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  1. #1
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    Predefinito Make room for fiscal action through debt conversion

    Make room for fiscal action through debt conversion
    Vesa Vihriälä 15 April 2020

    The high level of public debt in the euro area and doubts over debt sustainability in some member states mean that the fiscal expansion necessary to counter the Covid crisis will be challenging. This column argues for debt relief by the ECB that would allow all member states to finance the necessary fiscal measures in a normal fashion. While effectively forgiving past debt would create expectations that the same could happen again in the future, this moral hazard should be weighed against what is likely to happen without such relief.

    The corona crisis is a massive supply shock turning rapidly into an equally massive demand shock. A wide consensus exists that a large-scale fiscal expansion stemming not only from automatic stabilisers but also from discretionary measures is necessary.

    The starting point for fiscal expansion is unfortunately far from ideal in the euro area because of the high level of public debt – almost 90% of GDP – prior to the crisis. More importantly, some countries have debt levels that clearly make them vulnerable to doubts over debt sustainability. Even more unfortunate is that the corona shock has hit some of these fiscally vulnerable countries hardest, notably Italy.

    Coronabonds are a non-solution

    The vulnerable countries – rightly – point out that the current shock is not of their making and, if European solidarity has any meaning, it should be forthcoming now. Therefore, these countries and many economists have proposed a completely new financial instrument, Coronabonds, guaranteed by all member states by a joint and several guarantee, as a way to finance the necessary expenditures of the highly indebted countries.

    The Coronabond is a temporary version of the old Eurobond idea. That is why countries whose own public finances are in a better shape are resisting the idea. They see it as a way to start a permanent programme, which would lead to increasing mutualisation of the risks associated with the debt issued by countries pursuing imprudent fiscal policies. This has been politically impossible for many countries to accept; it is considered unfair by large parts of their populations. The argument is that while the current shock is not due to bad policies by individual countries, the fiscal vulnerability is.

    Old and new debt instruments

    This unwillingness to engage in direct debt mutualisation has prompted the search for other solutions. They now involve some reallocation of EU budget towards coronavirus-related expenditures in member states. This implies modest transfers to the countries hit by the greatest healthcare problems.

    But the bulk of the measures take the form of credits. This applies to the new vehicle, SURE, the €100 billion mechanism set by the EU Commission to borrow funds against the future EU budget to refinance national unemployment insurance schemes. Additional EIB funding to the private sectors is also loans.

    The decision on 9 April to use the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) belongs to the same category. It makes an ESM credit line available to finance coronavirus-related healthcare expenditures up to 2% of GDP. While this is a creative way of using the existing crisis institution for the crisis at hand, it is problematic at the same time. First, particularly when limited to healthcare expenditures, it may not help the worst affected countries sufficiently. Second, the new credit line is effectively without conditions, blurring the original idea of the ESM support, which is supposed to be a bulwark against threats of financial instability by means of strictly conditional loans.

    The essential thing is that all of these instruments add to the debt burden of the already highly indebted countries.

    In the end, it is up to the ECB

    Given the limited size of the aforementioned programmes and the high debt levels of the relevant countries, the avoidance of a new debt crisis continues to depend on the ECB, as the purchaser of last resort of government debt.

    So far, the ECB has managed to be very effective in providing liquidity not only in aggregate but also with regard to limiting the spreads between different countries’ bonds. The new programmes, especially the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), serve the same twin objectives, particularly as the PEPP involves a significant degree of flexibility with regard to country composition. The new programmes also show the ECB’s ability to take swift and quantitatively decisive actions.

    The question, however, is how far the ECB can go with debt purchases, which deviate from the capital key, to assist fiscal expansion of the member states vulnerable to doubts over debt sustainability. Guaranteeing liquidity can easily drift into guaranteeing solvency, which is a deeply political issue and is certainly not part of the ECB mandate (Beck 2020).

    Applying PEPP with a lot of flexibility approaches OMT but without conditionality. For the OMT, the conditionality requirement is at least in principle stringent: “A necessary condition for Outright Monetary Transactions is strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme.” This, like the conditionality on the ESM loans themselves, is not for nothing. It exists to ensure that credits remain credits, and will not turn into unintended transfers.

