Il nuovo primo ministro giapponese vuole stampare soldi per tutto il mondo

[John Orr]

A me è più utile che lo stato stampi che fallisca personalmente. Nella prima ipotesi so per certo quali saranno le conseguenze e m'adeguo, nella seconda ipotesi è tutto più difficile da prevedere.

Io preferisco che fallisca presto e stampando uno stato fallisce presto. Provo un odio estremo per lo stato. D'altra parte stampando moneta si crea euforismo e si dimezzano i debiti privati, sopratutto se i debiti li hai col fisco. Non capisco gli Austriaci e i Liberali che vanno contro l'espansione monetaria a prescindere. Se sappiamo come funziona la gioiosa macchina da guerra socialista possiamo usare a nostro favore i loro dannati tentativi di esproprio. Entrare nella mente dei politici è basilare. La Scuola Austriaca ci ha dato i mezzi, fortunatamente per fronteggiarli i politici, riducendo i rischi privati. Usiamo i loro stessi sporchi trucchi anche se solo contro di loro e mai contro il privato o il nostro vicino di casa, il nostro cliente o un antipatico qualsiasi. Solo contro la casta di merda. Se lo stato svaluta compriamo oro o contraiamo debiti, magari fiscali.

Per finire, in regime Liberale, ognuno di noi è una banca di emissione, e possiamo stampare quanto vogliamo: solo il mercato dovrebbe decidere se abbiamo stampato molto o poco, relegandoci a virtuosi e affidabili banchieri o a irresponsabili e faciloni bancaroli. Stampare liberamente è un diritto. Se stampa lo stato è delinquere a prescindere dato che lo stato delinque per natura in ogni modo possibile e immaginabile.

[Immanuel]

Lo stato che stampa difficilmente fallisce, ha tante persone che gli prestano fiducia, sai quante volte da persone istruite, di successo ho sentito dire "Eh però 30 anni fa ci davano il 20% d'interessi" Fa niente che l'inflazione "ufficiale" era addirittura al 17-18%.

[John Orr]

Lo stato che stampa difficilmente fallisce, ha tante persone che gli prestano fiducia, sai quante volte da persone istruite, di successo ho sentito dire "Eh però 30 anni fa ci davano il 20% d'interessi" Fa niente che l'inflazione "ufficiale" era addirittura al 17-18%.

A no? E qual'è lo stato che fallisce?????? Quello virtuoso??? Dai. Considera Weimar.

[00_Void]

+1. Visto che non possono dichiarare guerra a nessuno (per fortuna) onde praticare un bel resettone del sistema, azzerando tutto o quasi.

Guarda, anche lo "stampare" non è cosa priva di pericoli. E' che l'ipotesi alternativa (austerità) è imho tecnicamente inefficace oltre che impraticabile in uno stato democratico.

Comunque ripeto, potremmo essere arrivati al capolinea, spero di no, ma non lo escludo.

[Bulle]

Guarda, anche lo "stampare" non è cosa priva di pericoli. E' che l'ipotesi alternativa (austerità) è imho tecnicamente inefficace oltre che impraticabile in uno stato democratico.

Comunque ripeto, potremmo essere arrivati al capolinea, spero di no, ma non lo escludo.

Quale il rischio ? Inflazione non ne vedono in giro e se si manifestasse, in tempo alzerebbero i tassi, credo.

O forse per la quantità di soldi regalati-iniettati (ai responsabili della crisi tra l'altro) si paventa che quando l'inflazione si manifesta diventa incontenibile; tipo pupù liquida da un pannolino difettato ? (scusa se ti schifo, ma mi è venuta quest'immagine )

[00_Void]

Quale il rischio ? Inflazione non ne vedono in giro e se si manifestasse, in tempo alzerebbero i tassi, credo.

O forse per la quantità di soldi regalati-iniettati (ai responsabili della crisi tra l'altro) si paventa che quando l'inflazione si manifesta diventa incontenibile; tipo pupù liquida da un pannolino difettato ? (scusa se ti schifo, ma mi è venuta quest'immagine )

No io temo che quei soldi non arrivino mai nelle mani della "plebe", e che il tutto si risolva con un altro crash.

Uno spunto interessante è questo:

...it is not clear to me that it is well understood why inflation sometimes can be seen in consumer goods and sometimes is manifested in "asset price inflation". Do you have any ideas on this mechanism? I know some people deny there is such a thing as "asset price inflation". Do you have a theoretical basis for your ideas in this area?

I have a very simple answer to this question: Follow the money. Whether an economy generates asset price inflation or consumer price inflation depends on the details of to whom cash flows. In particular, cash flows to the relatively wealthy lead to asset price inflation, while cash-flows to the relatively poor lead to consumer price inflation.

