Il partito delle banche

[Vladimir Ilyich]

ma scusa, ma se la mmt è una teoria accettata e dimostrata, di che oste stai parlando? Lippi e boldrn sarebbero le banche? E se la teoria secondo la quale le banche creano moneta è addirittura sancita dalla normativa bancaria, perché dovrebbe essere controversa e avversata dagli economisti?

Scusami ma non si capisce cosa vorresti dire.

Non capisco se tu ritieni le banche dei meri intermediari tra prestatori e richiedenti prestito, o se ritieni che esse creino moneta elettronica contabile a fronte della promessa del debitore di ripagare il debito con moneta reale.

[markk]

Scusami ma non si capisce cosa vorresti dire.

Non capisco se tu ritieni le banche dei meri intermediari tra prestatori e richiedenti prestito, o se ritieni che esse creino moneta elettronica contabile a fronte della promessa del debitore di ripagare il debito con moneta reale.

no guarda, il mio scetticismo sulla creazione della moneta da parte delle banche l'ho già dimostrato.
Sei tu piuttosto che eviti di rispondere alle mie domande facendone delle altre.

[Vladimir Ilyich]

no guarda, il mio scetticismo sulla creazione della moneta da parte delle banche l'ho già dimostrato.
Sei tu piuttosto che eviti di rispondere alle mie domande facendone delle altre.

Ho postato una comunicazione della banca d’Inghilterra che ammette la natura esogena della moneta ed un paio di studi empirici, pubblicati su riviste peer reviewed, che mostrano come il denaro prestato non provenga dai CC dei correntisti o da assets precedentemente detenuti dalla banca.

Se puoi dimostrare che questo non é vero, accomodati.

Finora non hai dimostrato un cazzo dipinto, se non la tua ignoranza in materia.

[Entropia]

Tu invece potresti dare lezioni alla facoltà di economia, di monetarismo, giusto?

Amesso e non concesso poi che i sistemi monetari dipendano dalle banche, o solo da esse, il che è una corbelleria evidente.

Attenta osservazione e una sana e buona dose di buonsenso puoi capire molte cose, prova! Chi controlla il denaro è padrone dell'economia di quel paese...Per quello fanno i salti mortali per non mollare la gallina dalle uova d'oro.

[Conte Oliver]

Lenin,
con tutta la mia stima,fermati;non per le incredibili fregnacce che scrivi,ma perché il raffinato ragionare ogni tanto straborda nella boria intellettuale

E la riserva é 0% sui pronti contro termine, 1% per il resto.

Ovvero per ogni cento euri prestati a lungo termine, la banca deve avere una riserva di un euro.

Per i pronti contro termine, nessuna riserva é richiesta.

Leggasi: se una banca ha un milione di euro nel suo conto di riserva obbligatoria, può prestarne cento.

giusto,ma va letto all’incontrario; la banca deve tenere l'1% del passivo e il resto lo può prestare

tu lo leggi come se una banca con un passivo di 10 lo versa tutto alla BC e poi può prestare 1000!!

Le passività - ovvero i soldi prestati

i prestiti della banca fanno parte dell'attivo!!

non sono bilanciate dalla moneta presente nei conti correnti, o da altre attività. Sono bilanciate dal debito dei prestatari.

Tutto e solo questo.

che è quello che ti si dice, i prestiti sono tutti coperti dai debiti fatti dalla banca con depositari e obbligazionisti

[Conte Oliver]

Perché tu a pranzo mangi il primo e il secondo? Non ti basta il primo?

Comunque la creazione ex nihilo é stata scientificamente provata da Werner.

Ora chi la vuole negare deve portare le prove. Fino a che non le porterà, la tesi endogena é verificata.

è stata provato solo nella testa di chi non sa di cosa parla

Werner ha solo detto che una volta acceso un prestito il passivo non è cambiato, cioè una banalità

[Conte Oliver]

Lo sai quali sono gli assets che coprono i mutui erogati? I contratti di mutuo stesso!

E leggiti lo studio di Wener che ho linkato poco fa.

fermati, per cortesia

[Conte Oliver]

La banca d’Inghilterra stessa conferma la mia tesi:

https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/me...rn-economy.pdf

Thisarticleexplainshowthemajorityofmoneyinthemoder neconomyiscreatedbycommercial
banks making loans.
� Moneycreationinpracticediffersfromsomepopularmisco nceptions—banksdonotactsimply as intermediaries, lending out deposits that savers place with them, and nor do they ‘multiply up’ central bank money to create new loans and deposits.
� Theamountofmoneycreatedintheeconomyultimatelydepen dsonthemonetarypolicyofthe central bank. In normal times, this is carried out by setting interest rates. The central bank can also affect the amount of money directly through purchasing assets or ‘quantitative easing’.

ma guarda che sei di coccio

tutto giusto, ma tu sostieni che la banca può' prestare soldi che non ha!!