    Importantly, the bond purchases by the ECB, presumed to be temporary monetary policy actions, do not solve the fiscal conundrum; sovereign debt levels increase strongly, including in the highly indebted countries like Italy. While the additional burden is not overwhelming with low interest rates, things may change in the future.

    A stock operation as a solution

    The need to be able to run deep deficits in the current situation directs attention to possible ways of reducing debt levels by stock operations. The first option is debt restructuring. However, subjecting particularly a large country to restructuring in the midst of a worldwide economic crisis would almost certainly lead to a massive financial crisis, the very thing one wants to avoid.

    The second option is debt relief by the ECB on all countries’ debt. Converting a fraction of the sovereign debt held by the ECB (or better the European System of Central Banks, or ESCB) into perpetuity with zero coupon would ease the debt burden instantaneously.1 Monetary financing strictly speaking, yes. But how different economically from the continued holdings and rollover of large amounts of the same sovereigns’ debt at (close to) zero rates? Relative to trusting the ECB to continue to pursue extremely accommodative policies for undetermined period of time, such a conversion would make debt relief certain. This would make a significant difference in the eyes of the investors in government bonds.

    The conversion would contribute to anchoring inflation expectations at a higher level, given that undoing the associated stimulus would require active tightening measures by the ECB. This would help the ECB to achieve its inflation target at a juncture where the well-below-the-target-inflation economy is hit by an extraordinary shock. In this sense, the conversion would serve the ultimate purpose of price stability against the threat of deep deflation, even if it would bend one of the institutional constraints set to prevent a route to accelerating inflation.

    A key point is that if the conversion took place in relation to the capital key, it would not involve any direct transfers between member states, and thus would not reward imprudent behaviour any more than prudent behaviour. The capital key-based relief would also match very well the broadly symmetric nature of the shock.

    The size of the conversion should be big enough to bring debt-to-GDP ratios to lower levels even after the increase in current deficits by at least 10 percentage points. On the other hand, the stock of the Eurosystem-held sovereign bonds, currently somewhat over €2,000 billion or some 18 % of euro area GDP, is a technical upper limit, though increasing rapidly. Any share around 20% is also well below the present value of ECB seigniorage income consistent with 2% inflation in most scenarios (Buiter 2019).This means that such a debt relief should not excessively threaten price stability even in the longer run.2

    A clearer division of labour of the instruments

    The proposed debt relief would allow all member states to finance the necessary fiscal measures in a normal fashion. It would not eliminate the moral argument for burden sharing by all member states of part of the shock, which has been exceptionally large for some of them. But it could reduce the size of the needed transfers to a level which would be easier to agree on, be it through the reallocation of the future EU budget contributions (Gros 2020) or otherwise.

    Should member states still have financing difficulties, the ESM and the OMT programmes with the appropriate conditionality would be the right instruments to meet such challenges. A significant reduction of the effective indebtedness of all member states might also help to expand the resources of the ESM. This would be helpful in meeting future financial stability threats and obviously benefit most the member states at greatest risk of market pressures.

    The proposed debt conversion is very close to the helicopter money proposals by Gali (2020) and Kapoor and Buiter (2020). A difference is that here the debt relief would be a part of package that would seek to maintain a clear division of labour between programmes that involve, or are likely to involve, politically sensitive transfers between member states and liquidity provision.

    A Münchausen scheme?

    Why could a conversion scheme like this help alleviate the constraints of the highly indebted states? After all, the budget constraints of the states including their central banks would not change as a result; the reduction of the nominal debt service burden of the states would be exactly compensated by a reduction of seigniorage income from their respective central banks.

    What changes is inflation. As noted, the conversion would make a significant part of the current monetary expansion permanent unless undone by active policy measures. This would ultimately result in more inflation than currently on the cards, which would transfer some of the real burden from debtors to creditors. This applies to sovereign debtors as well as to private ones. And obviously, to the extent the fiscal expansion facilitated by the scheme lifts real economic activity, it would also contribute to better debt service capacity.