Why? In Keynesian terms, poorer people have a higher marginal propensity to consume. The relatively poor include people who are cash-flow constrained — that is they cannot purchase what they wish to purchase for lack of green, so their marginal dollar gets immediately applied to the shopping list. Also, poorer people may be different, there may be a correlation between poverty and disorganization, lack of impulse control, inability to defer gratification etc. Think of Greg Mankiw's Spenders/Savers model.

Except when the world seems very risky, no one holds cash for very long. Poorer people disproportionately use their cash to purchase goods, while richer people disproportionately "save" by purchasing financial assets. If the supply of both goods and financial assets is not perfectly elastic, then increases in demand will be associated with increases in price. If relative demand for goods and financial assets is a function of the distribution of cash, what price changes occur will be a function of who gets what. [1]

This tale of two inflations helps to explain how we arrived at the unequal, credit-centric economy we have today. Central bankers are notoriously allergic to "wage pressure" as a harbinger of rising prices. Wages have two distressing properties: First, they are sticky. They represent repeated and persistent cash flows that cannot be downward adjusted en masse except during a serious crisis or dislocation. Second, a substantial fraction of wages goes to lower quintiles of the income distribution, who have a high marginal propensity to consume. Central bankers are not evil scrooges — they have nothing against consumption by poor people. But funding that consumption by wages limits the effectiveness of monetary policy. They'd prefer that the marginal dollar bound for consumption flow from a more malleable source.

During the "Great Moderation" in the US a variety of structural changes helped to increase the potency of monetary policy:

The wage share of GDP decreased significantly over the 1970s and 80s. Compensation did not decrease as much, but much of nonwage compensation is retirement savings that is saved rather than consumed.

Wage inequality increased, such that a growing fraction of wages went to "savers" rather than "spenders", limiting the direct impact of wage growth on consumption.

The growth and "democratization" of consumer credit provided consumers with an alternative source of purchasing power that was sensitive to monetary policy.

Prior to the Great Moderation, central bankers had to provoke recessions in order to control inflation. Broad-based wage growth led to increases in nominal cashflows by "spenders" that could only be tempered by creating unemployment or other conditions under which workers would accept wage concessions. In the post-Reagan world, growth in the sticky component of disposable income shifted to the wealthy, who tend to save rather than spend their raises. The marginal dollar of consumer expenditure switched from wages to borrowed money. The great thing about consumption funded by credit expansion, from a central banker's point of view, is that it is not sticky downward — no one who gets a loan today assumes that she will be able to expand her borrowing by the same amount every year. Credit-based consumption is susceptible to monetary policy with far less impact on employment than wage-based consumption. (One of Ben Bernanke's many claims to fame is his characterization of the credit channel of monetary policy transmission.)

By the middle 2000s, the credit economy was the air we breathed, and conventional wisdom held (and continues to hold) that economic growth and credit expansion are synonymous. We had those peculiar debates about the difference between "consumption equality" and "income equality", and which mattered more, since middle-class consumption had become significantly credit-financed. But from central bankers' perspective, we had stumbled into a good place, one where output growth was channeled into asset price inflation, but provoked consumer price inflation only indirectly and via a channel policymakers could regulate. This benign regime faced two threats, however. First, asset price inflation is unstable — while on any given day, price moves are determined by the flow of funds into assets, over time prices can become so unreasonable relative to the the asset's cash or service flows that arbitrageurs and nervous fundamentalists appear, creating the potential for a collapse. Second, credit expansion is unstable, as chronic borrowers may become unable to service existing debt, let alone borrow more to sustain aggregate demand. Unnervingly, sustaining consumption has required a secular downtrend in the policy interest rate, and eventually you hit that zero-bound. [2]

The Greenspan/Bernanke doctrine can be summed up by three familiar words, "Yes We Can!" Greenspan famously concluded that we can "mop up" asset price bubbles after they burst, rather than interfering with the dynamic whereby asset price inflation substitutes for consumer price inflation. Bernanke devoted his life to studying the role of credit in monetary policy and the hazards of deflation and credit collapse, and he famously concluded that we have the technology to prevent "it" from happening here. We are watching his experiment play out, in real time and from inside the maze. The outcome is not yet known.

preso da: Interfluidity :: Asset inflation, price inflation, and the great moderation

[Phileas]

No io temo che quei soldi non arrivino mai nelle mani della "plebe", e che il tutto si risolva con un altro crash.

Uno spunto interessante è questo:

...it is not clear to me that it is well understood why inflation sometimes can be seen in consumer goods and sometimes is manifested in "asset price inflation". Do you have any ideas on this mechanism? I know some people deny there is such a thing as "asset price inflation". Do you have a theoretical basis for your ideas in this area?

