Chiarezza su Blu-Express!!!

[max__ (POL)]

Ho controllato varie opinioni su alcuni siti internet in merito alla compagnia Blue Panorama e molti giudizi sono negativi affermando che si è assitito alcune volte a problemi dovuti al carrello e altro... Inoltre in un'opinione ho letto che i pezzi di ricambio vengono da aeromobili Alitalia...
Insomma... Adesso aprono una low-cost con i loro ex velivoli... Ma è una compagnia sicura? Sapete dirmi qualcosa in merito alla manutenzione dei loro aeromobili?

P.S
Le tratte che hanno messo sono molto interessanti e credo anche sotto il profilo business... i clienti però dovrebbero avere maggiore chiarezza sulla loro compagnia!

[airblue]

Per fare chiarezza su alcuni dei tuoi dubbi:

- Blu Express al momento non è una compagnia aerea, ma un mero brand commerciale con cui vengono venduti dei voli di linea spacciati per low cost (giusto perchè oggi tanto di moda). I voli sono operati con aeromobili e AOC di Blue Panorama. (Per intenderci i voli hanno codice BV).

- E' opinione diffusa tra esperti del settore che nuove operazioni low cost tipo quella intrapresa da Blu Express devono essere iniziate con un capitale di start up minimo XXXX e flotta XXX in modo tale da garantire da subito una massa critica ed un hub di riferimento per supportare la fase di start up. (Il Tedesco coinvolto nell'operazione Blu Express essendo di provenienza HLX dovrebbe ben saperlo dato che la capo gruppo TUI aveva messo a disposizione per i primi tre anni €100m di cui in verità dai dati diffusi ne sono stati utilizzati solo €58m oltre ad una flotta iniziale di 5 aeromobili passati a 10 in un anno).

- Le rotte offerte non sono per nulla interessnti, dato che quelle nazionali hanno un giro macchine che penalizza minimo due tratte e quelle internazionali verso la Francia sono a mio avviso di dubbio successo per via delle frequenze e aeroporti serviti. VIE si scontra con Niki e SkyEurope da BTS. Forse MUC si può salvare.

[tamtam]

Sono d'accordo con te airblue, non capisco come si possa pensare di poter fare dei voli di linea con due soli velivoli e con quattro o cinque destinazioni che sembrano un po' scelte a caso. Questo non mette in dubbio la sicurezza dei voli e non credo che ci si possa pronunciare su questo argomento senza ridchiare di dire delle enormi castronerie.
Ci sono delle similutidini fra Blu Panorama e la compagnia nella quale lavoro, Corsair, entrambe fanno rotte lungo raggio, entrambe fanno charter e linea, ma Corsair ha preferito chiudere il settore 737 e il corto-medio raggio, dove diventa sempre più difficile essere competitivi contro le low cost e le grosse compagnie nazionali.

[freesurfer]

Le affermazioni di molti forum molte volte provengono dal pour parlez e quindi senza una professionalità consolidata in quello che è l'aviazione civile, ma sopratutto frutto di impressioni, fatterelli vari riportati oppure vissuti ma senza il back ground proprio per affermare determinate cose. Questo non è per significare che tutti sono ignoranti, certamente non sono competenti e quindi i giudizi sono diciamo falsati da questa mancanza di conoscenza di come in realtà le cose si verificano.

Bene, è normale che un vettore di piccole dimensioni, che abbia una struttura di manutenzione di linea o qualcosa di piu', cioè i check minori si appoggi su vettori consolidati e per ovvie ragioni titolari di organizzazioni manutentive che arrivano a livelli maggiori e totali.
Di conseguenza è chiaro che per i check intermedi e maggiori questo tipo di compagnie (anche perchè previsto dalle normative internazionali) debbano stipulare accordi che prevedano la manutenzione di cellule, motori e componenti da queste società. Questi accordi (in mancanza di propria struttura interna che sia certificata dagli Enti dell'Aviazione Civile ad effettuare queste tipologie di attività) devono essere stipulati, in quanto si avrà precluso quello che è il rilascio/mantenimento del proprio AOC - Airline Operations Certificate, in Italia questo si chiama COA.
Di conseguenza in questo caso Blue Panorama ha accordi con Alitalia ma anche con Lufthansa per la revisione motori, aerei ed accessori e la gestione dei magazzini delle parti di ricambio principali.

