Wayne Madsen l'ex agente della NSA (Agenzia Nazionale Sicurezza USA) ipotizza CON ARGOMENTAZIONI STRINGENTI CHE IL POSTO DI BLOCCO SAPEVA BENISSIMO CHI SI TROVAVA DI FRONTE AL MOMENTO DELLA SPARATORIA.
Tutti i cellulari di Bagdad sono controllati dalle agenzie di spionaggio USA. Così pure era per il cellulare di Calipari, attraverso il cui controllo i comandi militari sapevano in ogni momento dove si trovasse il maggiore Calipari.
E' solo un'ipotesi ma del tutto verosimile.
The Calipari Slaying and the Cell Phone Diversion
One example of how poor management at NSA has affected the ability of U.S. intelligence to protect American and Allied personnel in combat zones is the slaying in Baghdad by U.S. troops of the number two man in the Italian military intelligence service—SISMI—Major General Nicola Calipari.
Accompanying freed Italian journalist hostage Giuliana Sgrena by car to Baghdad Airport after her liberation from Iraqi captors, Calipari was shot to death by troops of the 69th Infantry Regiment of the New York National Guard while talking to his superiors on his cell phone. The report issued by the United States that cleared the American troops of any responsibility for the killing of Calipari and wounding of Sgrena states that "Route Irish [the main access road to the airport] [is] a lucrative target area for insurgents to employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of varying types and to achieve effects in terms of casualties." A Secret/NOFORN [Not for Release to Foreign Nationals] sentence in the report states, "The use of radios or cell phones should be limited to essential communications and/or entirely prohibited as their transmissions may detonate any IEDs present."
Calipari's cell phone signal was likely picked up by tactical signals intelligence units in the area and may have been the reason the U.S. side opened fire on the Italian vehicle. However, according to NSA insiders, cell phones are not used to detonate either Remote Control IEDs (RCIEDs) or Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBEIDs). In fact, insurgents use cheap, Asian-made long-range cordless phones bought in the street markets of Baghdad to detonate IEDs. By using cordless phones bought from carpets strewn on streets in Baghdad, the insurgents know there is no way to identify the purchaser or track the use of the phones. The three cordless phones of choice for the insurgents are Senao and Voyager, which are made in Taiwan, and Anytone and Soontone, both made in China. Therefore, Calipari's cell phone frequency was a non-threat signal.
The U.S. report on the shooting death also refers in another Secret/NOFORN sentence to the use by the American Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Voice Over IP (VOIP) phones and FM radio as the two primary means of communications. NSA insiders scoff at the reference to VOIP—claiming that such phones are not routinely used because of their inherent unreliability. Even the Secret/NOFORN sentence alludes to problems in VOIP communications between the 69th Infantry unit and a field artillery unit: "The 1—76 FA [Field Artillery] Battle Captain was using only VOIP to communicate with 1—69 IN, but experienced problems with VOIP, therefore losing its only communication link with 1—69 IN."
According to NSA officers, the failure of the agency to upgrade or change its ELINT parameter data, contained in two databases known as the Emitter Parameter List (EPL) and KILTING, has led to a number of friendly fire incidents in Iraq, including the killing of Calipari, an attack on a Kurdish convoy in the north of Iraq, and the shooting down of a British RAF Tornado jet fighter near the Kuwaiti border. Hayden's response has been to move SIGINT and ELINT functions to Texas and Colorado, respectively.
http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/nsa-archives.htm




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