[Vladimir Ilyich]

fermati, per cortesia

https://jrc.princeton.edu/sites/g/fi...f-boewp529.pdf

In the intermediation of loanable funds model of banking, banks accept deposits of pre-existing real resources from savers and then lend them to borrowers. In the real world, banks provide financing through money creation. That is they create deposits of new money through lending, and in doing so are mainly constrained by profitability and solvency considerations. This paper contrasts simple intermediation and financing models of banking. Compared to otherwise identical intermediation models, and following identical shocks, financing models predict changes in bank lending that are far larger, happen much faster, and have much greater effects on the real economy.

Ma tu ne sai certamente di più di questi due ignorantoni, giusto?

[Vladimir Ilyich]

II. Misconceptions about Banks in ILF and DM Models
Subsection A contrasts the ILF and FMC views of banking. We first cite authoritative statements that express the FMC view, including recent publications of the world’s leading central banks, and leading economists of the past. Thereafter, using balance sheets, we study the problems with the ILF view in greater detail, and then explain that these problems can be corrected by adopting the FMC view. Subsection B discusses problems with the DM view of banking, again by citing leading central banks and economists. Subsection C adds brief comments on the roles of monetary and macroprudential policies.
A. ILF Models? New Loans Lead to Deposit Creation, Not Vice Versa
1. Statements by Central Banks and Early 20th Century Economists
The fact that banks create their own funds through lending is acknowledged in descriptions of the money creation process by leading central banks and policymaking authorities. The oldest goes back to Graham Towers (1939), the then governor of the central bank of Canada: “Each and every time a bank makes a loan, new bank credit is created — new deposits — brand new money”. Berry, Harrison, Thomas and de Weymarn (2007), staff at the Bank of England: “When banks make loans, they create additional deposits for those that have borrowed the money.” Keister and McAndrews (2009), staff economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York: “Suppose that Bank A gives a new loan of $20 to Firm X ... Bank A does this by crediting Firm X’s account by $20. The bank now has a new asset (the loan to Firm X) and an offsetting liability (... Firm X’s deposit at the bank).” Bundesbank (2012) (translation by the authors): “How is deposit money created? The procedure is equivalent to the creation of central bank money: As a rule the commercial bank extends a loan to a customer and credits the corresponding amount to his deposit account. ... The creation of deposit money is therefore an accounting transaction.” Mervyn King (2012), former Governor of the Bank of England: “When banks extend loans to their customers, they create money by crediting their customers’ accounts.” Lord Adair Turner (2013), former head of the UK Financial Services Authority: “Banks do not, as many textbooks still suggest, take deposits of existing money from savers and lend it out to borrowers: they create credit and money ex nihilo — extending a loan to the borrower and simultaneously crediting the borrower’s money account.”11 One can find similar statements from the private sector. One example is Standard and Poor’s (2013): “Banks lend by simultaneously creating a loan asset and a deposit liability on their balance sheet. That is why it is called credit "creation" — credit is created literally out of thin air (or with the stroke of a keyboard).”

The fact that banks create their own funds through lending is also repeatedly emphasised in the older economics literature. One of the earliest statements is due to Wicksell (1906): “The lending operations of the bank will consist rather in its entering in its books a fictitious deposit equal to the amount of the loan...”. Rogers (1929): “... a large proportion of ... [deposits] under certain circumstances may be manufactured out of whole cloth by the banking institutions themselves.” The following passage from Schumpeter (1954) is highly illuminating (emphasis added): “But this ... makes it highly inadvisable to construe bank credit on the model of existing funds’ being withdrawn from previous uses by an entirely imaginary act of saving and then lent out by their owners. It is much more realistic to say that the banks ... create deposits in their act of lending, than to say that they lend the deposits that have been entrusted to them. ... The theory to which economists clung so tenaciously makes [depositors] out to be savers when they neither save nor intend to do so; it attributes to them an influence on the "supply of credit" which they do not have. Nevertheless, it proved extraordinarily difficult for economists to recognise that bank loans and bank investments do create deposits. In fact, throughout the period under review they refused with practical unanimity to do so. And even in 1930, when a large majority had been converted and accepted that doctrine as a matter of course, Keynes rightly felt it to be necessary to re-expound and to defend the doctrine at length ...”. The first half of this statement is exactly the FMC view. The second half shows that a struggle to convince the economics profession, and policymakers, of the FMC view had been won by 1930. This is also reflected in the report of the Macmillan Committee (1931).
Unfortunately, the work of Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1956) brought a major step backwards in our understanding of banks and money. Gurley and Shaw replaced the critical distinction between banks, which can create their own funds in the act of lending, and non-bank financial intermediaries, which cannot, with the far less important distinction between intermediated and direct debt. They treated banks as simply another form of intermediary, and bank liabilities as simply another form of debt. This work was heavily (and correctly) criticised by monetary theorists of that time, including Culbertson (1958, p. 121), who writes: “A change in the volume of demand deposits, in contrast, is initiated by banks when they change the volume of their debt holdings; the banks’ creditors, as such, play no active role in the process. The banking system "creates credit" by acquiring debt and creating demand deposits to pay for it. The commercial banks do not need "to borrow loanable funds from spending units with surpluses" [as claimed by Gurley and Shaw] in order to extend credit...”. Similarly, Smith (1959) writes: “Commercial bank credit creation makes funds available to finance expenditures in excess of the funds arising out of the current income flow. ... Commercial banks ... are distinctly not intermediaries. That is, the decision to save a portion of current income and to hold the savings in the form of a demand deposit does not make any more funds available to the capital market than would have been available had the decision been made to spend instead, and does no more than to restore to the commercial banking system the lending power that was lost when the original cheque was written to transmit income to the recipient.”
Tobin (1963) played a critical role in establishing the ILF view of Gurley and Shaw as the new dominant paradigm. This paper stated explicitly that banks are not creators of money in the sense of the FMC view. Tobin’s argument is that the behaviour of the agents that receive the newly created bank deposits after they are spent will be a function of their portfolio preferences and the endogenous adjustments of returns on deposits and alternative assets, with some agents using the new money to repay outstanding loans, thereby quickly destroying the money. In other words, banks do not possess the same “widow’s cruse” as the central bank with its printing press,