E' da significare che le parti si dividono in A,B,C, dove le C sono i consumabili, cioè particolari con vita che si esaurisce alla loro inefficienza o necessità di sostituzione. Le altre hanno vita calendariale utile come temporalità o ad ore di funzionamento. Mi spiego meglio, un accessorio a vita oraria utile, cioè a limite di ore di funzionamento - LOF, dove da ultima revisione è prevista all'installazione una vita di 800h di volo, tolte le applicazioni supplementari di estensione percentuali applicabili, dopo 800h di volo deve essere sbarcato, inviato ad una ditta incaricata e certificata per la revisione di questo componente. Nello specifico verranno effettuate tutte le attività previste per quel dato step di verifica in accordo al manuale di revisione di quell'apparato, al termine delle lavorazioni verrà effettuato un test che permetterà l'emissione di un certificato di conformità che certificherà la possibilità del particolare di essere nuovamente reimpiegato. In questo caso se Alitalia o Lufthansa hanno questa parte a proprio magazzino in gestione a Blue Panorama e questo necessiti di essere installato su un aereo Blue Panorama..questo verrà installato e avrà provenienza da un magazzino di un altro vettore.
Lo stesso dicasi per quelle a scadenza impiego calendariale cioè LIC, queste imbarcate il 2.5.2005 e con scadenza a 2 anni, se non intervenga un inefficienza che ne forzi la sostituzione il 1.5.2007 deve essere sbarcato. Questo, come per quelle per LOF, spesso accade che avvengano ragionevolmente, calcolati le varie tempistiche di scadenza revisione, sostituiti prima di norma o un po' dopo..sempre in relazione alle proroghe ammissibili.

Capitolo avarie..spesso i giornali scrivono anche le piccole cosine che succedono su un volo..cosine che all'occhio del giornalista hanno un evidenza rilevante, magari accompagnato da un titolo di effetto, ma che poi leggendo si rivela di una pochezza inaudita. Un avaria carrello è sinceramente un evento molto serio, pero' spesso puo' essere causato da un microinterruttore di posizione, che è on condition di norma..quindi senza limiti particolari, che per qualche ragione, ma sopratutto per funzionamento è diventato resistivo, non permettendo queindi che la commutazione della sequenza avvenga e quindi accade alla prima retrazione o estensione , nella maggior parte dei casi è solo un avaria di indicazione, cioè il carrello si e' esteso, ma negli indicatori posti in cabina , uno di essi non avrà indicato la completa estensione con il bloccaggio del carrello in posizione estesa come da sequenza...quindi alla luce del discorso si dichiara un atterraggio con priorità. Stile , l'aereo di ieri sera a Palermo, dove ha dirottato in priorità per prossimo esaurimento del carburante..rilanciato immediatamente dalle agenzie di stampa come " atterraggio di emergenza per esaurimento carburante"...

Concludendo, generalizzatamente si parla..si chiacchiera..si sparla...si scrive a casaccio..ma purtroppo questo è un argomento ed una cosa complessa che..purtroppo solo gli addetti ai lavori sanno esattamente dirimere in quale stato do gravità o meno si trovi il singolo evento. Purtroppo è da dire che ultimamente il "terrorismo mediatico" porta all'insorgenza di paure non giustificate nell'opinione pubblica che fanno insorgere uno stato di insicurezza significativo..anche se poi verificando l'informazione si nota che la stessa è solamente stata ingigantita per fare effetto.

Ciao,
Free

[runway]

Senza voler creare inutili insicurezze, diciamo pero' che Blue Panorama non e' proprio conosciuta per le proprie procedure eccellenti e professionali. A piu' riprese piloti e unione piloti si sono rivolti anche alle autorità competenti per segnalare le mancanze della compagnia aerea in questione. Su pprune (autorevole forum di professionisti) non gode certo di particolare ammirazione per quanto rigurarda la sicurezza delle operations.

Mi permetto di copiare uno dei post, abbastanza dettagliato, che spiega situazioni realmente avvenute in BPA:

COPY OF THE REPORT WRITTEN BY Captain XXXX (PART 1)

These findings are a detailed description of observations made during an unofficial audit over a number of flights at BLUE PANORAMA. This is accumulative and the items mentioned did not necessarily occur on every flight. Possible solutions are offered where available. Although these findings have been submitted early on in the audit process, clear trends have already become evident. It was felt prudent to bring these to the attention on the flight operations management as soon as possible.

FLIGHT PLANNING

1. No organized crew discussion concerning weather, notams or fuel decision. FOs and Captains do not share each task in a specific and organized ETOPS way of thinking. “ETOPS DISPATCH AND CREW CHECK-LIST” (see annex 1) as used in long-haul airlines should be considered > CRM lacking. For example, FOs does not scrutinize notams thoroughly and brief the Captains on important items.

2. Crew must check the weather of all departure (+ alternate on departure if re-land is impossible due to weather), en route, emergency, destination and alternate airfields. Check the notams of all these airfields. Check the AERAD plates of all these fields. Relate available runways and weather from these fields to landing minima and crosswind limits to check if these fields are usable. These fields may be needed in an emergency. ETOPS weather minimums should be available for pilot’s flight planning (see annex 2). For example pilots are not able to check if CYYT, TXKF or any other ETOPS field retained as alternate is really above ETOPS weather minimums. This is a MUST…

3. Fuel policy should be reviewed to ensure it complies with the appropriate regulations and all dispatchers must be familiar with the updated regulations. There may be areas for fuel savings here as well.

