Grazie Putin!

[Siegfried]

impresentabile, ti quoto spesso, ma pensi davvero che putin stia con noi?
io lo vedo piu contro.
bah.
grazie

[impresentabile]

impresentabile, ti quoto spesso, ma pensi davvero che putin stia con noi?
io lo vedo piu contro.
bah.
grazie

No, penso che non stia con noi. Che non sia un nazionalrivoluzionario russo, in sostanza.
Però ha un pregio fondamentale, e in questo sta con noi: non avrebbe alcun problema a scatenare una guerra antisionista e antiamericana se questi pensano di calpestare il popolo russo o di ledere l'indipendenza della Russia. E, al giorno d'oggi, non è poco.

[carlomartello (POL)]

Ma finiscila con questa propaganda da atlantisti.
Putin antigiudaico e anti-israeliano non esiste nella realtà.





Putin and Katsav Sign Joint Declaration to Fight Anti-Semitism (Russia, Israel)


Apr 29, 2005
The Jerusalem Post
On April 29, 2005 The Jerusalem Post reported, "Russian President Vadimir Putin and President Moshe Katsav on Thursday signed a joint statement of cooperation which confirmed their commitment to combat anti-Semitism, xenophobia and national and religious intolerance. The statement in its preamble paid tribute to victims of the Holocaust and World War II. It then recognized the crucial contribution of the Red Army to the victory over fascism and reaffirmed the determination of both presidents 'to prevent yet another Holocaust tragedy and not to allow the attempts to rewrite history and the glorification of fascism.' The two presidents signed the statement after emerging from a meeting that lasted almost two hours. Putin had earlier in the morning presented the people of Israel with a large, impressive sculpture depicting a cluster of near-naked Holocaust survivors inside a barbed-wire compound on liberation day. The sculpture occupies a prominent position in the grounds of Beit Hanassi, the official residence of the president of Israel. Resurgent anti-Semitism in Russia and elsewhere was among the subjects discussed by Katsav and Putin at their meeting."
http://www.pluralism.org/news/article.php?id=9506

Dmitry Medvedev, President Putin's Favored Successor, Makes Hanukkah Visit to Moscow Jewish Center:


MOSCOW, Russia – Today Russia's President Vladimir Putin announced Dmitry Medvedev the current Deputy Prime minister, as his favored successor, as the next President of Russia.

Dmitry Mevdvedov has been a strong supporter of the Jewish community during his current service. Last week he spent a few hours with Jewish community leaders, discussing the development of Jewish life and the fight against Anti-Semitism in Russia. The meeting was headed by Russia's Chief Rabbi Berel Lazar at the Moscow Jewish Community center.The visit began with the top official publicly congratulating the Jewish community of Russia and Chief Rabbi of Russia Berel Lazar on the occasion of Chanukah and proceeded with a meeting about religious education, the perfecting legislation on education, and the functioning of institutions of higher education.

Chief Rabbi of Russia Berel Lazar and Alexander Boroda, the Chairman of the Board for the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia, hosted Mr. Medvedev and numerous other guests – Russia's Education Minister Andrei Fursenko and leaders of Jewish higher education institutions. The First Deputy Prime Minister began by addressing the threat of extremist propaganda – neo-Nazism, anti-Semitism and chauvinism. "These phenomena exist; we must not close our eyes to them. It is the state's role to clearly and rigidly fight these manifestations," stated Mr. Medvedev.
http://www.fjc.ru/news/newsArticle.asp?AID=608642


carlomartello

[carlomartello (POL)]

Putin's Pro-Israel Policy

by Mark N. Katz
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2005

The Russian government remains the greatest facilitator for Iranian nuclear ambitions. It has had close ties to terror-sponsoring regimes such as Syria and Saddam's Iraq. Russian president Vladimir Putin has not hesitated to oppose U.S. foreign policy. Washington and Moscow have clashed frequently over the Iraq war and its aftermath. But, mostly unnoticed by foreign policy pundits and Middle East watchers, Russia's policy toward Israel has undergone a steady shift.
Under Putin, Russia has not only declined to adopt Western Europe's increasingly shrill anti-Israel posture, but in many ways he has actually tilted Russian policy in Israel's favor, at least with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It would be a mistake, however, to interpret recent Russian shifts as due to a fundamental ideological shift. Putin neither seeks to please Washington nor to accommodate any domestic political imperative. Rather, Moscow's new Middle East policy results from Putin's personal calculation of Russian interests, one that does not find many other takers in his own government.
The Broader Russian-Israeli Relationship

While the Soviet Union was among the first states to recognize Israel in 1948, Moscow quickly changed course and aligned itself with Arab nationalist regimes. The USSR severed diplomatic relations with Israel following the 1967 Six-Day War and subsequently supported Palestinian nationalist and terrorist movements in the West Bank and Gaza.[1] Only in October 1991, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, did Moscow and Jerusalem again exchange ambassadors. During the Yeltsin years (1991-99), Russian-Israeli relations were relatively good, especially in terms of trade. But they again cooled during Yevgeny Primakov's tenure as foreign minister (1996-98) and prime minister (1998-99). Strongly pro-Arab, Primakov sought to shift Moscow's policy once more into the Palestinian camp.[2]
During his five years in power, Putin has worked to upgrade Russia's relations with Israel. Nevertheless, many differences remain. Jerusalem remains upset with Moscow's continuing support for Iran's nuclear program. Russian companies remain the main contractors behind the Iranian nuclear reactor at Bushehr. In 1995, Tehran and Moscow signed a US$800 million deal in which the Iranian government purchased a reactor and 2,000 tons of uranium.[3] In March 2001, Iranian president Muhammad Khatami traveled to Moscow where he finalized a $7 billion deal to purchase Russian military equipment. His defense minister, the force behind the agreement, returned to Moscow seven months later to seal the deal.[4]
Israeli policymakers view the Iranian nuclear program as posing a grave threat to Israeli security. When Ariel Sharon traveled to Moscow in October 2002, he raised the issue of Russian nuclear assistance to Iran.[5] Putin again rebuffed Sharon's concerns about Russian support for Iran's nuclear program during Sharon's November 2003 visit to Moscow.[6] In September 2004, the Israeli prime minister said, "there is no doubt" that Tehran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons and "that is a very big danger, especially since they succeeded in developing a rocket, the Shihab-3 that … puts Israel in its range."[7]
Similarly, the Putin administration has refused to end Russian support for the Iranian atomic energy program despite U.S., Israeli, and even European expressions of concern that Russian support is facilitating the Islamic Republic's drive to acquire nuclear weapons. Russian commentators have argued that the sale of nuclear reactors to Iran is vital to the survival of the Russian atomic energy industry, which has few other domestic or foreign customers.[8] The Russian government's reluctance to react to Israel's security concerns is no surprise. After all, the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran to Russia itself is not sufficient to affect a change in Russian policy.
As with Iran, economic considerations guided Russian policy toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In return for Moscow's political support, Saddam's regime rewarded Russian firms with oil development and U.N.-sponsored Oil-for-Food program contracts. Bolstered economically, Saddam sheltered terrorists like Abu Abbas, mastermind of the 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking, sponsored the Arab Liberation Front, and spent millions of dollars to reward family members of suicide bombers and other terrorists. Saddam threatened to attack Israel on several occasions and did, indeed, launch Scud missiles at Tel Aviv in 1991.[9] U.S.-led military action, rather than Russian or Israeli diplomacy, eliminated Iraq's threat to Israel.
The Putin administration has continued Russia's traditionally warm relationship with Syria. The Russian government continues to sell Syria arms. The Israeli security establishment fears that any weapons sold to Syria might fall into the hands of Hezbollah. During his October 2002 trip to Moscow, Sharon raised the issue with Putin but failed to get Moscow's commitment to halt these activities.[10] Indeed, when Syrian vice president Abdel Halim Khaddam met Putin three months later, among the projects they discussed was Russian assistance in upgrading Syria's Soviet-era weaponry as well as construction of both a nuclear power plant and a nuclear-powered desalination plant for Syria.[11] While the Putin administration has emphasized the similarities in Russian and U.S. approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Moscow has distanced itself from the Bush administration's policy toward Syria.[12]
The Putin Doctrine

