Off topic vari

[Halberdier]

No, il discorso e' semplicemente che i siciliani non avevano alle spalle una potenza che gli passava le armi sotto banco.

Né dovevano tenere un fronte di combattimento.

C'entra con il fatto che hanno mandato un esercito a controllare territori dove lo Stato era minacciato.
Come ha fatto Roma.
La differenza sta nel fatto che la Sicilia non aveva un Putin che gli dava tonnellate e tonnellate di armi.

Più probabile si trattasse di un Roosewelt o di un Truman, o qualche altro nome del genere.

Infatti una persona intelligente capisce la differenza che ci passa, tu non sei tra quelli.

Te l'ho già detto, quando insulti qualcuno in realtà gli fai un grande complimento.

Paulhowe ti dirà che la società americana è la più coesa del mondo

Gli americani fanno tutto in grande. Anche il trolling.

[paulhowe]

Né dovevano tenere un fronte di combattimento.

La sicilia alla fine degli anni 40 se avesse avuto una potenza alle spalle, la guerra per l'indipendenza forse l'avrebbe fatta.

Più probabile si trattasse di un Roosewelt o di un Truman, o qualche altro nome del genere.

Certo qualcuno che gli dava armi e denaro.

[Halberdier]

La sicilia alla fine degli anni 40 se avesse avuto una potenza alle spalle, la guerra per l'indipendenza forse l'avrebbe fatta.
Certo qualcuno che gli dava armi e denaro.

Con i "se" ed i "ma" la politica la si fa solo a posteriori.

[Amati75]

Startfor ha rilasciato oggi l'analisi di quell che pensa possano essere le dinamiche del prossimo decennio (ogni 5 anni poi le aggiustano in base ai fattori in essere dato che ovviamente i fattori e le dinamiche possono cambiare per via di eventi non quantificabili).

Nel 2010 scrissero al roguardo della Russia:

RUSSIA:


Russia will spend the 2010s seeking to secure itself before the demographic decline really hits. It will do this by trying to move from raw commodity exports to process commodity exports, moving up the value chain to fortify its economy while its demographics still allow it. Russia will also seek to reintegrate the former Soviet republics into some coherent entity in order to delay its demographic problems, expand its market and above all reabsorb some territorial buffers. Russia sees itself as under the gun, and therefore is in a hurry. This will cause it to appear more aggressive and dangerous than it is in the long run. However, in the 2010s, Russia's actions will cause substantial anxiety in its neighbors, both in terms of national security and its rapidly shifting economic policies.

The states most concerned — and affected — will be the former satellite states of Central Europe. Russia's primary concern remains the North European Plain, the traditional invasion route into Russia. This focus will magnify as Europe becomes more unpredictable politically. Russian pressure on Central Europe will not be overwhelming military pressure, but Central European psyches are finely tuned to threats. We believe this constant and growing pressure will stimulate Central European economic, social and military development.


Ed ora quello che stnado a loro potrebbe essere lo scenario Russo da qui al 2025:

Russia
It is unlikely that the Russian Federation will survive in its current form. Russia's failure to transform its energy revenue into a self-sustaining economy makes it vulnerable to price fluctuations. It has no defense against these market forces. Given the organization of the federation, with revenue flowing to Moscow before being distributed directly or via regional governments, the flow of resources will also vary dramatically. This will lead to a repeat of the Soviet Union's experience in the 1980s and Russia's in the 1990s, in which Moscow's ability to support the national infrastructure declined. In this case, it will cause regions to fend for themselves by forming informal and formal autonomous entities. The economic ties binding the Russian periphery to Moscow will fray.
Historically, the Russians solved such problems via the secret police — the KGB and its successor, the Federal Security Services. But just as in the 1980s, the secret police will not be able to contain the centrifugal forces pulling regions away from Moscow this decade. In this case, the FSB's power is weakened by its leadership's involvement in the national economy. As the economy falters, so does the FSB's strength. Without the FSB inspiring genuine terror, the fragmentation of the Russian Federation will not be preventable.
To Russia's west, Poland, Hungary and Romania will seek to recover regions lost to the Russians at various points. They will work to bring Belarus and Ukraine into this fold. In the south, the Russians' ability to continue controlling the North Caucasus will evaporate, and Central Asia will destabilize. In the northwest, the Karelian region will seek to rejoin Finland. In the Far East, the Maritime regions more closely linked to China, Japan and the United States than to Moscow will move independently. Other areas outside of Moscow will not necessarily seek autonomy but will have it thrust upon them. This is the point: There will not be an uprising against Moscow, but Moscow's withering ability to support and control the Russian Federation will leave a vacuum. What will exist in this vacuum will be the individual fragments of the Russian Federation.
This will create the greatest crisis of the next decade. Russia is the site of a massive nuclear strike force distributed throughout the hinterlands. The decline of Moscow's power will open the question of who controls those missiles and how their non-use can be guaranteed. This will be a major test for the United States. Washington is the only power able to address the issue, but it will not be able to seize control of the vast numbers of sites militarily and guarantee that no missile is fired in the process. The United States will either have to invent a military solution that is difficult to conceive of now, accept the threat of rogue launches, or try to create a stable and economically viable government in the regions involved to neutralize the missiles over time. It is difficult to imagine how this problem will play out. However, given our forecast on the fragmentation of Russia, it follows that this issue will have to be addressed, likely in the next decade.
The issue in the first half of the decade will be how far the alliance stretching between the Baltic and Black seas will extend. Logically, it should reach Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea. Whether or not it does depends on what we have forecast for the Middle East and Turkey.


https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/decade-forecast-2015-2025


Discussione al riguardo:

https://forum.termometropolitico.it/...l#post14173491

Eh di grazia... dove sarebbe l' Off Topic qui,......?

[Lawrence d'Arabia]

Buonasera Signori e Signore,
anche questa sera va in onda il consueto programma di varietà che si occuperà di fantascienza, politica internazionale, paranormale e storia. Conduce Paulhowe. Buona visione.

Questo forum non delira solo nelle prime ore della giornata, grazie al fuso orario.