4. There should be a route clearance unit summary of all BPA routes. This must NOT be a regurgitation of the AERAD manual but rather important pilot and operational information specific to the route.

5. The Captain should NEVER have to argue with dispatcher re extra fuel if needed. If, in the opinion of the dispatcher an unreasonable decision has been made, this information should be reported to the Chief pilot of the fleet who may at a later stage choose in to discuss this with the Captain at a convenient time. As the dispatcher has no 767 command experience, he can not possibly make an informed decision about the fuel requirements. Management should in turn set up an extra fuel tracking system to monitor extra uplifts so they can be controlled.

6. Dispatchers regularly file LIMJ (Genoa) as an alternate departure or alternate arrival for LIMC (Milan Malpensa) for which most 767 operators does not approve 767 operations : downdrafts and updrafts reported, specific aerological concerns which oblige operators to usually classify this airport as a category C airport.

7. Specific flight planning rooms are ONLY available in LIMC (Milan Malpensa) and MUHA (Havana). Crews shouldn’t be obliged to prepare their flight in front of the passengers in the boarding area or in the cockpit. This is nearly illegal and does not respect the minimum airmanship. Each BPA station should provide a quiet room to ensure adequate flight planning. In case of training flight, the actual situation aggravates the CRM lacking.

8. Cabin crew briefing is rarely done by the captain. It should be done on every flight and a specific document should be given to the Chief Purser (see Annex 3). > CRM lacking

9. Flight documentation (Operations Manuals A to D) are not JAR organized and it is really difficult to find the appropriate information in a minimum of time.

10. Altitude capability performance must be cross-checked on the appropriate charts before departure (Optimum and 1.3G altitudes to be checked).



BEFORE START

1. FOs or Captains do not do thorough preflight, sometimes sloppy. They do it in record time and would not pick up any problems because of the rush they are in.

2. When getting on board, the FO must ensure that ALL en route emergency, suitable and alternate AERAD plates are in the manuals for the flight. Crews do not check on board manuals to make sure that the alternate plates are there in case of a diversion, en route and destination.

3. No Dangerous goods manual on board going or diverting to USA (i.e. KBWI). No one knows where it should be kept. The FAA checks this.

4. Crew must use a torch for preflight at night, this is sometimes not done.

5. IRS position entered by the PNF should be crosscked at any time before being computed. > this is basic airmanship. Further, the IRS DSPL SEL should be positioned to PPOS

6. The official Boeing 767 Operations Manual Volume 1 stipulates well organized and CRM minded tasks thru the PREFLIGHT and BEFORE START set-up & check-list. This is not presently the case : BPA set ups and check-lists are related to an old and non-always understood philosophy used by the former Air Europe at the beginning of the 767 operations. This results in a non-logical process for every step of any check-list. BPA Operations Manual Volume B does not respect the latest Boeing recommendations (see latest Boeing Operations Manual updates – rev.22 available thru http//myboeingfleet.com).
Boeing normal checklist has had many changes that result in flow breakdown and ultimately violations. There must be a return to the normal Boeing checklist. This will also resolve the confusion that arises with respect to checklist responses in the cockpit.

7. Crew should brief on aircraft differences, engines etc. max T/O EGT during the pre-flight

8. According to BPA policy, It should be a normal crew function to assume an ETOPS post-flight check after a 17 hours (or even more !) flight duty. This a absolutely not JAR related and being able to fly for example from Milan Malpensa to Cancun and back to Milan Malpensa without any pertinent check from a qualified engineer in MMUN is definitely NOT SAFE. A lot of crews are not current with the “POST FLIGHT CHECK” and some never had any course on the matter ! This procedure more Italian than European encourages crews to leave without the optimum oil or hydraulics refill (in the mean time some pilots do not know the minimum oil dispatch for GE and PW engines !)
There is obviously some JAR protocol here that needs to be clarified as soon as possible.

9. Suggest RTO touch drills + time of jettison when briefing. Take off alternate should be discussed and included in the take off briefing when appropriate. In case of Low Visibility Operations, a specific briefing should be done by the captain. The use of a remainder available at the first page of the QRH is recommended (see below):


10. During crosscheck of the take off speeds/performance, a easy rule by thumb check should be made by the captain for V2 (the survival speed) : i.e. V2 should be equal to the Flaps 20 approach speed plus or minus 3 knots. This easy to remember process is not the only one, but there should be some insistence on killer switches (V2 knob speed, Stab trim, etc.)

11. Loadsheet should be performed by qualified ground staff instead of being done by tired crews. A mistake such as Tailstrike on takeoff could ruin BPA efforts to become a respected airline in its business. The current procedure is more than UNSAFE and is a identified key factor for creating unaffordable delays
Loadsheet should be also read aloud to whole crew and Zero Fuel Weight crosschecked by the PF and the PNF.