    Additional inflation would imply some transfers also across national borders. But unlike in a Coronabond/Eurobond scheme, there would not be any explicit commitment by governments to share other sovereigns’ credit risk now or in the future. The member states would remain responsible for their debts, supporting incentives of the governments to pursue prudent policies. These incentives could also be strengthened by making debt restructuring a more credible way of solving debt sustainability problems in the future. A reform of ESM statutes with regard to debt sustainability requirement, stronger common action clauses and effective constraints on banks’ holdings of single sovereign debts would be ways of achieving this.

    Exceptional times require exceptional measures

    Effectively forgiving past debt obviously creates expectations that the same could happen again in the future. Nevertheless, this moral hazard should be weighed against what is likely to happen without such relief.

    Either fiscal expansion would fall badly short of what is needed in the highly indebted member states, or it would be financed by ever-increasing asymmetric ECB bond purchases, perhaps aided by a depletion of ESM resources before an acute financial crisis. The marginal financing – and, yes, solvency – of the vulnerable member states would become increasingly dependent on the ECB.

    Both alternatives risk creating an existential crisis for the euro area and the whole EU. Not facilitating fiscal expansion in Italy and other highly indebted countries would be economically stupid and politically explosive. Increasing the dependence of these countries on the ECB (and the ESM) liquidity increases the likelihood that the liquidity support has to be recognised as solvency support for individual countries in not too distant future. What turn the events would take at that point is anybody’s guess, but it is not at all clear that the euro would survive.

    Compared with this perspective, the political and legal difficulties of the symmetric debt relief outlined should not be insurmountable.

    References

    Beck T (2020), “The economic, political and moral case for a European fiscal policy response to Covid-19”, VoxEU.org, 7 April.

    Buiter, W (2019), Central Banks as Fiscal Players. The drivers of fiscal and monetary policy space, unpublished manuscript.

    Gali, J (2020), “Helicopter money: The time is now”, Chapter 6 in R Baldwin and B Weder di Mauro (eds) (2020), Mitigating the COVID Economic Crisis: Act Fast and Do Whatever It Takes, a VoxEU.org eBook, CEPR Press.

    Gros, D (2020), “EU solidarity in exceptional times: Corona transfers instead of Coronabonds”, VoxEU.org, 5 April.

    Kapoor, S and W Buiter (2020), “To fight the COVID pandemic, policymakers must move fast and break taboos”, VoxEU.org, 6 April.

    Vihriälä, V and B Weder di Mauro (2014), “Orderly debt restructuring rather than permanent mutualisation the way to go”, VoxEU.org, 2 April.

    Endnotes

    1 This type of stock operation was discussed in a somewhat different context in Vihriälä and Weder di Mauro (2014).

    2 As Estonia’s debt is less than 10% of GDP, the programme would have to involve a transfer other assets or issuing for example ECB CDs to Estonia to maintain equal treatment of all member states.

    https://voxeu.org/article/make-room-...ebt-conversion

    capre europeiste leggete e meditate
    «che giova ne la fata dar di cozzo?»

    “Grande è la confusione sotto il cielo, la situazione è ottima”

  2. #2
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    Predefinito Re: Make room for fiscal action through debt conversion

    Monetisation: Do not panic
    Olivier Blanchard, Jean Pisani-Ferry 10 April 2020

    The extraordinary operations that are under way in most countries in response to the COVID-19 shock have raised fears that large-scale monetisation will result in a major inflation episode. This column argues that so far, there is no evidence that central banks have given up, or are preparing to give up, on their price stability mandate. While there are obviously some reasons to worry, central banks are doing the right thing and the authors see no reason to panic.

    In response to the sanitary crisis, extraordinary operations are under way in most countries (Baldwin and Weder di Mauro 2020). Exceptionally large, often open-ended fiscal support programmes have been launched and they are being coupled with exceptionally large purchases of government bonds. In the UK, the Treasury and the Bank of England have just announced the temporary reactivation of a scheme that makes it possible for the central bank to finance public spending directly.

    These developments have raised fears that large-scale monetisation will result in a major inflation episode. Yet, other commentators would like the central banks to do even more and embark on some form of ‘helicopter money’ (e.g. Galí 2020).

    This column is an attempt to clarify what we see as a confused discussion.

