Scrivete su Google: fallimento!!!

[Il Condor]

In Origine Postato da Oasis
Internet, cerchi 'fallimento' e trovi Berlusconi e Bush
Se inserisci 'fallimento' o 'failure', il motore di ricerca di Google rimanda rispettivamente alle biografie del premier italiano e del presidente Usa

Il primo risultato della ricerca di 'fallimento'
(dal sito della Presidenza del Consiglio)



Il primo risultato della ricera di 'failure'
(dal sito della Casa Bianca)







Roma, 6 gen. (Adnkronos) - Come trovare velocemente il curriculum di Silvio Berlusconi o di George W. Bush, su Internet? Basta cliccare sul motore di ricerca di 'Google' la parola ''fallimento'' o la sua 'omologa' inglese ''failure'' e ci si collega direttamente con il sito ufficiale di palazzo Chigi o della Casa Bianca.
E' l'effetto dell'ultimo 'raid' pirata operato da uno sconosciuto 'hacker' sulle pagine web. Entrando nel sito di 'Google' e inserendo il termine ''fallimento'' nella rubrica della ricerca nel web, il motore rimanda subito a 203.000 risultati ma proprio in testa, al numero 1 della lunghissima lista, si trova proprio il sito ufficiale del governo italiano e, in particolare, la pagina sul presidente del Consiglio, cliccando sulla quale si apre la videata con il curriculum di Silvio Berlusconi e la composizione del suo governo.
Analogamente, inserendo lo stesso termine in lingua inglese, ''failure'', il motore di ricerca riporta 13.800.000 risultati, il primo dei quali ad aprire la 'classifica' e' qualificato come ''Biography of President George W. Bush'' con il curriculum del capo della Casa Bianca, leggibile anche in lingua spagnola, con tanto di foto e di discorsi ufficiali tenuti dal presidente americano.

Ma lo avete letto cosa dice l'articolo ???!!!

E' l'effetto dell'ultimo 'raid' pirata operato da uno sconosciuto 'hacker' sulle pagine web.

Dico, ma lo sapete chi sono gli HACKER ???!!!

Lo capite che a esaltarli vi state sputtanando, che convincete sempre di piu' le persone normali che siete una mandria di balordi, che siete un potenziale pericolo per la sicurezza dei nostri computer, che convincete le persone normali a chiedere leggi sempre piu' "repressive" tipo il Patriot Act per difendere la propria sicurezza e quella dei propri computer, o non ci arrivate ?

Roba dell'altro mondo. Che eravate fuori dalla realta' lo aveva gia capito, ma sinceramente non credevo che foste cosi' pazzi da dichiarare apertamente il vostro tifo verso la pirateria informatica

[MrBojangles]

In Origine Postato da asti_sinistra
minacciano anke in pvt!!!

A me servirebbe un antispamming....

[MrBojangles]

In Origine Postato da Il Condor
Ma lo avete letto cosa dice l'articolo ???!!!

E' l'effetto dell'ultimo 'raid' pirata operato da uno sconosciuto 'hacker' sulle pagine web.

Dico, ma lo sapete chi sono gli HACKER ???!!!

Lo capite che a esaltarli vi state sputtanando, che convincete sempre di piu' le persone normali che siete una mandria di balordi, che siete un potenziale pericolo per la sicurezza dei nostri computer, che convincete le persone normali a chiedere leggi sempre piu' "repressive" tipo il Patriot Act per difendere la propria sicurezza e quella dei propri computer, o non ci arrivate ?

Roba dell'altro mondo. Che eravate fuori dalla realta' lo aveva gia capito, ma sinceramente non credevo che foste cosi' pazzi da dichiarare apertamente il vostro tifo verso la pirateria informatica

Madonna che cantonata!!! Non ci s'era mica arrivati, sai?

Meno male che ci è corsa in soccorso la tua "mente"...

[Barbera]

fffffffff.......grazie BADRONE....menomale ke c'e' l'intelligentia di destra a metterci al riparo dalla cattiva societa'!

Silvio Berlusconi (Milano, 1936) è laureato in giurisprudenza.

Nel 1962 inizia l'attività nel settore dell'imprenditoria edile. Diventa il primo operatore italiano nella realizzazione di centri residenziali e centri commerciali (Milano 2, Milano 3, il Girasole).