I have a very simple answer to this question: Follow the money. Whether an economy generates asset price inflation or consumer price inflation depends on the details of to whom cash flows. In particular, cash flows to the relatively wealthy lead to asset price inflation, while cash-flows to the relatively poor lead to consumer price inflation.

Why? In Keynesian terms, poorer people have a higher marginal propensity to consume. The relatively poor include people who are cash-flow constrained — that is they cannot purchase what they wish to purchase for lack of green, so their marginal dollar gets immediately applied to the shopping list. Also, poorer people may be different, there may be a correlation between poverty and disorganization, lack of impulse control, inability to defer gratification etc. Think of Greg Mankiw's Spenders/Savers model.

Except when the world seems very risky, no one holds cash for very long. Poorer people disproportionately use their cash to purchase goods, while richer people disproportionately "save" by purchasing financial assets. If the supply of both goods and financial assets is not perfectly elastic, then increases in demand will be associated with increases in price. If relative demand for goods and financial assets is a function of the distribution of cash, what price changes occur will be a function of who gets what. [1]

This tale of two inflations helps to explain how we arrived at the unequal, credit-centric economy we have today. Central bankers are notoriously allergic to "wage pressure" as a harbinger of rising prices. Wages have two distressing properties: First, they are sticky. They represent repeated and persistent cash flows that cannot be downward adjusted en masse except during a serious crisis or dislocation. Second, a substantial fraction of wages goes to lower quintiles of the income distribution, who have a high marginal propensity to consume. Central bankers are not evil scrooges — they have nothing against consumption by poor people. But funding that consumption by wages limits the effectiveness of monetary policy. They'd prefer that the marginal dollar bound for consumption flow from a more malleable source.

During the "Great Moderation" in the US a variety of structural changes helped to increase the potency of monetary policy:

The wage share of GDP decreased significantly over the 1970s and 80s. Compensation did not decrease as much, but much of nonwage compensation is retirement savings that is saved rather than consumed.

Wage inequality increased, such that a growing fraction of wages went to "savers" rather than "spenders", limiting the direct impact of wage growth on consumption.

The growth and "democratization" of consumer credit provided consumers with an alternative source of purchasing power that was sensitive to monetary policy.

Prior to the Great Moderation, central bankers had to provoke recessions in order to control inflation. Broad-based wage growth led to increases in nominal cashflows by "spenders" that could only be tempered by creating unemployment or other conditions under which workers would accept wage concessions. In the post-Reagan world, growth in the sticky component of disposable income shifted to the wealthy, who tend to save rather than spend their raises. The marginal dollar of consumer expenditure switched from wages to borrowed money. The great thing about consumption funded by credit expansion, from a central banker's point of view, is that it is not sticky downward — no one who gets a loan today assumes that she will be able to expand her borrowing by the same amount every year. Credit-based consumption is susceptible to monetary policy with far less impact on employment than wage-based consumption. (One of Ben Bernanke's many claims to fame is his characterization of the credit channel of monetary policy transmission.)

By the middle 2000s, the credit economy was the air we breathed, and conventional wisdom held (and continues to hold) that economic growth and credit expansion are synonymous. We had those peculiar debates about the difference between "consumption equality" and "income equality", and which mattered more, since middle-class consumption had become significantly credit-financed. But from central bankers' perspective, we had stumbled into a good place, one where output growth was channeled into asset price inflation, but provoked consumer price inflation only indirectly and via a channel policymakers could regulate. This benign regime faced two threats, however. First, asset price inflation is unstable — while on any given day, price moves are determined by the flow of funds into assets, over time prices can become so unreasonable relative to the the asset's cash or service flows that arbitrageurs and nervous fundamentalists appear, creating the potential for a collapse. Second, credit expansion is unstable, as chronic borrowers may become unable to service existing debt, let alone borrow more to sustain aggregate demand. Unnervingly, sustaining consumption has required a secular downtrend in the policy interest rate, and eventually you hit that zero-bound. [2]

The Greenspan/Bernanke doctrine can be summed up by three familiar words, "Yes We Can!" Greenspan famously concluded that we can "mop up" asset price bubbles after they burst, rather than interfering with the dynamic whereby asset price inflation substitutes for consumer price inflation. Bernanke devoted his life to studying the role of credit in monetary policy and the hazards of deflation and credit collapse, and he famously concluded that we have the technology to prevent "it" from happening here. We are watching his experiment play out, in real time and from inside the maze. The outcome is not yet known.

preso da: Interfluidity :: Asset inflation, price inflation, and the great moderation

Se non era in inglese avrei pensato che a scriverlo era Di Pietro o Scilipoti

[Phileas]

No io temo che quei soldi non arrivino mai nelle mani della "plebe", e che il tutto si risolva con un altro crash.