COPY OF THE REPORT WRITTEN BY Captain XXXX (PART 2)


PUSH BACK & START

1. Work towards silent start. Call malfunctions rather indications (“Fuel ON”) on the normal start.

2. Engine start must be done by LH seat pilot (captain) ONLY as per Boeing Operations Manual.

3. It is quite strange not to check the flight controls BEFORE the engine start (see Boeing Operations Manual) : this should be the appropriate way to check the normal operation of the HYD ELEC PUMPS in case of dual engine failure in flight. The strange BPA procedure is an old heritage from nowhere.

4. Standard phraseology for pushback procedure must be developed and taught to Cockpit and ground crew. If not, we can expect broken tow bars and structural damage to be a possibility.

5. There is confusion on PF/PNF duties for start and taxi.



TAXI & BEFORE TAKEOFF

1. Crew must have feet correctly positioned on rudder pedals for the RTO and must ensure on rudder check that full deflection is possible with current rudder pedal and seat settings to ensure full braking is available.

2. Boeing checklist - Compare checklist with standard Boeing checklist and make appropriate changes to avoid violations, e.g. non essential items have been inserted to the before take off checklist (as a reminder, Official Boeing Before Takeoff Check-List has only ONE item related to Flaps with only ONE answer). This causes distraction and unnecessary cockpit chatter when anticipation take off clearance. The consequence is the aircraft getting airborne without take off clearance. A return to the Boeing checklist and procedures is imperative.

3. Awareness V1 is brakes on speed NOT decision speed. Crews require RTO training and standardize simulator and line procedure.

4. Altitude awareness procedure should be incorporated into normal procedures.

5. A/P should be engaged in accordance with conditions and risk management principles. This decision should not be affected just because it is a training/checking flight.

6. Gear lever to be off when the AFTER TAKEOFF Check-List is requested, NOT immediately after gear retracts. There is NO rush to put gear lever to off. In rushing this procedure the FO has put the gear lever to DOWN instead of OFF.

7. Clarify procedure with landing/taxi lights on prior to taxi. In some darkness areas, some people hesitate to use the NOSE GEAR light just because it is assimilated in their mind as a takeoff or a landing clearance !


TAKEOFF

1. Captains should make FOs aware of VMCG speed when operating at low weights.

2. Crew must become more "wind aware" just prior to take off. Too much Aileron into wind for takeoff causes spoiler float. They must consider the implications of the effect of wind on the RTO, Pax evacuation, vortices and drift after takeoff. (See Boeing Flight Crew Training Manual which should be given to all Captains and FOs. This is no doubt the Boeing Bible…)

5. During the takeoff roll PNF should have his attention focused between scanning outside and inside (mainly Upper Eicas because every takeoff should be stopped before 80 knots for any problem or failure). When the PNF calls “Rotate”, the PF should crosscheck the value on its airspeed indicator before pulling the yoke. It has been observed three times in a month with three different pilots that people have only an outside scan.

6. In conditions of poor weather/high workload/problem, the autopilot must be engaged ASAP after takeoff (In high workload conditions the autopilot should be used till on final approach. An autoland should be considered to manage risk if conditions require).


CLIMB & CRUISE

1. Caution with shoulder harness release. Rapid release could injure someone or damage the P11 panel

2. When retracting flaps, PNF must check that his action on the flap lever is followed by the consecutive movement of the needle on the instrument. The old well known airmanship concept “ACTION-CHECK” is not an evidence for some BPA crews.

3. All FMA annunciation's should be called (see Flight Safety Foundation 2003 Symposium and recommendations).

4. PNF must not contact company or assistance company before 10 000 ft on the climb (with A/P engaged) and must warn the PF he is "off the air".

5. Hand flying the aircraft to cruise altitude in busy airspace is not good risk management as it significantly increases cockpit workload. When hand flying, it is mandatory that the PF calls for all AFDS changes to be done by the PNF so as not to disrupt scan.

6. Crew do not make pilot reports (PIREPS) regarding significant weather and turbulence to ATC.

7. No Altitude awareness procedures in place. Confirmation obtained on flight level changes selected in the altitude window. PNF points out the altitude window and calls “CHECK ?” while the PF responds “CHECKED”. Remember : altitude selector is again a killer switch !

8. All crew, at each waypoint must discuss in detail, the fuel variances (+ or – reported on the Jetplan) and at re dispatch point all crew must be aware of fuel state, destination and en route weather. The re file point is currently not even mentioned and it is a MAJOR event in operational safety on long range operations.