and money created by banks is not a “hot potato” that can be passed along by non-banks but whose aggregate quantity cannot be changed by them. This however is not a counterargument to the FMC view, because the FMC view does not make these claims. In fact, its claim is precisely that the extent of credit and money creation is determined by the interaction of the optimisation problems of banks and their customers, and that the solution to these problems is interior, in other words that the extent of credit and money creation is finite. It is simply not useful to frame this argument in a black-and-white fashion, whereby either banks do or do not possess the power to independently create additional credit and money, as some opponents of the FMC view have done using the Tobin (1963) paper.12 Because, in order to challenge the FMC view in this fashion, one would have to argue that in general 100%, or close to 100%, of newly created bank money will be extinguished in the above-mentioned way in the short to medium run, so that money creation by banks cannot cause significant financial and real cycles. That however would be a very strange argument, of a kind that is never invoked for any other shocks, for example shocks to consumption demand. To see this, assume a credit supply shock whereby one group of agents receives larger loans and therefore larger money balances. This does not imply that another group of agents must automatically want to repay existing loans after receiving the additional money, just like a shock that increases the consumption demand of one group of agents does not imply that another group of agents must automatically want to reduce their consumption. In fact, in both cases, it implies the exact opposite. In the case of the credit supply shock, the reason is that the additional money creation stimulates additional economic activity, by facilitating additional transactions, which in turn means that households want to keep some of the additional money to support additional spending, rather than to repay existing loans. This phenomenon is very prominent in the simulations of our model. And it does not, contrary to what is alleged in Tobin (1963), depend on the assumption that banks create a special but hard-to-define liability called money. The critical insight is that banks can create their own funds instantaneously, and that there is a well-defined demand for those funds, whether they are called money or not. A portfolio-balance-type demand would be perfectly sufficient to generate similar results. But of course in practice the liability that banks create has monetary characteristics, and we therefore generate the well-defined demand in our models by way of a money demand function.
Two other important points need to be made concerning Tobin (1963). They relate to the fact that that paper’s analysis, which is verbal rather than model-based, is essentially static and partial equilibrium, while the key arguments of the FMC view can only be understood using a dynamic and general equilibrium analysis. First, perhaps the most critical difference between FMC models, where banks can create their own funds, and ILF models, where they cannot, turns out to be that the variables on bank balance sheets, deposits and loans, are jump variables in the former case and predetermined variables in the latter. In economic terms, banks in the ILF model can only lend after attracting real savings, which can only be accumulated gradually over time, while banks in the FMC model can create new money instantaneously and independently of any available quantity of real aggregate saving. This difference affects exclusively the dynamics of the models, as the long-run steady states of both models are identical. But it has dramatic consequences for the economy’s transition to its long-run steady state that simply cannot be captured in a static conceptual framework such as Tobin (1963). Second, Tobin (1963) relies in his arguments on the notion that when banks try to expand their balance sheets, some of their depositors will have more deposits than they wish to hold, and will switch to non-bank assets instead, thereby limiting the increase in the size of bank balance sheets. This may be true in some circumstances, but this in no way affects the size of the overall financial system. Because when deposits are withdrawn from the banking system, this can only happen if some matching assets are withdrawn from the same banking system. In the most extreme case of full withdrawal of all newly created deposits, the size of bank balance sheets does not change at all, but some assets that were previously held on bank balance sheets are now held on non-bank balance sheets. Overall, gross assets and liabilities throughout the economy have clearly increased by the exact amount of the bank loan. So long as the quantity of gross assets and liabilities is not neutral in the short and medium run, which is a key assumption of the FMC view with its emphasis on monetary effects, and which should have been an implicit assumption of Tobin (1963) with his emphasis on portfolio effects, this additional bank lending will therefore have real effects, irrespective of any partial equilibrium effects on bank balance sheets alone.
The analysis of Tobin (1963), and of the long subsequent literature in the same tradition13, is therefore subject to the same critique that Culbertson (1958), Smith (1959) and others directed at Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1956). However, this debate did not continue much beyond the 1960s, as the macroeconomic and monetary functions of banks disappeared almost entirely from mainstream macroeconomic theory. As a result, many important insights of the past have been forgotten14, and need to be relearned today.