Nel 1980 fonda Canale 5, la prima rete televisiva nazionale, a cui si aggiungono Italia 1 (1982) e Rete 4 (1984). Il successo della tv commerciale gli consente di sviluppare varie iniziative, inserite, come tutte le altre società, nell'ambito della holding capogruppo Fininvest, fondata nel 1978.

Diffonde così la televisione commerciale in Europa: in Francia La Cinq (1986), in Germania Telefünf (1987), in Spagna Telecinco (1989). Con la Mondadori (1989) diviene il principale editore italiano nel settore libri e periodici.

Il Gruppo Fininvest, con le società Mediolanum e Programma Italia, sviluppa una forte presenza nel settore delle assicurazioni e della vendita di prodotti finanziari.

È Presidente dal 1986 della squadra di calcio Milan A. C., che sotto la sua gestione ha vinto sei campionati nazionali, quattro Coppe dei Campioni, due Coppe del Mondo e numerosi trofei internazionali.

Il 26 gennaio 1994 si dimette da tutte le cariche ricoperte nel Gruppo Fininvest.

Fonda il movimento Forza Italia e dà vita alla coalizione del Polo delle libertà e del Buongoverno. Alle elezioni del marzo '94 conquista la maggioranza e diviene Presidente del Consiglio. Nel giugno 1999 viene rieletto deputato al Parlamento europeo con tre milioni di preferenze. Dal 1996 al 2001 è il leader dell'opposizione democratica al governo della sinistra.

Vince le elezioni politiche nazionali del 13 maggio 2001 come leader della Coalizione della Casa delle Libertà con 18 milioni e mezzo di voti.

Maggio 2001

[il buttero]

In Origine Postato da Malik
Silvio Berlusconi (Milano, 1936) è laureato in giurisprudenza.

Nel 1962 inizia l'attività nel settore dell'imprenditoria edile. Diventa il primo operatore italiano nella realizzazione di centri residenziali e centri commerciali (Milano 2, Milano 3, il Girasole).

Nel 1980 fonda Canale 5, la prima rete televisiva nazionale, a cui si aggiungono Italia 1 (1982) e Rete 4 (1984). Il successo della tv commerciale gli consente di sviluppare varie iniziative, inserite, come tutte le altre società, nell'ambito della holding capogruppo Fininvest, fondata nel 1978.

Diffonde così la televisione commerciale in Europa: in Francia La Cinq (1986), in Germania Telefünf (1987), in Spagna Telecinco (1989). Con la Mondadori (1989) diviene il principale editore italiano nel settore libri e periodici.

Il Gruppo Fininvest, con le società Mediolanum e Programma Italia, sviluppa una forte presenza nel settore delle assicurazioni e della vendita di prodotti finanziari.

È Presidente dal 1986 della squadra di calcio Milan A. C., che sotto la sua gestione ha vinto sei campionati nazionali, quattro Coppe dei Campioni, due Coppe del Mondo e numerosi trofei internazionali.

Il 26 gennaio 1994 si dimette da tutte le cariche ricoperte nel Gruppo Fininvest.

Fonda il movimento Forza Italia e dà vita alla coalizione del Polo delle libertà e del Buongoverno. Alle elezioni del marzo '94 conquista la maggioranza e diviene Presidente del Consiglio. Nel giugno 1999 viene rieletto deputato al Parlamento europeo con tre milioni di preferenze. Dal 1996 al 2001 è il leader dell'opposizione democratica al governo della sinistra.

Vince le elezioni politiche nazionali del 13 maggio 2001 come leader della Coalizione della Casa delle Libertà con 18 milioni e mezzo di voti.

Maggio 2001

Hai lasciato nella penna la P2 e i pastrocchi con Craxi.
Dai ricopia in bella copia!

[Barbera]

In Origine Postato da Malik
Silvio Berlusconi (Milano, 1936) è laureato in giurisprudenza.

Nel 1962 inizia l'attività nel settore dell'imprenditoria edile. Diventa il primo operatore italiano nella realizzazione di centri residenziali e centri commerciali (Milano 2, Milano 3, il Girasole).

Nel 1980 fonda Canale 5, la prima rete televisiva nazionale, a cui si aggiungono Italia 1 (1982) e Rete 4 (1984). Il successo della tv commerciale gli consente di sviluppare varie iniziative, inserite, come tutte le altre società, nell'ambito della holding capogruppo Fininvest, fondata nel 1978.