    Let us start with the easy part. Governments everywhere are channelling funds to companies and households to protect them from the fallout of the economic contraction. In a way, they are practicing what the proponents of helicopter money asked for – but in a much more targeted way than anything central banks could ever do. As a result (and because of the drop in government revenues), fiscal deficits are exploding. At the same time, central banks have initiated new, large-scale government bond purchase programmes. The question is no longer whether monetary institutions will embark on direct transfers, as supporters of helicopter money had asked for, but whether we are seeing in effect the equivalent – namely, large-scale monetisation of the deficits – and if so, what the future implications will be.

    What is monetisation?

    Monetisation is an ambiguous concept. Evidently, not all central bank purchases of government bonds qualify as such. In the US, the Fed buys and sells government bonds all the time so as to achieve an interest rate consistent with its mandate of low inflation and full employment. In the euro area, the traditional modus operandi of the ECB was to repo government bonds, which equally affects the market equilibrium. The influence of centrals banks on the government bond market has been magnified since they have embarked on quantitative easing (QE). Their aim has been to broaden the set of interest rates that they are able to influence and thereby to flatten the yield curve, even when the policy rate is at, or below, zero. Sustained, large-scale government bonds purchases have become part of the toolbox of central banks, irrespective of the fiscal policy stance.

    So, worries cannot be about the principle of central banks buying government bonds. They must be about them buying too many of them and for the wrong reasons – what one might call excess monetisation, motivated by public finance sustainability objectives rather than price or macroeconomic stability objectives.

    What would then be the consequences? To think about the potential effects of excess monetisation, it is useful to start with a simple proposition.

    To a first approximation, when interest rates are equal to zero, the purchase of bonds by the central bank in exchange for money – that is, the degree to which public debt is monetised – does not affect public debt dynamics. The reason is simple: it just replaces a zero interest rate asset, called debt, by another one, called money. This is true whether none of the deficit, some of the deficit, or all the deficit is financed by issuing money.

    If this were the end of the argument, it would be hard to see why central banks would ever embark on such monetisation. And, indeed, the proposition must be refined in at least three ways.

    First, the eventual impact of central bank purchases of government bonds depends on what will happen in the future when economic activity and inflation are such that the central bank will want to increase interest rates. Monetisation today may affect expectations of what will happen then.

    Second, when there is one central bank, many national treasuries, and different rates for different sovereign bonds (as in the case of the euro area), monetisation does affect the distribution of risk across countries.

    Third, when markets becoming dysfunctional, or become potentially subject to multiple equilibria, monetisation – or even the threat of monetisation – can improve market functioning and avoid the convergence of expectations on ‘bad equilibria’.

    Monetisation and future central bank behaviour

    Our earlier proposition was that, so long as interest rates are close to zero, whether the liabilities of the consolidated government are debt or money does not matter. But what about the point in the future when economic activity warrants an increase in the monetary policy rate?1 The central bank then has two options.

    The first option is to pay interest on money – the way, for example, the Fed did before this crisis by paying a positive interest on excess reserves held by banks. The consolidated government has now two types of debt: regular debt and interest-paying money. Neglecting the impact of term premia (i.e. the effects of QE if the central bank buys long maturity bonds), the total interest rate burden is the same whatever the composition of the debt is between the two.

    The second option is to keep the interest rate at zero. If, however, the economic situation warrants a positive interest rate, keeping it at zero will lead to overheating, and eventually to higher inflation. One of the implications of higher inflation will be a decrease in the real value of nominal debt, alleviating the debt burden.

    What matters therefore is what the central bank, which may have a large balance sheet by then, will do when it needs to increase interest rates to achieve its mandate. If monetisation today is a signal that it will keep a large balance and not pay interest rate, then indeed there are reasons to worry about inflation.

    Should, then, current large-scale purchases by central banks of government securities indeed be interpreted as a signal that, when the time comes, they will not pay interest on the large money stock and thus allow for overheating, inflation, and a reduction in the real value of government debt? It is true that the larger the portfolio of government bonds held by the central bank, the stronger the effect of its policy on debt sustainability. Large purchases do increase the risk of fiscal dominance. None of the central banks has hinted, however, at such future behaviour,2 and past experience is reassuring. The Fed and the Bank of England, among others, paid interest on reserves when they increased their policy rates in 2017-2018. The ECB did not, but because of the persistently low level of inflation expectations, not because of its government bond holdings.