Uno spunto interessante è questo:

...it is not clear to me that it is well understood why inflation sometimes can be seen in consumer goods and sometimes is manifested in "asset price inflation". Do you have any ideas on this mechanism? I know some people deny there is such a thing as "asset price inflation". Do you have a theoretical basis for your ideas in this area?

I have a very simple answer to this question: Follow the money. Whether an economy generates asset price inflation or consumer price inflation depends on the details of to whom cash flows. In particular, cash flows to the relatively wealthy lead to asset price inflation, while cash-flows to the relatively poor lead to consumer price inflation.

Why? In Keynesian terms, poorer people have a higher marginal propensity to consume. The relatively poor include people who are cash-flow constrained — that is they cannot purchase what they wish to purchase for lack of green, so their marginal dollar gets immediately applied to the shopping list. Also, poorer people may be different, there may be a correlation between poverty and disorganization, lack of impulse control, inability to defer gratification etc. Think of Greg Mankiw's Spenders/Savers model.

Except when the world seems very risky, no one holds cash for very long. Poorer people disproportionately use their cash to purchase goods, while richer people disproportionately "save" by purchasing financial assets. If the supply of both goods and financial assets is not perfectly elastic, then increases in demand will be associated with increases in price. If relative demand for goods and financial assets is a function of the distribution of cash, what price changes occur will be a function of who gets what. [1]

This tale of two inflations helps to explain how we arrived at the unequal, credit-centric economy we have today. Central bankers are notoriously allergic to "wage pressure" as a harbinger of rising prices. Wages have two distressing properties: First, they are sticky. They represent repeated and persistent cash flows that cannot be downward adjusted en masse except during a serious crisis or dislocation. Second, a substantial fraction of wages goes to lower quintiles of the income distribution, who have a high marginal propensity to consume. Central bankers are not evil scrooges — they have nothing against consumption by poor people. But funding that consumption by wages limits the effectiveness of monetary policy. They'd prefer that the marginal dollar bound for consumption flow from a more malleable source.

During the "Great Moderation" in the US a variety of structural changes helped to increase the potency of monetary policy:

The wage share of GDP decreased significantly over the 1970s and 80s. Compensation did not decrease as much, but much of nonwage compensation is retirement savings that is saved rather than consumed.

Wage inequality increased, such that a growing fraction of wages went to "savers" rather than "spenders", limiting the direct impact of wage growth on consumption.

The growth and "democratization" of consumer credit provided consumers with an alternative source of purchasing power that was sensitive to monetary policy.

Prior to the Great Moderation, central bankers had to provoke recessions in order to control inflation. Broad-based wage growth led to increases in nominal cashflows by "spenders" that could only be tempered by creating unemployment or other conditions under which workers would accept wage concessions. In the post-Reagan world, growth in the sticky component of disposable income shifted to the wealthy, who tend to save rather than spend their raises. The marginal dollar of consumer expenditure switched from wages to borrowed money. The great thing about consumption funded by credit expansion, from a central banker's point of view, is that it is not sticky downward — no one who gets a loan today assumes that she will be able to expand her borrowing by the same amount every year. Credit-based consumption is susceptible to monetary policy with far less impact on employment than wage-based consumption. (One of Ben Bernanke's many claims to fame is his characterization of the credit channel of monetary policy transmission.)

By the middle 2000s, the credit economy was the air we breathed, and conventional wisdom held (and continues to hold) that economic growth and credit expansion are synonymous. We had those peculiar debates about the difference between "consumption equality" and "income equality", and which mattered more, since middle-class consumption had become significantly credit-financed. But from central bankers' perspective, we had stumbled into a good place, one where output growth was channeled into asset price inflation, but provoked consumer price inflation only indirectly and via a channel policymakers could regulate. This benign regime faced two threats, however. First, asset price inflation is unstable — while on any given day, price moves are determined by the flow of funds into assets, over time prices can become so unreasonable relative to the the asset's cash or service flows that arbitrageurs and nervous fundamentalists appear, creating the potential for a collapse. Second, credit expansion is unstable, as chronic borrowers may become unable to service existing debt, let alone borrow more to sustain aggregate demand. Unnervingly, sustaining consumption has required a secular downtrend in the policy interest rate, and eventually you hit that zero-bound. [2]

The Greenspan/Bernanke doctrine can be summed up by three familiar words, "Yes We Can!" Greenspan famously concluded that we can "mop up" asset price bubbles after they burst, rather than interfering with the dynamic whereby asset price inflation substitutes for consumer price inflation. Bernanke devoted his life to studying the role of credit in monetary policy and the hazards of deflation and credit collapse, and he famously concluded that we have the technology to prevent "it" from happening here. We are watching his experiment play out, in real time and from inside the maze. The outcome is not yet known.

preso da: Interfluidity :: Asset inflation, price inflation, and the great moderation

Se non era in inglese avrei pensato che a scriverlo era Di Pietro o Scilipoti