Diffonde così la televisione commerciale in Europa: in Francia La Cinq (1986), in Germania Telefünf (1987), in Spagna Telecinco (1989). Con la Mondadori (1989) diviene il principale editore italiano nel settore libri e periodici.

Il Gruppo Fininvest, con le società Mediolanum e Programma Italia, sviluppa una forte presenza nel settore delle assicurazioni e della vendita di prodotti finanziari.

È Presidente dal 1986 della squadra di calcio Milan A. C., che sotto la sua gestione ha vinto sei campionati nazionali, quattro Coppe dei Campioni, due Coppe del Mondo e numerosi trofei internazionali.

Il 26 gennaio 1994 si dimette da tutte le cariche ricoperte nel Gruppo Fininvest.

Fonda il movimento Forza Italia e dà vita alla coalizione del Polo delle libertà e del Buongoverno. Alle elezioni del marzo '94 conquista la maggioranza e diviene Presidente del Consiglio. Nel giugno 1999 viene rieletto deputato al Parlamento europeo con tre milioni di preferenze. Dal 1996 al 2001 è il leader dell'opposizione democratica al governo della sinistra.

Vince le elezioni politiche nazionali del 13 maggio 2001 come leader della Coalizione della Casa delle Libertà con 18 milioni e mezzo di voti.

Maggio 2001

Nel 1962 inizia come imprenditore edile con finanziamenti "simpatici" scritti nel libro di Marco Travaglio L'odore dei soldi....
Negli anni 80 si iscrive alla p2 di Licio Gelli......
Nel 1980 grazie alla legge fatta apposta per lui da Craxi e compagni di merende inizia a trasmettere a livello nazionale (legge Mammi')
Poi si cucca Italia 1 e Rete 4 da Mondadori e Rizzoli......e frega Rete4 a De Benedetti con le norme che oramai tutti conosciamo.....o meglio le conosce meglio Previti......
Nel 1994 si dimette da tutte le cariche ricoperte nel gruppo fininvest e a dicembre nel 2003 ridetiene il 51% delle azioni tramite giri contabili( il resto e' quasi tutto in mano alla famiglia)....
Tutto il resto e' storia recente.....non posso scrivere imputazioni per 150 pagine........

[ago]

Eccoti Malik qualche approfondimento sulla prima parte del CV... Leggi bene, e cerca di capire quello che c'e' scritto...

6. Your early business career

Jul 31st 2003
From Economist.com


Milano 2

Your proudest business achievement in the 1970s was Milano 2, a very large development of offices and flats at Segrate on the outskirts of Milan. You had just started construction of Milano 2 in 1970, leading your small and dedicated team. By the end of the decade, the development was complete.

Yet you were nowhere to be seen in the company filings of the main developer, a limited partnership called Edilnord Centro Residenziale di Lidia Borsani (Edilnord). Successive managing partners of Edilnord were your cousin (Lidia Borsani), her mother (your aunt), and an Edilnord employee. Umberto Previti, the father of your friend, Cesare Previti, at the time a little-known lawyer in Rome, became Edilnord?s liquidator in January 1978 when it went into voluntary liquidation.

Nor were you to be seen in company filings for Societa Generale Attrezzature di Walter Donati (SOGEAT), the firm that developed the commercial part of Milano 2. SOGEAT was also a limited partnership. Its managing partner was Walter Donati, a Milanese accountant who became a director of many companies connected to Fininvest.

Yet jointly with Luigi Berlusconi, your father, you guaranteed facilities from Banca Popolare di Novara (BPN), an Italian bank, to Edilnord of at least 6.9 billion lire in 1973-77. You also jointly guaranteed facilities to SOGEAT from BPN of at least 4.7 billion lire in 1976-77. And, in 1978, you personally guaranteed facilities of 3 billion lire to SOGEAT.

Swiss registered companies with nominee directors controlled both SOGEAT and Edilnord, and the Swiss companies? shares were in bearer form. An internal document from one of your lenders, dated December 1976, shows that the bank believed you to be their beneficial owner. This was hardly surprising. Otherwise the bank would have been light on security for its loan.