    Should central banks be clearer, emphasise that monetary dominance will remain unchallenged and commit to not allow for inflation when the time comes? We think not. Central banks face a familiar trade-off. On the one hand, having the ability to decrease the real value of the debt if things are exceptionally bad is clearly a useful option to have. If the virus crisis lasts for long and imposes such a debt burden on governments that they cannot repay their debt, they will be bound to choose between inflation, debt restructuring, financial repression and wealth expropriation, and there is no a priori reason to pretend that they must rule out inflation. But, on the other hand, fuelling the anticipation by investors that the central bank may have recourse to inflation in the future will increase nominal rates on longer maturity bonds today, and increase the cost of debt finance today.

    There is no simple answer as to whether the trade-off is favourable, and remaining silent about what will be done in the future may indeed be the best policy today.

    Monetisation in the euro area: The basics

    So far, we have assumed that there is only one government and one central bank. What about monetisation by the ECB, in a common currency zone where interest rates on sovereign bonds differ?

    Again, we can think of monetisation in this case as governments sending checks to households, issuing bonds to finance them, and the bonds being purchased by the ECB in exchange for euros.

    Assume that the euro area consists of just two countries: a low-debt country that issues safe debt, and a high-debt country whose bonds carry a positive premium, reflecting the perception by investors of a (small) probability of default. Assume also that the safe rate, the rate on the low debt is equal to zero, and the rate on the high debt is higher, and therefore positive.

    Now suppose that both governments run deficits and issue bonds, and that the ECB buys the bonds in exchange for euros, thus increasing central bank money. From the point of view of the consolidated government of the euro area (that is, putting together all the treasuries and the ECB), this is just an internal transfer of risk from the holders of securities issued by the high debt country to the shareholders of the ECB – ultimately national governments – with no implication for the total debt held by the public. But now, there is an implicit transfer of risk across euro members. Thus, monetisation in this case has an effect: it leads to some risk sharing across euro members.3

    Whether or not this is the best way to achieve some risk sharing among euro area members is questionable. Other mechanisms (expenditure sharing, a dedicated credit line) would help lower the burden on the ECB and alleviate fears of monetization. Mutualisation is a political choice and it is advisable to practice it in a transparent way.

    Monetisation in the euro area: The good and bad equilibria

    If monetisation has no obvious implication for debt dynamics, and risk sharing is not its main purpose, why has the ECB announced a large purchase programme, the “pandemic emergency purchase programme” (PEPP), with an envelope of €750 billion, which allows it to buy sovereign bonds without necessarily adhering to the capital key? The answer is multiple equilibria and disrupted markets.

    Sovereign bond markets are potentially subject to multiple equilibria. At a low interest rate, the probability that the debt is sustainable is high, justifying the low rate. Think of this as the good equilibrium. But there may well be another one, in which investors get worried, ask for a higher premium, increase debt service, and in so doing make their worries self-fulfilling and make debt unsustainable. Call it the bad equilibrium. Multiple equilibria can emerge nearly at any time, but they are more likely in the current circumstances when investors are edgy.4

    In this case, the central bank can play a crucial role: by committing to buy if the investors sell, it can eliminate the bad equilibrium. One way to do this is to do what the Bank of Japan has been doing, which is to commit to maintaining a given low interest rate, a strategy called yield curve control. The ECB mandate does not allow it to adopt such a strategy, but it has made clear that, were rates to increase beyond what is justified by fundamentals, it will intervene and buy the bonds that investors are selling. Standing ready to purchase bonds in this context is not an attempt to monetise the debt. Indeed, if the strategy is successful, it actually deters investors from selling, and may achieve its purpose with little or no intervention, little or no monetization, and little or no cost to the other governments.5 In this case, the insurance that it provides to the high-debt country has no cost to the low-debt country. It may even benefit it by preventing a debt crisis and its cross-border spillovers.

    This role is not limited to the euro area or to government bonds. Markets everywhere can become dysfunctional. Some investors have to sell to get liquidity. Others may not have the liquidity to take the other side. Or there can be multiple equilibria. In recent years, and again in this crisis, we have seen examples of both. When markets become dysfunctional, the central bank can take the other side until investors return, or others come in.

