former head of the National Security Council (Conselho de Segurança Nacional--CSN) under Figueiredo. The CPI investigation exposed secret bank accounts, code-named "Delta," which were managed by the CNEN and used for funding the program. The most disturbing revelation in the CPI report was that the IEAv had designed two atomic bomb devices, one with a yield of twenty to thirty kilotons and a second with a yield of twelve kilotons. It was also revealed that Brazil's military regime secretly exported eight tons of uranium to Iraq in 1981.

Through a series of agreements, Brazil and Argentina have defused the issue of nuclear rivalry. On May 20, 1980, while under military rule, both countries signed the Brazilian-Argentine Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, establishing technical cooperation in developing the nuclear fuel cycle and coordination of nuclear policy. President Sarney and Argentine president Raúl Alfonsín strengthened this cooperation in 1985, with the Joint Declarations on Nuclear Policy of Foz do Iguaçu. After the 1985 agreement, the presidents and technical staffs made reciprocal visits to nonsafeguarded nuclear installations in both countries. The heads of state made subsequent joint declarations in Brasília (1986); Viedma, Argentina (1987); Iperó, Brazil (1988); and Buenos Aires (1990).

The most important nuclear accord between Brazil and Argentina was signed on December 13, 1991, in a meeting attended by Presidents Collor de Mello and Menem at the headquarters of the IAEA in Vienna. The accord is referred to as the quadripartite agreement, because it was signed by Brazil, Argentina, the IAEA, and the ABACC. The agreement allows for full-scope IAEA safeguards of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear installations. It also allows the two countries to retain full rights over any "technological secrets" and to develop nuclear energy for the propulsion of submarines. Brazil's Senate ratified the agreement on February 9, 1994, but only after considerable pressure by Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty).

Brazil's nuclear programs have experienced severe financial constraints since 1990, when Collor de Mello was president. The Aramar Experimental Center dismissed 700 of its 1,600 employees between August 1994 and March 1995. The completion date for the navy's nuclear-powered submarine was postponed several times, from 1995 to 2010. Until 1995 that project had cost an estimated US$1 billion. The submarine program, rarely scrutinized in the past, was the subject of scathing criticism by Veja, the leading weekly news magazine, in December 1994. The magazine raised allegations of corruption and exposed technical difficulties with the program.

Despite such financial and technical hurdles, it is likely that Brazil will continue to fund efforts to develop more autonomous nuclear programs. Indeed, the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (president, 1995- ) in mid-1995 placed a high priority on completing the Angra II nuclear power plant. Such programs will be pursued in a more open environment, given the many bilateral and multilateral nuclear accords signed by Brazil.

Miles Insulae

[Lorenzo]

Sul nucleare argentino:

Argentina pursued a covert nuclear weapons program for many years, refused to accede to the NPT, and did not sign the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty). A gaseous diffusion enrichment plant was built. Construction of reprocessing facilities was pursued for some years, but was suspended in 1990. A number of sites and facilities were developed for uranium mining, milling, and conversion, and for fuel fabrication. A missile development program was pursued for some years. Argentina's nuclear program was supported by a number of countries: power reactors were supplied by Canada and West Germany, a heavy water plant was supplied by Switzerland, and the Soviet Union was another supplier of nuclear equipment. Hot cells operated from 1969-1972, with no international safeguards; figures on the amount of spent fuel treated in the hot cells vary greatly.

In 1992 Argentina constructed with Brazil a bilateral arrangement to place both countries' nuclear material and facilities under their mutual supervision, and signed along with Brazil a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. On 24 March 1993 the Argentine Senate ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, moving Argentina one step closer to becoming the 25th country to join the 1967 agreement calling for a nuclear-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean.


In February 1995 Argentina acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. The European Union said that Argentina's accession to the NPT confirms its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, already demonstrated by the quadripartite agreement on nuclear safeguards concluded among Argentina, Brazil, ABACC (Argentinean-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control) and IAEA, and by the Treaty of Tlateloco.

Miles Insulae