The last of former Russian president Boris Yeltsin's six prime ministers, Putin assumed the presidency upon Yeltsin's 1999 resignation. Soon after he became prime minister, Putin moved to crush Chechen separatism, sending the full force of the Russian military into the renegade province. Natan Sharansky, the former Soviet dissident turned Israeli politician, visited Moscow shortly after Putin became president. While the United States and other Western governments criticized Russian operations in Chechnya, the Israeli government did not. Rather, Sharansky offered strong support for Putin's hard-line policy of not negotiating with terrorists but defeating them militarily instead.[13] Parallels between Russia's conflict with the Chechens and Israel's struggle with the Palestinians have resonated strongly with the Putin administration.
A year after the Russian army reentered Chechnya, peace talks aimed at settling the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian dispute collapsed. Active conflict was renewed as Yasir Arafat launched a new intifada. With the collapse of the Camp David II talks, the Russian Foreign Ministry appeared set to take on a major role as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians. During Arafat's August 2000 visit to Moscow, Putin declared Russia's support for "the Palestinian people's right to self determination."[14] Moscow, though, reacted coolly to Arafat's declaration that he would soon make a unilateral declaration of Palestinian independence. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov indicated that making such a declaration was the prerogative of the Palestinians but that Russian recognition might not be forthcoming, especially if a Palestinian declaration of independence would lead to more violence. "All circumstances and time frame must be weighed carefully," he said.[15]
Putin's decision not to attend or send Russian representatives to the October 2000 Sharm el-Sheikh summit had less to do with Russian disengagement than with a desire to avoid any process which the United States dominated. The center-right business daily Kommersant suggested that Putin did not want to be sidelined at the summit.[16] At the same time, Ivanov made clear that the Russian government would oppose any U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing a U.N. peacekeeping force for the West Bank and Gaza so long as Israel opposed it.[17] In March 2001, Russia, nevertheless, voted in favor of a resolution to dispatch international observers to Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Kommersant expressed surprise, noting that the Russian foreign ministry had rejected this proposal, apparently out of fear that if accepted here, it might also be applied to Chechnya. There was speculation that the Russian ministry of foreign affairs anticipated a U.S. veto and thus voted in favor in order to score points with the Arabs "without risking anything."[18] Russia repeated the pattern in September 2003 when the Security Council considered a resolution demanding that Israel not expel Arafat from the West Bank and Gaza. The United States vetoed the resolution while Russia voted in favor. However, Russia mitigated its traditional pro-Arab position with subsequent statements complaining that the Security Council vote had been "rushed."[19]
In January 2001, Putin received Israel's ceremonial president, Moshe Katzav. The two emphasized that "there can be no negotiations with terrorists." According to the daily Vremya MN,[20] "This was essentially the first time that Putin, who has said on numerous occasions that there can be no dialogue with the Chechen rebels, expressed support for this basic Israeli principle as a whole."[21]
Soon thereafter, Israeli voters gave Ehud Barak's Labor Party a resounding defeat, and Sharon became the new prime minister. Vilified by many European governments, Sharon, nevertheless, enjoyed good relations not only with U.S. president George W. Bush but also with Putin. According to Sevodnya, "Sharon is impressed with Vladimir Putin and has spoken approvingly of Moscow's Chechnya policy, saying that it is what the Israelis should have done in Lebanon."[22]
In the spring, when the new Bush administration indicated that it did not want to take as active a role as had the Clinton administration in negotiation of an Israeli-Palestinian peace, Moscow made clear that it would not seek to replace Washington in this role.[23] Putin expressed sympathy for Israel's position, even telling Secretary of State Colin Powell that "there is absolutely no logic" to Arafat's actions.[24] When Arafat again visited Moscow in May 2001, both Putin and Ivanov reiterated that "there were no differences between the Russian and the U.S. approaches" to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[25] Arafat could not hope to exploit differences between former Cold War rivals. The following month, the Kremlin made clear its displeasure with former prime minister Primakov's statement to a Jordanian paper in which he blamed Israel for the violence.[26] Ivanov reiterated that "Russia had no disagreements with the U.S. regarding the Palestinian-Israeli settlement process."[27]
In September, Sharon traveled to Moscow and met Putin. Putin referred to the fact that many Israelis originally came from Russia and other ex-Soviet republics, stating that he wanted them to "live in peace and security," and denounced terrorism, even as he also referred to Russia's "traditionally good" relations with the Arab world and the Palestinian Authority.[28]
As the Palestinian intifada continued, the White House and international community moved to reinvigorate diplomacy. The United States joined with Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations to form the Quartet. In January 2002, Andrei Vdovin, the Russian foreign ministry's special representative for Middle East peace, told the Russian government-owned daily Rossiiskaya gazeta that "there aren't any significant differences" between the approach taken by Russia and the three other cosponsors of the Middle East peace process.[29]
When Arafat, confined to his headquarters in Ramallah, appealed to Russia for assistance in pressuring Sharon to back off his hard-line policies, Putin told Arafat that "combating terrorism and extremism is the most urgent task facing the world community today."[30] Izvestia observed that, "The Kremlin's assessment of the situation could hardly have encouraged Arafat."[31]
During a March 2002 visit to Israel, Sergei Mironov, the speaker of Russia's Federation Council, the Russian parliament's upper house, canceled a meeting with his Palestinian counterpart as a result of "a ‘personal decision' not to ‘show politeness' to the Palestinians and not to visit the Palestinian Authority because ‘the terrorist acts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Israel have the same roots, mainly financial ones.'"[32] While the Russian foreign minister disavowed Mironov's remarks, the sentiment reflected Putin's thinking on Israel. In a statement suggesting that the Palestinian leadership knew this, Palestinian spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi told Vremya novostei that, "We became disillusioned with Russia's position a long time ago … Russia is following the U.S. lead more and more."[33]
The Putin administration may have become disillusioned with Arafat's leadership, but it was not willing to follow the Bush administration's position blindly. When Bush argued that Arafat was no longer a legitimate partner and needed to be replaced as Palestinian leader, Putin emphasized that Arafat was the elected Palestinian leader, and therefore talks must be held with him.[34] Nevertheless, Moscow played down its differences with Washington. In response to Bush's statement calling for the replacement of the Palestinian leadership, Aleksandr Yakovenko, official spokesman of the Russian foreign ministry, stated that, "[W]e read the president's speech carefully, and I want to point out that it makes no mention of Yasir Arafat personally."[35]
In December 2002, Israeli foreign minister Benjamin Netanyahu received a much friendlier reception in Moscow than he had in London or Paris. When Netanyahu raised the issue of Russia supporting pro-Arab resolutions at the U.N., Ivanov was conciliatory, even suggesting the time was near for Russia to "reassess its position and perhaps revise it."[36] While a brief diplomatic spat erupted between Jerusalem and Moscow in July 2003 over Ivanov's decision to meet with Arafat, the dispute did not last long. The Israeli government wanted to marginalize Arafat in order to bolster the position of the newly appointed Palestinian Authority prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). His resignation in September 2003 in the face of Arafat's obstructionism made moot the dispute.
In November 2003, Sharon and Putin once again met in the Kremlin. While Sharon expressed dislike for the Russian-drafted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1515 endorsing the U.S.-sponsored "road map,"[37] he called Putin "a true friend of Israel." For his part, Putin reiterated his concern about the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on migrants from Russia to Israel and proposed that Russia open an exhibit "devoted to the tragedy of the Holocaust."[38]
In January 2004, Russia, along with seventy-three other countries (including all those from the European Union), abstained from a U.N. General Assembly resolution asking the International Court of Justice to rule on the legality of the security barrier that the Israeli government was constructing to protect Israeli communities from Palestinian terrorism. Russian diplomats had tried to persuade the Palestinians and others not to put this resolution to a vote. Again, Russian concerns about its own Chechnya problem mitigated its historically pro-Palestinian position. This was because, as two Kommersant journalists noted, the resolution "sets a precedent in which an international organization … is asking the court to provide an expert assessment of the legality of actions by a country that is not prepared to accept its verdict. If the hearings go forward and the court decides in favor of the Palestinians, in the future nothing will prevent the European Union or the [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] from asking The Hague to assess, for example, the actions of the Russian authorities in Chechnya."[39] Nevertheless, after the International Court of Justice ruling, Russia voted in July 2004 to condemn the wall's construction.[40]
Also in January 2004, the Palestinians witnessed eroding Russian support when Nabil Shaath, the Palestinian Authority's chief foreign representative, met with Ivanov in Moscow to discuss the impasse in road map talks. Shaath blamed the Israelis, but Ivanov would have none of that. Ivanov reportedly told Shaath that, "the only person who can take the terrorist groups in hand is Yasir Arafat. But the Palestinian leader, who remains firmly in control of the situation … doesn't want to lift a finger to rein in the terror." The clear implication was that Russia considered Arafat the main obstacle and might even withdraw their diplomatic support for Arafat's continued leadership. Ivanov further chided Shaath for the claim that the Palestinian Authority's and Russia's positions coincided, insisting that the Palestinian Authority not seek to use Shaath's visit to Moscow for propaganda purposes. [41]
In April 2004, the Russian foreign ministry condemned the Israeli killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. But according to Vremya novostei, it only did so "cautiously."[42] By contrast, Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the Federation Council's international affairs committee, spoke positively of Israeli actions: "The killing of Yassin by the Israeli military means that Israeli special forces are essentially doing the job of eliminating terrorist groups for the Palestinian security organs."[43]
Later that month, Kommersant reported on the Bush administration's support for and EU opposition to Sharon's plan to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza and build a fence inside the West Bank. Shaath called on Russia and others to persuade Washington to abandon its support for this plan. But as Kommersant noted, the Palestinians should not pin their hopes on Russia: "As Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said yesterday, ‘A withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza is a step in the direction indicated in the road map.' True, he qualified his statement by saying that such a step could be useful ‘provided that it is not the last.'"[44] In a subsequent meeting with Shaath at the Russian foreign ministry, Lavrov offered Shaath no recourse as he repeated almost verbatim the words of George Bush. [45]
Where Goes Russia's Middle East Policy?