9. Altitude capability performance should have been cross-checked before departure and ESPECIALLY before changing altitudes. Crews often climb to very near thrust limits and well above the optimum plus 2000 ft. This is inviting a stall. (Coffin corner) Crew try to "out climb" weather and thunderstorms this way. Thunderstorms regularly grow up to 60000ft and above. This is a dangerous and futile exercise. When an altitude change is required, the figures must be checked by two crew members before initiating the climb.
Remember : Optimum altitude is the altitude that gives the minimum trip cost for a given trip length, cost index, and gross weight. It provides approximately a 1.5 load factor (approximately 48° bank to buffet onset) or better buffet margin. As deviation from optimum cruise altitude increases, performance economy deteriorates. Some loss of thrust limited maneuver margin can be expected above optimum altitude. Levels 2000 feet above optimum altitude normally allows approximately 45° bank prior to buffet onset. The higher the airplane flies above optimum altitude, the more the thrust margin is reduced. Before accepting an altitude above optimum, determine that it will continue to be acceptable as the flight progresses under projected conditions of temperature and turbulence.
BEST RECOMMENDATION : to always fly at a maximum of 1500 ft below Maximum altitude given by FMC !

10. BPA Crew put newspapers as “big” sunvisor, often with the newspapers held up in such a way that if a hazard appears or an interception occurs, it would not be noticed.

11. En route emergency, suitable, destination and alternate weather is not obtained regularly. It must be obtained and related to notams and the appropriate weather document for that route. If an emergency occurs in the cruise that requires an immediate landing, crew will not have ALWAYS the necessary information at their disposal unless this procedure is followed. Maintain situational awareness at all times. Constantly check en route weather for diversion airfields weather as well as weather at destination and alternate. The crew must develop a situational awareness cocoon around the aircraft at all times.

12. Crew must calculate thru the FMC drift down altitudes / speeds with engine out and place data. Crew must always be aware of 1 engine out performance with respect to optimum altitudes, grid mora's and MEA's. This is not done especially when flying over the Alps. BPA should provide specific charts with recommendations as the well-known one provided by Jeppesen. This should be also done on flights bound to Bangkok or to Male when overflying Iran or Pakistan… Routes and aerodromes briefings should be provided by BPA.

13. The crews do not always understand the RNP concept and the philosophy attached to the IRS NAV ONLY which appear on both FMCs. As a remainder and according to the 2003 International Regulations: in case of non-availability, or failure of the Nav-aids (IRS NAV ONLY message), the following time limits should apply :
1. B-RNAV : do not exceed 2 hours after the latest IRS alignement or nav update
2. RNP10 :
– do not exceed 6 hours 12 minutes after the latest IRS alignement.
– do not exceed 5 hours 54 minutes after a DME/DME update or at the runway threshold.
– do not exceed 5 hours 42 minutes after a VOR/DME update.
3. MNPS : no specific limitation.

COPY OF THE REPORT WRITTEN BY Captain XXXX (PART 3)


DESCENT & APPROACH

1. Descent briefing should be concise and should not exceed 2 minutes After missed approach, discuss alternate course of action. Diversion fuel requirement, routing and altitude and diversion field and weather. Autobrake must be included, discussed and set in landing briefing. Making the Captain select Autobrake minimum after the gear is down and while he is PF can induce vertigo/disorientation and breaks down instrument scan at a critical phase of flight close to the ground. Autobrake should be used with airmanship in mind. It is not necessary to use it for every landing and considerable cost savings can be made here with reduced brake and tire wear.

2. Crew must anticipate turbulence penetration speeds (FMC entries)

3. In case of Cat2/3 approach a quick remainder should be available in the QRH

4. All altimeter call outs must be referenced to pressure altimeter. Cat 2/3 to Radio altimeter only. Radio altimeter setting procedures must be reviewed.

5. Crews do not confirm new cleared altitudes when reset in altitude window.

6. Approach checklist must be done at the correct time and the checklist must not be continued if an item is not complete. (again a return to the Boeing checklist and procedures is imperative).

7. Crews are reluctant to use the speedbrakes. Safety takes priority over passenger comfort. If the speedbrake is needed, it must be used without hesitation.

8. Outer marker height call is to check for glide slope functionality and ensure the correct QNH is set. It is often missed and the consequences can be dire.

9. It is Italian or french procedure to do a time check at the outer marker. (There is no reason for this that we know of). On inquiry, the crew said it is so that the crew can downgrade to an NDB/VOR if the ILS fails. You then have timing to the missed approach point. This attitude may have had a contributory factor to the Guam accident due to the trained mind set. Crews must be trained, in the event of a malfunction of the primary approach aid on any approach, an IMMEDIATE missed approach is necessary. Reestablish situational awareness, find out the problem, re brief and then re-enter the safety window. There is NO other way.

10. Understand the meaning of the terms: radar contact, under radar control and radar vectors.

11. An urgent review of Cat 2/3 procedures is required. Most of the questioned pilots feel CAT3A as a ”let’s go whatever” concept.