    Conclusions

    So far, there is no evidence that central banks have given up, or are preparing to give up, on their price stability mandate. It may eventually happen, if the fiscal cost of the crisis proves to be unbearable, but the size of the current public bond purchases should not be regarded as indicative of future excess monetisation.

    In the specific case of the euro area, the ECB’s bond-buying purchase programme can evidently serve as a channel for mutualising the cost of the crisis. This is in part by default: we see good reasons why part of the burden of fighting the pandemic should be mutualised among EU members, but it would be more appropriate to do so in a more transparent way through explicit budgetary and financial channels.

    So far, no agreement has been reached on such schemes, and this is unfortunate. But this is no reason to interpret ECB actions as mainly distributional. The PEPP is not a hidden budgetary mechanism. At a time when investors are prone to nervousness, its main purpose is to prevent the convergence of expectations on a bad, self-fulfilling crisis equilibrium. Such action serves the interest of all the members of the eurozone.

    In short, there are obviously some reasons to worry, but we see no reason to panic. The central banks are doing the right thing. Their actions are sustainable. And they have not tied their hands to the inflation mast.

    References

    Baldwin, R and B Weder di Mauro (2020), Mitigating the COVID Economic Crisis: Act Fast and Do Whatever It Takes, a VoxEU.org eBook, CEPR Press.

    Galí, J (2020), "Helicopter money: The time is now", voxEU.org, 17 March.

    Endnotes

    1 This may be far in the future, but it will happen one day.

    2 The joint press release by the BoE and HM Treasury of 9 April explicitly states that any use of the direct financing scheme will be short-term and temporary.

    3. As the interest paid on the bonds held by the ECB is redistributed to its shareholders, it also involves a transfer from the high debt country to the low debt country, which can be regarded as a remuneration for the risk transfer.

    4 We do not discuss here the risk of redenomination of the public debt following an exit from the euro area. It only strengthens the argument.

    5 To be clear, this is not a strategy without risks. Distinguishing between the emergence of a bad equilibrium, and a justified increase in the rate in the good equilibrium is not easy, and the central bank may find itself taking credit risk.

    https://voxeu.org/article/monetisation-do-not-panic
    «che giova ne la fata dar di cozzo?»

    “Grande è la confusione sotto il cielo, la situazione è ottima”

  3. #3
    Non dire gatto se...
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    Predefinito Re: Make room for fiscal action through debt conversion

    eurobond da pagare con bilancio europeo = tasse

    mes = patrimoniali tagli a spesa sanità privatizzazioni a mani basse

    unica via possibile è la monetizzazione, una sola cosa abbiamo in europa, ed è la bce, usiamola

    qui si vede chi è europeista per davvero e chi solo a chiacchiere
    «che giova ne la fata dar di cozzo?»

    “Grande è la confusione sotto il cielo, la situazione è ottima”

  4. #4
    Lo spirito del '22
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    Predefinito Re: Make room for fiscal action through debt conversion

    adesso arriva contemerkel a dirti che sono tutti parte del gombloddo di pescaraaaah


  5. #5
    Non dire gatto se...
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    Predefinito Re: Make room for fiscal action through debt conversion

    Citazione Originariamente Scritto da Sparviero Visualizza Messaggio
    adesso arriva contemerkel a dirti che sono tutti parte del gombloddo di pescaraaaah

    voxeu è il gotha del pensiero economico leu ropeista, e perfino questi dicono che l' unica via è monetizzare di brutto
    «che giova ne la fata dar di cozzo?»

    “Grande è la confusione sotto il cielo, la situazione è ottima”

  6. #6
    Eurofobo/mainstreamofobo
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    Predefinito Re: Make room for fiscal action through debt conversion

    Citazione Originariamente Scritto da Sparviero Visualizza Messaggio
    adesso arriva contemerkel a dirti che sono tutti parte del gombloddo di pescaraaaah

    Meglio ancora, a dire che se volete i soldi ve li dovete guadagnare, che i soldi si fanno solo col lavoro duro e che il corona virus non cambia niente.
    È un vanto essere ignorati da utenti di livello 0.

    Agli euradical snob antifà che danno del lei per sottolineare la distanza dal ceto del popolino rispondo con un voi (come usava quando c'era LVI) così imparano. Gradassi avvisati mezzi salvati.

 

 

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