Under Putin, concern over Chechnya and renewed anxiety about terrorism has led Russian policy to tilt toward Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Still, although Russian-Israeli relations have become close under Putin, he is not willing to forego for the sake of Russian-Israeli friendship strong ties with Middle Eastern regimes that Jerusalem considers threatening. But at the same time, Putin has not been willing to forego strong ties to Israel—now worth more than $1 billion annually—for the sake of friendship with Iran and rejectionist Arab regimes. In this sense, Putin has pursued an "evenhanded" policy toward Israel on the one hand and radical regimes in Iraq, Iran, and Syria on the other. This makes Putin's "tilt" toward Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians all the more remarkable. What explains it?
One possible explanation is that Putin does not want, as Ashrawi suggested, to oppose U.S. foreign policy on an issue that is so important to Washington.[46] The fact that Moscow has opposed the United States on so many other issues may make Putin's support for Washington on this one issue more important. This is unlikely, though. Putin, after all, has opposed the United States on issues of key importance for Washington, such as both the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq and Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program. Despite this, Russian-U.S. relations remain relatively good. It is difficult to imagine, then, that the prospect of annoying Washington is preventing Moscow from pursuing a more pro-Palestinian policy. Russian foreign policy observers acknowledge that much of Russian foreign policy is actually predicated on a desire to spite the Americans.[47] The Putin administration has clearly not feared negative U.S. reaction to Russian votes for pro-Palestinian U.N. resolutions.[48] Pleasing the United States, then, cannot explain Putin's pro-Israeli tilt.
Russian domestic politics—specifically, concern over Chechnya—may play an important role in shaping Putin's policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Officials and commentators in both Russia and Israel have frequently pointed out the similarities of the fight against the Chechens and the Palestinians. Like Palestinian terrorists, Chechen rebels have launched a number of attacks on civilian targets in Russia, including attacks on hospitals in southern Russia during the first Chechen war (1994-96), the seizure of a Moscow theater in 2002, and a series of attacks in the summer of 2004 that culminated in the death of hundreds of school children in Beslan.[49] This similarity in predicament seems to have increased sympathy for Israel in Russia. But the translation of domestic concern about Chechnya on Russian policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is complicated. A succinct description of the contradictory Russian domestic political factors affecting this appeared in the liberal daily Sevodnya, which, under Kremlin pressure, ceased publication in 2001:

Russia is on very delicate ground. On the one hand, our people account for one-quarter of Israel's population, and the violence in the Middle East is being incited by the same people who are inciting it in the North Caucasus … On the other hand, Moscow would offend Russia's millions of Muslims and the numerous "friends of the Palestinians" among the political elite if it took an openly pro-Israeli position.[50]

Indeed, as Konstantin Kosachov, vice-chairman of the Duma's International Affairs Committee, pointed out, the Duma has no shortage of either pro-Israel or pro-Palestinian deputies.[51]
There are limits to how the Russian public's increasing awareness of terrorism and sympathy toward its victims can translate into support for Israel. According to the 2002 Russian census, there are 14.5 million Muslims in Russia, or about 10 percent of the population, compared to just 230,000 Jews.[52] Anti-Semitism still persists. The combination of a large Muslim population, a small Jewish one, and the persistence of anti-Semitism among ethnic Russians would seem to militate in favor of a pro-Palestinian foreign policy instead of a pro-Israeli one. Being similarly besieged in the war on terrorism, then, is not the only factor driving the Russian tilt toward Israel.
Economic concerns, of course, are among Putin's priorities. It is not clear, however, whether a pro-Palestinian tilt in Russian foreign policy would harm the Russian-Israeli economic relationship. The relatively pro-Palestinian tilt in Russian foreign policy during Primakov's tenure as foreign and prime minister did not prevent growth in the Russian-Israeli economic relationship.
What, then, explains Putin's pro-Israeli tilt vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? In a Russia where Putin increasingly dominates domestic and foreign policies, the pro-Israel tilt must be a result of Putin's personal choice. Sympathy for Israel's position is something Putin maintains despite the traditional preference of the Russian foreign ministry and most of the foreign policy elite. It is true that other Russian politicians have voiced pro-Israeli sentiments. Many of these, however, may simply be parroting Putin's position instead of actually agreeing with it. If Putin is followed by a pro-Palestinian president, they would probably change their tune accordingly.
But what has motivated Putin to make this choice? Putin's history indicates a deep, emotional commitment to defeating the Chechen rebellion. He denies that the Chechen rebels have any legitimate basis for complaint against Moscow and refuses to negotiate with them. Putin does not appear to doubt the rightness of his hard-line policy toward Chechnya, even in the face of international outrage. Sunni Islamists see Russia as being as much of an enemy as the United States and Israel. European leaders criticize Russian human rights abuses in Chechnya. Even at the height of Russian collaboration with "Old Europe" to block United Nations approval for the U.S-led intervention in Iraq, French president Jacques Chirac raised the issue of Russian human rights violations in Chechnya while hosting Putin at a Paris banquet.[53] After the September 2004 Beslan tragedy, the Russian foreign ministry "reacted with outrage" at the implied criticism of Moscow's policy in an EU statement asking "the Russian authorities how this tragedy could have happened."[54] Very few have given the unequivocal support for Putin's Chechnya policy that Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon has.
Sharon, who is fluent in Russian, has established a genuine bond with Putin. Both share a similar mindset about their Muslim opponents: they are terrorists with whom there can be no negotiation. Both Putin and Sharon use force against opponents they believe undeserving of sympathy, and both share a bond formed by their resulting vilification in the West.
While Sharon is not the first or only Israeli official to express sympathy for Russia's Chechnya policy, Sharon's key role in the improvement of bilateral relations is suggested by the improvement under his watch. Prior to Sharon's accession, Putin was content to leave the Israeli-Palestinian issue in the hands of the strongly pro-Palestinian Russian foreign ministry. Only after his first meeting with Sharon in September 2001 did Putin's pro-Israel tilt emerge.
Could this change? A more leftist government in Israel would probably be less sympathetic toward Putin's hard-line policy in Chechnya. By the same token, a Russian government willing to negotiate with the Chechens would probably not be as sympathetic as Putin now is to the current hard-line Israeli approach toward the Palestinians. Sharon would have had less reason to value relations with a Moscow willing to accommodate the Chechens. But so long as Putin remains Russia's president and Sharon (or someone like him) Israel's prime minister, the close Israeli-Russian relationship will probably continue to develop, especially if Sharon's successor is also a Russian-speaker. The strong Russian-Israeli trade relationship alone provides an incentive for Moscow and Jerusalem to maintain good working relations to some degree. The Russian foreign policy elite's pro-Palestinian sympathies might emerge again, though, with Putin's successor.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.