12. If a diversion is required, the Captain makes the decision to divert, NOT the dispatcher or the Top Management as was currently the case. It happened with a foreign Captain on board, the FO consults with the dispatcher in Italian and the Captain does not know what they are saying. The crew is then divided as the Captain will want to go with his plan having assessed all the options. The FO will actively oppose the Captain in diverting to his intended airfield of diversion if it is not the same as that of the dispatcher for fear of upsetting the dispatcher. This dispatcher has no idea of aircraft condition or fuel status. The dispatcher may by all means make suggestions to the crew. He may offer alternatives that may assist the company and provide weather, but the decision lies with the Captain and his crew alone. When the decision is made they must support him, implicitly. This is currently a totally unsatisfactory set of circumstances. Some rumors state that one captain has been sacked because his decision to divert was not “politically correct” according to BPA management. If that kind of rumor is confirmed, BPA is much more a dictatorship than an airline with safety concerns.

13. Chart depicted on the EHSI should be checked versus navaids by the PNF before starting descent (Radial & distance of the RDMI checked against the FIX page). A lot of people think that a GPS equipped aircraft never lies… And some forget that the BPA 767 fleet is different : only one aircraft is GPS equipped, the others not…

LANDING

1. Use of autopilot is totally acceptable to manage risk during an approach.

2. Correct crosswind technique (for landing) to be taught. Crews are using rudder, rudder trim or and aileron trim for landing and pitch trim for the flare. Crew must be taught about the effect of yaw on aspect ratio with swept wing aircraft. Large rudder inputs close to the ground may cause damage.

3. Crew must make more use of visual cues in VMC conditions. For the visual approach, the two most important "instruments" are the window and the VSI. Monitoring the VSI is extremely important on wide body jets and is largely ignored by some people. Crews tend to stay head down for the entire visual approach. Look up and look out.

4. The landing sequence is not correctly realized by most of the BPA 767 pilots. According to the Boeing Flight Crew Training Manual (737 technique is the same as the 767 !).
1 – At touchdown, when Main Landing Gear is on the ground, up and aft rapidly to interlock
2 – When Nose Gear is on the ground, normal reverse until 60 knots
Confusion throughout the fleet on who is PF/PNF on landing roll and the hand over/changeover of control when FO is flying. Some Captains assume control at 80 knots with all thrust reversers coming out, some at 60 knots etc. This must be standardized thru the FCTM. At 60 knots, the LH seat pilot should call “my control” (with the hand onto the steering) giving the signal to the RH seat pilot to release brake pressure and control on the yoke.

5. Nobody should touch the autobrake selector during the landing roll. The RH seat pilot should select the autobrakes OFF when runway is vacated. When captain stows speed brake, clean up automatic. Easy…

6. Go around by 1000 ft RA (IMC) or 500 ft RA (VMC) mandatory if unstable or landing check-list not complete. Management must be trained in the appropriated management of handling of crews with respect to the go arounds. Missed approach when necessary is good airmanship. There should be no fear of disciplinary action after a go around. Minima must NEVER be violated. This is poor airmanship, unsafe and totally unprofessional.

7. All height calls with reference to the pressure altimeter except cat 2/3 calls.

8. Manual flying in poor weather or by night after a long duty is poor management of resources. A monitored coupled approach policy will stop unsafe maneuvers close to the ground and also help eradicate any potential tail strike on landing.

9. Some crew believe it is "not possible to get windshear if there are no mountains" despite thunderstorms in the vicinity. Windshear training is required.

COPY OF THE REPORT WRITTEN BY Captain XXXX (PART 4)


GENERAL STANDARDS

1. SOPS (Standard Operating Procedures) and call outs must be designed for each fleet. Note all callouts require responses. This is to ensure that there is no incapacitation. All pilots make mistakes from time to time. SOP's ensure a level of operation that is standard and well inside the operating envelope of the aircraft. They give the crews confidence in what they are doing. In flying " confidence is contagious, complacency kills." A complacent crew member is a dangerous crew member.

2. Crews are largely unaware of checklist philosophy. A thorough understanding of the checklist and how to manage it is the foundation of a safe operation.

3. AERAD charts have been choosen for economy reasons, not for ERGONOMY reasons. The latest audit organized by Britannia on the topic (June 2003) should be read by the BPA management. The conclusion of the audit was : “AERAD charts philosophy is well different from the one acquired by cockpit crews for years while they have been used to use JEPPESEN charts (…) Less Information, less details (…) JEPPESEN is a MUST to maintain a reasonable level of good airmanship in the flight deck.

4. Current procedures require that the individual crew members operate totally independently of each other. They do not keep each other informed of what they are doing. This is a major risk to flight safety. The crew is a team and must share ALL information. Improved communication will result in improved safety. Crew must announce all changes in frequencies, headings, altitude, courses and switch positions.

6. No circuit breaker of a normally functioning system should be pulled in flight. Any CB that is pulled must only be done with the permission of the Captain and after all crew have discussed the implications thereof.