[1] Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 288-9; idem, Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 110-23.
[2] Robert O. Freedman, "Russia and Israel under Yeltsin," Israel Studies, Mar. 1998, pp. 140-69; Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Sept. 16, 1998; Talal Nizameddin, Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 122-41.
[3] Michael Eisenstadt, "Russian Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran: Policy Challenges to the United States," Arms Control Today, Mar. 2001; idem, Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), p. 11; The Washington Post, May 4, 1995.
[4] Islamic Republic News Agency, Oct. 1, 2001.
[5] Vremya novostei, Oct. 1, 2002, English translation in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (hereinafter, CDPSP), Oct. 30, 2002.
[6] Ibid., Nov. 4, 2003, in CDPSP, Dec. 3, 2003.
[7] Jerusalem Post (Internet version), Sept. 8, 2004.
[8] Ekho Moskvy Radio, Dec. 27, 2002, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, Dec. 29, 2002.
[9] Robert O. Freedman, "Moscow and the Gulf War," Problems of Communism, July-Aug. 1991, pp. 1-17; The Moscow Times, Oct. 25, 2004.
[10] Rossiiskaya gazeta, Oct. 2, 2002, in CDPSP, Oct. 30, 2002.
[11] Trud, Jan. 17, 2003, in CDPSP, Feb. 5-12, 2003.
[12] Kommersant, May 13, 2004, in CDPSP, June 2-9, 2004.
[13] Izvestia, Jan. 29, 2000, in CDPSP, Mar. 1, 2000.
[14] Nezavisimaya gazeta, Aug. 12, 2000, in CDPSP, Sept. 13, 2000.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Kommersant, Oct. 21, 2000, in CDPSP, Nov. 15, 2000.
[17] Nezavisimaya gazeta, Nov. 17, 2000, in CDPSP, Dec. 13, 2000.
[18] Kommersant, Mar. 29, 2001, in CDPSP, Apr. 25, 2001.
[19] Ibid., Sept. 18, 2003, in CDPSP, Oct. 15, 2003.
[20] MN is an abbreviation for Moskovskiye novosti.
[21] Vremya MN, Jan. 24, 2001, in CDPSP, Feb. 21, 2001.
[22] Sevodnya, Feb. 8, 2001, in CDPSP, Mar. 7, 2001.
[23] Noviye Izvestia, Apr. 18, 2001, in CDPSP, May 16, 2001; idem, May 23, 2001, in CDPSP, June 20, 2001.
[24] Ibid., Apr. 18, 2001, in CDPSP, May 16, 2001.
[25] Izvestia, May 30, 2001, in CDPSP, June 27, 2001.
[26] Kommersant, May 30, 2001, in CDPSP, June 27, 2001; idem, June 20, 2001, in CDPSP, July 18, 2001.
[27] Izvestia, June 29, 2001, in CDPSP, July 25, 2001.
[28] Kommersant, Sept. 5, 2001, in CDPSP, Oct. 3, 2001.
[29] Rossiiskaya gazeta, Jan. 22, 2002, in CDPSP, Feb. 20, 2002.
[30] Izvestia, Jan. 23, 2002, in CDPSP, Feb. 20, 2002.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Vremya novostei, Mar. 13, 2002, in CDPSP, Apr. 10, 2002.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Vremya MN, Mar. 30, 2002, in CDPSP, Apr. 24, 2002; idem, June 26, 2002, in CDPSP, July 24, 2002; idem, July 18, 2002, in CDPSP, Aug. 14, 2002.
[35] Izvestia, June 27, 2002, in CDPSP, July 24, 2002.
[36] Kommersant, Dec. 24, 2002, in CDPSP, Jan. 22, 2003.
[37] "Security Council Adopts Resolution Endorsing Road Map Leading towards Two-state Resolution of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," U.N. news release, Nov. 19, 2003.
[38] Vremya novostei, Nov. 4, 2003, in CDPSP, Dec. 3, 2003.
[39] Kommersant, Jan. 20, 2004, in CDPSP, Feb. 18, 2004.
[40] Vremya novostei, July 22, 2004, in CDPSP, Aug. 18, 2004.
[41] Kommersant, Jan. 22, 2004, in CDPSP, Feb. 18, 2004.
[42] Vremya novostei, Mar. 23, 2004, in CDPSP, Apr. 21, 2004.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Kommersant, Apr. 16, 2004, in CDPSP, May 19, 2004.
[45] Ibid., Apr. 17, 2004, in CDPSP, May 19, 2004.
[46] Vremya novostei, Mar. 13, 2002, in CDPSP, Apr. 10, 2002.
[47] Kommersant, Mar. 29, 2001, in CDPSP, Apr. 25, 2001.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Nabi Abdullaev, "Chechnya Ten Years Later," Current History, Oct. 2004, pp. 332-6.
[50] Valerya Sychova, "Who Are You for, the Israelis or the Palestinians?" Sevodnya, Oct. 14, 2000, in CDPSP, Nov. 15, 2000.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Nezavisimaya gazeta, Nov. 11, 2003, in CDPSP, Dec. 10, 2003.
[53] Izvestia, Feb. 12, 2003, in CDPSP, Mar. 12, 2003.
[54] The Moscow Times, Sept. 6, 2004.


http://www.meforum.org/article/690


carlomartello

[carlomartello (POL)]

Israel-Russia Relations



Shlomo Avineri Carnegie Endowment Report Background
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have fundamentally changed the strategic balance in the Middle East and have had a profound impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Although the Middle East conflict never totally fit into a neatly polarized Cold War pattern, the Arab-Israeli conflict was for the most part sucked into the larger East/West confrontation. After a brief period (l947-51), in which the Soviet Union supported Israel when it was attacked by then Western-oriented Arab countries (mainly Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan), that opposed the l947 United Nations General Assembly resolution for the partition of the British Mandate of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies basically supported the Arab side in the wars against Israel in l956, l967, and l973, as well as during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in l982.
The support of the Soviet bloc was strategic, financial, ideological and diplomatic. Its main ingredient was the arming and training of the armies of radical Arab regimes (mainly Egypt and Syria) with massive state-of-the-art weaponry, coupled with a strategic umbrella consisting of two elements: re-supplying Egypt and Syria with abundant heavy weaponry after each war so as to redress the balance of power after heavy Arab losses of tanks and aircraft in each of the wars with Israel; and making it clear that in extremis the Soviet Union might intervene directly if Israeli armies tried to capture an Arab capital or were about to achieve a total victory over the Arab side; in l973 this caused the United States to call a world wide alert in response to information that Moscow might have been trying to send forces to assist Egypt after Israel crossed the Suez Canal.
This strategic umbrella effectively enabled Arab regimes to recoup politically from humiliating military defeats and gave them enough support to avoid the painful concessions that peace with Israel would have entailed. When the whole Soviet bloc (except Romania) broke diplomatic relations with Israel in the wake of the Six-Day War in l967, and Warsaw Pact countries joined an Arab initiative at the UN to brand Zionism as a form of racism, the Soviet Union and its allies moved ever so closely to the fundamental Arab position of delegitimizing Israel's existence, though Moscow always insisted that it objected to Israeli occupation policies after l967 but not to its very existence.
Suppression of Jewish culture within the Soviet Union and the crackdown on Jewish dissidents and refuseniks only added a further dimension to the tension between Israel and the Soviet bloc. All this deepened US strategic support for Israel.
Under these circumstances, Israeli policies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union focussed on two issues: Soviet support for radical Arab regimes (and the Palestinian Liberation Organization), and opposition to the repression of Jewish culture and activities within the Soviet Union. The first provided Israel with significant strategic support within the Cold War context; the second gave Israel an effective public relations access to many liberal human rights activists in the West, and made the issue of Jewish emigration a mainstay of the human rights criticism of Soviet power, especially after the Helsinki conference.
Gorbachev's "New Thinking" on foreign policy mitigated, in a series of steps, Soviet attitudes toward Israel and the issue of Jewish emigration. Soviet policies moved in the later l980's from an outright pro-Arab orientation to a position somewhere between the European and the US positions on the conflict--culminating in Gorbachev's participation, in the waning days of the Soviet Union, at the opening of the Madrid Peace Conference in Autumn 1991. Diplomatic relations with Israel were resumed (some countries like Hungary and Poland resumed relations even earlier, as part of their gradual de-communization); most significantly and dramatically, emigration bans were lifted. The latter has led to the immigration of almost one million former Soviet citizens to Israel in the last decade. This migration not only strengthened Israel, but also made Israel into the country with the largest Russian-speaking diaspora outside the former Soviet Union.
The disappearance of the Soviet strategic umbrella deprived Arab leaders of their military and diplomatic insurance policy. It was this that moved the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) toward the Oslo Accords with Israel and led the Syrian Ba'athist regime to agree to serious negotiations with Israel. Even if these negotiations have not yet borne fruit in the form of an agreement, they have greatly diminished the dangers of a new Syrian-Israeli conflagration and signified the realization of even radical Arab regimes that absent the Soviet Union and its strategic guarantee, the Arab side no longer possesses a military option, and that the only way to cut Arab historical losses would be through negotiations--and negotiations via Washington.
Soviet impotence and consequent acquiescence in the Gulf War, combined with the strengthening of Israel through the enormous contribution of former Soviet immigrants to the country's economic, technological, and demographic strength further tilted the balance of power in Israel's favor and caused a more realistic and pragmatic attitude among erstwhile radical Arab leaders. It is reasonable to state that had the Soviet Union still existed in the l990's, the window for peace offered by the Oslo Accords and the Israeli-Syrian negotiations would not have been available.
The last years have consequently totally changed the role of Russia (as the main successor state of the Soviet Union) in the Middle East. Russia still has its own agenda regarding Iran and Iraq, and as the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement (as well as its demise) suggest, there are aspects of Russian policy in the region which are deeply troubling. Yet it is convincingly arguable that in the case of Iran, Russia's motivation is as much economically driven as it is strategically-oriented; if a "thaw" in Russian-Iranian relations does have a strategic aspect, it certainly has Central Asian, rather than Middle Eastern, considerations at its core.
Regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, Russia today is a status quo power, interested in stability, not in stasis. While it was never true--contrary to occasional western Cold War propaganda--that the Soviet Union was the cause of Arab-Israel tensions and was interested in exacerbating them, it cannot be denied that instability in the region greatly enhanced Arab dependency on the Soviet Union and hence Soviet influence in the region.
At present--again, with the possible destabilization inherent in Russia's involvement in Iran and Iraq--Russia aims toward contributing to stability in the region in all that concerns Israeli-Arab relations. While Russian leverage in moving the Israel-Arab peace process is limited, its potential for destabilization (e.g. through undermining US-led negotiations) would still be considerable; yet Russian policy in the last decade has been consistently supportive of stabilization and of US peace efforts. Even Putin's more assertive rhetoric on other issues (like NATO-enlargement and National Missile Defense) is limited, in the Middle East context, to mild expressions calling for a Russian role in peace-making, without offering specific alternative policies which might hinder US-led peace efforts.
In the current Russian attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and toward Israel, four facets can be discerned that inform Russian policy, and all point in the direction of a Russian role which while not overly active, is certainly not destabilizing. Occasionally, even a clear tilt toward Israel can be identified. These facets are the following:
While the Soviet Union could through military aid and its diplomatic international clout greatly influence regional politics and hamper the peace process (as it did after Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty after l979), current Russian policies are premised on realizing the limits of Russian power and the narrowness of Moscow's policy options. After the breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation under Clinton at Camp David in July 2000, Russian officials did occasionally mention that Russia, as a co-sponsor of the Madrid Peace Conference, should not be excluded from further efforts of peace-making, but no specific alternative proposals were ever raised. Russian spokesmen reiterated Moscow's commitment to solving the conflict through peaceful means and called on both Israel and the Palestinian Authority to resume negotiations, yet no Russian initiative was ever launched. Putin himself insisted to Arafat, during his visit to Moscow after the failure of Camp David, not to declare Palestinian independence unilaterally and urged him to go back to the negotiating table.
This careful and non-committal language has been consistently used by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov during his various trips to the Middle East in the last months; even after some criticism from nationalist and communist deputies in the Duma about Russia's exclusion from the Sharm el-Sheikh summit in October 2000, Ivanov blandly responded that the summit's recommendations were identical with the Russian proposals and in any case they did not seen to have been excessively effective.
The Russian choice of maintaining a low profile can be ultimately attributed to a realistic assessment that Russia neither possesses a magic formula nor the necessary clout to do more than Washington tried to achieve in the last months of the Clinton Administration. Moreover, it appears that Moscow is aware that at present there is no obvious winning strategy, so why be a partner in what is basically going to be a failure? This may, of course, change if the region heads toward a major conflagration, yet the low profile approach appears to have been carefully thought out.
This realistic approach is not only substantially different from Soviet high profile involvement in which Moscow periodically suggested new strategies for solving the conflict; it is also methodically different in eschewing ideological wishful thinking in favor of a clear headed assessment based on what can be achieved given both the positions of the two sides as well as Russia's own diminished stature. The gap between rhetoric (and bluster) and reality, which bedeviled Soviet Middle Eastern diplomacy over the years, has narrowed considerably.
Current Russian policies also reflect a sober assessment of the Arabs' relative weakness and Israel's relative strength. Soviet policies tried to overcome the disparity by bolstering Arab military strength on the one hand, as well as attributing Israel's strength to its being an outpost and extension of American power. Current Russian thinking shirks from any support for Arab military options and recognizes the facts of Israel's military, technological, and economic edge as an essential attribute of its existence.