7. PNF doing the radio often does not wait long enough for ATC to respond after a request is made. This results in the PNF transmitting the request again, just as ATC is responding and transmitting a response. The result is a blocked transmission and failed communication. This often happens a second time for the same reason. Pressure now builds quickly as other aircraft are trying to get in a transmission. Use correct RT procedures.

8. Crew must learn to treat all clearances with suspicion. Never just accept a clearance unless you are totally happy that the clearance is reasonable.

9. Two crew members must be in the cockpit at all times, except for physiological reasons. Crew to announce whenever leaving the cockpit. On return to cockpit the returning crewmember will be told "no change" or advised of any change in ATC, switch position, or aircraft status.

10. Smoking in the cockpit is totally UNSAFE

11. No reading of non-operational material or food preparation in climb or descent.

12. Pilots should take meals at separate times. This in case of an emergency. This is just about the position that the crew wish to eat, and they always eat at the same time. An emergency could have serious consequences if all the crew aren't totally prepared.

13. Loosening of collar and tie reduces fatigue and should be encouraged.

14. No checklist must proceed if any crewmember says "standby". The correct procedure is to read the checklist to where the crew member says standby and then say: e.g. Holding at flaps. Crewmember who stopped the checklist must call for the checklist to proceed when ready.

15. All crew must be involved in fuel decision. Currently, it's the Captain only.

16. Crew must understand what reserve fuel is required i.e. Min tanks + diversion + holding. Crews develop fixations on the destination airfields and do not plan for diversions. Diversions do not just occur because of weather. Airfields can close for a multitude of reasons like fire, hijacking, strong winds etc. Crew must always be diversion orientated.

17. BPA flight operations seem to totally dictated to by the commercial department or top management without due consideration being given to flight safety. NO NEW airport should be operated into unless the standards department of flight operations has done a full and thorough investigation into it and EVALUATED it. The decision of flight operations must be FINAL as they are the flight safety experts. Commercial departments relate only to the bottom line and this is NOT always the cheapest way in the long run.

18. Captains must be trained as aircraft "managers" and must delegate responsibility and manage resources to conduct a safe operation under adverse conditions. This obviously requires that all crew are competent, current and proficient. It is a shame that Captains and FOs are not authorized to rest into the Business Class even this one is empty ! The reaction of Flight Crew Members could be violent within the next few weeks…

19. Headsets must be worn during climb and descent and optional in cruise.

20. Limited knowledge is evident on aircraft performance, specifically take off and landing performance. Refresher courses should be conducted on contaminated runways and anti skid problems. Boeing should be consulted when operational questions arise.

21. Take off and landing briefing must be updated and must provide a logical flow without regurgitating too much info so that the important information is lost. They must include strict and vigilant awareness of Grid MORA, Sector safe altitude and initial approach altitudes. Diversion planning must be made timeously and with adequate fuel reserves. Planning must be done for go around and missed approach, diversion fuel requirement, and routing.

22. Medical department must get involved with crew training with respect to Medical emergency training and management of incapacitated crew members. Crew must be aware of the doctors bag contents and trained in the management of in flight medical emergencies. Knowledge of doctor's bag and contents is essential. The mismanagement of these problems can have major liability problems for BPA.

23. BPA cabin service is of the highest standard as far as presentation and appearance is concerned from a passenger's point of view.

24. English standard needs to be improved to enhance safety with ATC and ground communications. Many of the world best airlines (Swiss, KLM, Emirates, Lufthansa, SAS, Finnair etc.) have English as a second language, but within the airline it is the primary language. All crew however have a very high standard of cockpit English. Publications are in English to ensure crews maintain English currency and competence. A good standard of English is mandatory for flight safety. It is, after all, the international aviation language.

25. CRM should be incorporated into all aspects of BPA's operation. This includes management, training, safety and discipline. Sadly, CRM doesn't seem to leave the ground school building.
A training method of evaluation should be adopted that has the capability of allowing positive reinforcement into the assessment. Constant negative evaluation only is negative training and is destructive.

26. Extra crew talking in the cockpit in terminal areas is unacceptable but occurs most of the time.

COPY OF THE REPORT WRITTEN BY Captain XXXX (PART 5)


MANAGEMENT FEEDBACK FROM THE CREWS

BPA crew were very open about pointing out areas of concern for the good of the company. There is tremendous good will within the company and the staff are very keen to see things improve. Good suggestions were made and crews were grateful to have a mechanism to express themselves without fear of retribution or retaliation.
Their feedback is listed below.

1. The flight operations department appears to have poor communications between management and the staff. There is very little feedback to the crew on any matters, important or otherwise. The Foreign Captains especially, source most of the company information via the rumor network. This is a most unsatisfactory and of little benefit to anybody. It appears that the silent, secret dis-information technique is a current management style. The recent tragedy involving the Swissair accident highlights the incredible success Delta and Swiss Air had using rapid, high quality and open communication techniques. THEY WORK and are used in all modern successful businesses!

2. Inter department communications within BPA also seem substandard. There are many examples that the "right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing". This can only be resolved by clear, honest and open communication throughout the company.

3. All BPA Aircrew spoken to expressed major aggravation regarding conditions of service, flight and duty time and salary.

4. In the words of the BPA B767 pilots :
- "They do not trust the company" regarding their salaries. There is no way to check. "They do not trust the salary" Any one who makes an inquiry regarding their salary faces victimization and may forfeit a command or be terminated.
- "General staff do not respect pilot positions". It is felt pilots have very low status in Top Management philosophy.
- "There is no team spirit”.
- BPA Crew members are aware of BPA's problems. However, if they go to management to make a suggestion there is fear of termination or suspension of promotion. A suggestion is seen as an insult to the management and dealt with swiftly. It sends a clear signal to others with the same idea. The “spy” concept is well identified in BPA. It contributes to a very bad image of the Top Management
- "BPA procedures are not Boeing standard." Each Captain wants a different procedure.
- If a crew member has good flying skills it does not mean that he should be made a Captain. Captains in today's cockpits are "Managers" and as such it takes many years as a FO to develop these management skills. There is no substitute for experience. This process typically takes 10 years on various aircraft types, operating in a good training environment, with good Captains as role models, to be achieved.
- BPA Crew want a democratic system of seniority that involves date of hire and competence.
- The upgrade system is dishonest and unfair. First Officers can suddenly find their career comes to a halt for no apparent reason. They say there may be a secret reporting system and they are too afraid to ask why their promotion has been stopped.
- Employees say we work for "Blue Panorama" and do not say "our company". The employees themselves do no see themselves as part of the company. The morale is low and they do not feel proud of it.
- Crew feel being over worked with inadequate rest and inadequate salaries


5. The quality of the BPA hotels for the crew has constantly been dropping over the past year. This has now reached a stage that adequate rest can no longer be taken before a scheduled international departure, so flight safety will be an issue here (Male for example).

6. There is a low level of airline aviation knowledge in certain areas of the company. These areas include check list philosophy, altitude capability (coffin corner), pilot incapacitation, wind shear, instrument approaches, flight planning, Category 2/3 training, high speed flight, instructional technique and principles of flight to mention just some. To solve this, management must select candidates and send them overseas for training at internationally recognized training establishments. They will be trained correctly to international standards and must return with the correct information to set up courses here. This is the core of the training department.(These courses must be attended every year so the company does not fall behind). This information must all be coordinated through the Chief Pilot in charge of training through the respective Fleet Captains in charge of training. The goal being that ALL instructors teach the correct thing the same way. Without international exposure to stimulate lateral thinking on these problems, a good solution is unlikely to be found. The current technique of deciding policy amongst each other inside the company has not produced positive results.

7. Foreign crews do not trust the BPA management with respect to contracts. That’s one of the reasons why 33 B767 pilots left the company for the last 2 years…

8. Any time crew are traveling as extra crew while on duty, they are not revenue producing and are costing the company money. A quick check of the ratio of actual hours flown to extra crew hours flown will prove that this is a highly costly and inefficient method of crew scheduling.

9. Crew with low time should be flying on the domestic to develop handling skills. Crews sent directly to the long range fleet will not gain the flying experience necessary to develop as airline pilots. Command time in most national carriers is typically about 10 years with crew having obtained both long and short haul experience as FO's before obtaining a short haul command.



10. It is imperative that the BPA training staff visit the training departments of other airlines. This will enable them to see how other airlines do their training. The networking established helps keep training standards up to date.

11. Crew who make positive contributions to the company do not have their contributions acknowledged, and are shown no gratitude for it for it.

12. Management are quick to condemn any crew member for any unusual situation/incident and take quick and harsh, some times career destroying action before analyzing all the facts. Crews are generally afraid to do a go around or diversion as management may see this as a shame or embarrassment to the company. This is despite the fact that the crew member performed entirely professionally and appropriately. They may face disciplinary action.

13. Management is currently reactive with many situations and problems. A proactive approach will avoid problems by anticipating them and making the appropriate policy decisions to ensure they are correctly managed. It is not appropriate to apportion blame to an individual immediately, as there may be other causes of the problem. All problems must be evaluated. It may indeed have been as a result of a management or training problem that manifests itself in an incident/accident. An "open door policy" by management is the path to take for a free flow of information and it must know that management will not "shoot the messenger".


SUMMARY

None of the aforementioned statements are intended to be disrespectful or antagonistic to the BPA management. They are real facts and perception expressed by the crew in the hope of opening up communications. People trust that they will be seen as open and honest, and taken in the context of trying to make Blue Panorama a better company.

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