In line with the general de-ideologization of policy orientation in Moscow, this trend toward a realistic assessment of power relations causes Moscow to view Israel on the merits of its place in the regional balance of power; in a way this is similar to the Russian assessment (even under communism) of Turkey. This more knowledgeable and pragmatic approach to Israel has been partially caused by a better acquaintance with Israeli realities due both to the resumption of relations and better access to Israeli society through dialogue with and feedback from one million Russian-speakers in Israel. The ignorance about Israel, which permeated Soviet policy toward the country due to both ideological blinders and lack of access to Israeli society, has been superseded by an adequate assessment and judicious weighing of reality. The staff of the Russian embassy in Tel Aviv abounds with fluent Hebrew speakers, and they are able to counter-balance the kind of information that flows to Moscow from Arab capitals, which for decades was the only source of information to which policy-makers at the Kremlin could refer when making their decisions regarding Israel and the region. The Soviet-era information deficit has been publicly and privately admitted by top Russian policy makers in recent years.
In line with such a realistic assessment, the PLO appears as a weak factor vis-a-vis Israel; it has the potential of igniting a regional conflagration, and Russia remains committed--like the European Union (EU) as well as now also the United States--to Palestinian independence. But absent ideological distortions, a Russia that wishes to look for friends on its southern flank certainly looks to Israel, with its political and technological access to the West, rather than to the ailing, unreliable Arab orbit mired in Third World morass.
Moreover, since Russia lacks, on all sides, friendly neighbors, Israel now appears in some Russian thinking as a relatively strong country with which Russia has no conflict and does not threaten Russia. Israel can also, through its real or perceived closeness and access to US government, society, and public opinion, become a window to the West for Russia.
This attempt to be seen as more allied to Israel than to its adversaries has also informed Russian pronouncements about the recent outbreak of Palestinian-Israel violence. While EU statements have occasionally been harshly critical of Israel, Russian pronouncements, while calling for continued negotiations, have been singularly devoid of criticism of Israel and have avoided condemning Israel's military behavior in the Palestinian territories. Obviously, with the legacy of its own brutal behavior in Chechnya, Russia is not exactly in a good position to preach restraint in the use of force or fire power against civilians.
On a different level, aspects of joint Israeli-Russian defense and industrial cooperation opened avenues to western technology and markets to which Russia does not have easy access. The joint development of a new attack helicopter (Russian hardware, Israeli avionics) is just one example of a developing common strategic agenda. Under such conditions, and with these interests in mind, any Russian declaratory position that appears to be critical of Israel would obviously be counterproductive.
The brutal war in Chechnya, as well as Russia's perceived tilt against Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo, have greatly diminished Moscow's standing in the Arab and Muslim world in recent years. If under communism, the Soviet Union, incongruously as it might seem, could appear on the international scene as the Defender of Islam, building a common anti-Western ideological and strategic alliance with Muslim countries, today it is Russia that is perceived in the Islamic world, and not only among Islamic fundamentalists, as the enemy of Islam. After all, at the moment it is Russian, not American soldiers, who are involved in a murderous struggle with Muslim freedom fighters in Chechnya; and in Central Asia Russia is seen, directly and by proxy, as the mainstay of anti-Islamicist policies.
This shift does not enhance Russia's clout and standing in the Arab world, and creates a perceived common front with Israel against Islamic fundamentalism. Israeli right-wing politicians, like Ariel Sharon and Nathan Sharansky, have spoken about this alliance publicly, to the delight of Russian media and politicians. During the Kosovo campaign, Sharon (then Foreign Minister in the outgoing Netanyahu government) even expressed some sympathy with Belgrade; though immediately retracted under both domestic and international pressure, Sharon's statements were not lost on Moscow.
During Prime Minister Barak's visit to Moscow in early Summer 2000, Putin tried to persuade him to issue a joint statement against Islamic fundamentalism. Barak demurred, reportedly telling Putin in private that while operational cooperation against Islamic-inspired terrorism is an obvious joint agenda between Israel and Russia (and the United States), Chechnya is an internal Russian affair that has grown out of a national conflict, and Israel is not going to be drawn into supporting Russia's position regarding Chechen independence under an anti-Islamicist rubric.
Be this as it may, the Chechen war has certainly diminished Russia's interest in being supportive of Arab and Islamic positions and has opened Russia to some severe criticism in Arab public opinion. As an unforeseen and unintended consequence of its Chechnya policy, Russia is now paying the heavy price of being seen as an enemy in many sectors of the Arab and Islamic world. This development has further shifted Russian sympathies in the Middle East conflict, while at the same time further diminishing its policy options.
As mentioned earlier, around one million Israelis are Russian-speakers who immigrated in the last 12 years. They make up around 20 percent of Israel's Jewish population and are a powerful political, cultural, and economic force in the country. Their impact has not only been significant in the country's internal politics, but has also altered Russia's perception of Israel and hence bilateral relations and mutual perceptions.
Russians view the one million Russian-speakers in Israel as part of the Russian diaspora and as a major foreign policy asset. This creates a sometimes problematic osmosis or symbiosis of Russian and Israeli politics, which nonetheless further cements relations between both countries.
At the moment, there are three "Russian" parties represented in the Knesset (one of them with the very un-Israeli but very Russian name "Israel Is Our Home"). The "Russian" vote is the major bloc of swing voters in Israeli elections (pro-Netanyahu in 1996, pro-Barak in l999, pro-Sharon in the special 2001 elections). Israeli politicians appear regularly in interviews on Russian TV stations (which are avidly viewed, via satellite, by most Russian-speakers in Israel). Sometimes their appearances even go around the Israeli law restricting time allotted to election contenders on Israeli TV. In the recent elections, not only did Sharansky address Israeli Russian-speakers on various Moscow channels, but both Sharon and Barak made some of their statements in their political election broadcasts in Russian (which both of them speak a little due to their family background, despite the fact that both were born in Israel).
This aspect of the inter-connectedness of Russian and Israeli societies has other facets, some of them perhaps less savory: Gusinsky's problems with Russian tax authorities (and Putin in general) figure prominently in the Israeli media, since Media-Most owns one of the Russian-language mass circulation dailies in Israel and is also part-owner of Maariv, the country's third largest Hebrew daily. This caused Israeli politicians of all stripes, especially in the heated atmosphere of the recent election campaign, to intervene on Gusinsky's behalf--and make it known publicly, especially in the so-called "Russian street." Prime Minister Barak and Foreign Minister Ben-Ami thus intervened with the Spanish Prime Minister, asking for Gusinsky's freedom.
This close Russian-Israeli linkage is obviously a new discourse in Israeli politics, as are the structure and some of the characteristics of the "Russian" parties; they are commonly referred to, Moscow- style, as the "Sharansky Party," "Lieberman Party" and "Bronfman Party," to the exclusion of their official political designation.
These repercussions have also impacted some aspects of the Russian public's discourse on regional politics. Having a Russian diaspora in Israel gives rise to a novel Russian attachment to Israel and provides a different angle from which to look at the Middle East conflict. There are many expressions of this, the most pointed perhaps being Putin's statement in an interview he gave to ITAR-TASS on November 27, 2000. In a general interview on the Middle East, in which he reiterated his concern that the violence should not spread, Putin added (greatly exaggerating the figures):
Millions of people, or nearly one third of the Israeli population, have come from the USSR. We believe that our former citizens form a good reservoir for developing relations with other countries. We cannot be indifferent to their fate, and this is also true of Israel. Many of them have found themselves in the center of the conflict. This arouses Russia's concern and largely explains its interest in the Middle East.
This explicit note of empathy was not followed by any specific policy recommendation. However, it is emblematic of the new relationship between Russia and Israel that will remain a constant in the future thanks to Israel's vast Russian-speaking community.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union had far-reaching consequences for Eastern and Central Europe: it liberated nations from the Soviet yoke, brought about the unification of Germany, totally changed the European political map and consequently the global balance of power. Similarly, it has had no less of a tremendous effect on the Middle East.
The recent electoral campaign in Israel and Ariel Sharon's victory have similarly elicited a low-key response by Russian officials as well as the Russian media. While US and European media have generally depicted Sharon as an extremist, if not a dangerous hawk, usually also mentioning his Lebanon role and predicting dire results in the case of his election, reactions in Russia were much less critical. During the election campaign itself, Sharansky was given ample time on various Russian TV channels to explain his and Sharon's hard line positions, without much criticism from the interviewers. Sharon's victory itself was not criticized by official Russian spokesmen, given the general context of Russian attitudes to Israel mentioned earlier.
Since Sharon has in the past made some comments about closer relations with Russia, while generally suggesting that Israel should not rely exclusively on its US links, there would be in any case a subtext of sympathy for him in official Russian circles; a hard line vis-a-vis the Palestinians as Muslims might be seen in Moscow as highly laudable. Unless a major violent crisis follows the establishment of a Sharon-led government, one can expect a continuation of the current Russian line toward Israel. Similarly, one should not rule out attempts on the part of Sharon to capitalize on this relationship and even to try to formulate a more explicit strategic understanding with Moscow.
Shlomo Avineri is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for European Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. From September to December 2000 he was a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.


http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pub...fa=view&id=659


carlomartello

[carlomartello (POL)]

Momik ,il teatro russo d'Israele in scena al Teatro Due



PARMA, 27 OTTOBRE - Nell’ambito di Teatro Festival Parma arriva il Gesher Theatre di Giaffa, il teatro russo d’Israele, con lo spettacolo Momik, tratto dal famoso romanzo Vedi alla voce: amore di David Grossman, con la regia di Yevgeny Arie, in scena, domani, martedì 28 ottobre alle 21.00 e mercoledì 29 alle 20.00.

Fondato in Israele dal regista moscovita Yevgeny Arie nel 1991, fin dalla prima produzione Rosencrantz e Guildenstern sono morti di Tom Stoppard, Gesher è stato acclamato dalla stampa nazionale come “il miracolo russo del teatro Israeliano”. Gesher, che in ebraico significa ponte, ha creato effettivamente un importante tramite fra le cultura russa e quella israeliana.

Il libro di David Grossman racconta la storia dei superstiti dell’Olocausto vista da un bambino di nove anni, un membro della cosiddetta seconda generazione nata dagli immigrati in Israele dopo la seconda Guerra mondiale.

I genitori di Momik sono ebrei polacchi sopravvissuti all’Olocausto. Momik è un bambino di nove anni cresciuto nella Gerusalemme degli anni ‘50 in un’atmosfera di silenzio segreto e di malcelata paura.

I grandi si rifiutano di rispondere alle sue domande a proposito della loro vita nell’Europa nazista che nessuno nomina indicandola con un generico “laggiù” così Momik inventa una terra immaginaria “laggiù” dove la sua famiglia viveva felicemente prima della Guerra.

Chiunque lo circondi viene da “laggiù” e tutti costoro serbano ricordi dolorosi della “Bestia Nazista” che li ha torturati e ha ucciso le loro famiglie. Momik decide così di rievocare quell’incubo per riuscire ad esorcizzarlo.


Il racconto della storia dei superstiti dell’Olocausto è qui vista e descritta, con delicatezza comica e un po’ grottesca, da un bambino di nove anni, un membro della cosiddetta seconda generazione nata dagli immigrati in Israele dopo la Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Il racconto di questo piccolo straordinario protagonista, solleverà la storia del passato del suo popolo da toni cupi e tragici ammantandola invece dei colori della fiaba, e della semplicità quasi commovente che appartiene ai bambini.
Lo spettacolo sarà preceduto alle 19.15 dalla striscia quotidiana del Teatrogiornale di Roberto Cavosi.27/10/2008

http://www.parmaok.it/parmaok/spetta..._52710084.html


carlomartello

[carlomartello (POL)]

Nuovo regime dei visti tra Russia e Israele

È entrato in vigore un regime di liberalizzazione mutua dei visti tra la Russia e Israele. Lo rende noto l´agenzia informativa russa RIA Novosti.
Israele da tempo voleva cancellare l´obbligatorietà dei visti per la Russia, nel tentativo di raddoppiare i voli turistici verso la Russia e raggiungere le 400.000 unità annue nei prossimi due anni.
Israele era la terza destinazione turistica per i russi dopo gli Stati Uniti e la Francia, secondo le statistiche del 2007.

Gli osservatori hanno affermato che i viaggi senza visto tra i due Paesi saranno economicamente convenienti e storicamente naturali.
Gli immigrati dalla Russia e dalle altre Repubbliche ex-sovietiche sono più di 1 milione in Israele, che conta 7 milioni di cittadini in tutto: ciò significa che le visite ad amici e parenti sono prossime ad una grossa crescita.
I due Paesi hanno firmato un accordo per cancellare le norme sui visti già in marzo di quest´anno.
Le autorità israeliane, comunque, hanno raccomandato ai turisti russi di acquistare biglietti di andata e ritorno, utilizzare pacchetti vacanza, prenotare gli hotel o viaggiare con lettere di invito, oltre ad utilizzare carte di credito per evitare complicazioni presso i controlli dei passaporti in Israele. Le nuove norme permettono ai viaggiatori russi di visitare Israele per 90 giorni senza bisogno di un visto. Le stesse norme riguardano i turisti israeliani che intendono visitare la Russia. I possessori di passaporti diplomatici o business class, invece, devono ancora ottenere i visti, come anche chi viaggia per lavoro o studio.

Fonte: http://en.rian.ru - by Elena Arena

http://www.portalino.it/nuke/modules...icle&sid=32103


carlomartello

[impresentabile]

Ti sei dimenticato che ad agosto, subito dopo la guerra in Georgia, è stata inaugurata la sezione di Russia Unita. Ma perchè? Lo comprendi?

Chi ha fatto fuori il capo mossadista in Giordania?

[impresentabile]

Ti sei dimenticato che ad agosto, subito dopo la guerra in Georgia, è stata inaugurata la sezione di Russia Unita. Ma perchè? Lo comprendi?

Chi ha fatto fuori il capo mossadista in Giordania?

...???

[impresentabile]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXNTPjlU7CM