Strict exchange-control laws were in force in Italy in the 1970s?prison sentences for violations were severe. The Swiss companies behind Edilnord and SOGEAT were punctilious in applying to the Bank of Italy for permission to bring into Italy a total of 4 billion lire in 1968-75 to increase the companies? share capital. The Bank of Italy agreed on condition that any post-tax profits made by Edilnord or SOGEAT would be remitted to the Swiss parent companies.

The Swiss company behind Edilnord, your brother, Paolo, and you all had bank accounts at Banca Rasini, a little-known bank with only one branch (in Milan), where your father, by then retired, had worked for most of his life.

The foundation of Fininvest

Today, the holding company at the apex of your family?s business empire is Fininvest. A corporate forebear of Fininvest is a company called Finanziaria di Investimento Fininvest Srl (Fininvest Srl), which was incorporated in Rome in March 1975. Mr G Foscale, your cousin, was its sole director. In 1975, both Umberto Previti and his son, Cesare, were appointed to Fininvest Srl?s board of statutory auditors.

Mr G Foscale mandated two trust companies to be the registered holder of the shares: SAF and Servizio Italia, both owned by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), then a state-controlled bank. The person who mandates a trust company is either the beneficial owner, or someone ultimately acting on behalf of the beneficial owner. Through use of a trust company, which shows up to the public as the registered shareholder, a beneficial owner remains anonymous. Use of them was common in the 1970s in Italy.

Before anti-money-laundering rules in 1991, a beneficial owner of shares registered to a trust company could sell shares and receive payment directly from the buyer under so-called ?franco valuta? transactions (ie, the money would bypass the trust company). The trust company would merely execute a share transfer when instructed by the beneficial owner, and not handle the money. With a franco valuta transaction, the trust company would have only a beneficial owner?s word that he had sold his shares.

In May 1975, Fininvest Srl?s shareholder(s) agreed to inject 2 billion lire by way of share capital. Fininvest Srl bought 80% of Italcantieri in July 1975 and the rest in November 1976. Construction work at Milano 2 was sub-contracted to this Milanese firm, set up in 1973 by two Swiss registered companies which had nominee directors and bearer shares. The sole director of Italcantieri from 1973 until July 1975 had been Luigi Foscale, Giancarlo Foscale?s father and your uncle. You joined Italcantieri?s board in July 1975, immediately after Fininvest Srl bought it.

Bank of Italy inspectors carried out a check in 1979 at Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde (Cariplo). They found evidence that suggested that Edilnord, Italcantieri and SOGEAT might belong to you.

In October 1979, the Bank of Italy asked the Guardia di Finanza to investigate. The Guardia di Finanza found that Edilnord had made profits of 2.44 billion lire in 1974-78 that should have been remitted to the Swiss shareholder (ie, your alter ego), as agreed with the Bank of Italy. And SOGEAT had made 3.3 billion lire in 1974-78 that had not been remitted to Switzerland. The total infraction amounted to 5.74 billion lire.

As result, a posse of Guardia di Finanza officers came to another of your companies on November 13th 1979. Mr Berruti, then a captain in the Guardia di Finanza, led the team. The previous day you had told Mr Berruti that you were merely an external consultant to Edilnord and SOGEAT. Mr Berruti resigned from the Guardia di Finanza that month. Despite the strong evidence of exchange-control violations (ie, your personal guarantees at BPN and another bank, and failure to repatriate post-tax profits), no legal action was taken against you.

You, as chairman, and your brother, Paolo, joined Fininvest Srl?s board in November 1975.

Fininvest Roma and Fininvest Srl merger*

Another direct corporate forebear of Fininvest is Fininvest Roma Srl (Fininvest Roma), incorporated in Rome in June 1978. It was a shell company with paid-up share capital of 20 million lire. Umberto Previti was its sole director until June 1979.

On January 29th 1979, Fininvest Roma and Fininvest Srl voted to merge, but based on their respective balance sheets at December 27th 1978.

For 18 months prior to the merger you had been trying to increase the share capital of Fininvest Srl from its paid-up level (2 billion lire). This was a meagre capital base for a man of your ambition, so you needed more share capital. At that time, ministerial approval was needed for a share capital increase beyond 2 billion lire. By mid-1977, Fininvest Srl had not obtained this. The authorities typically requested information such as details of a company?s beneficial owners.

You found a solution. As chairman of Fininvest Srl, you proposed that shareholders make interest-free loans on account of the approved share capital increase. As the approved increase was 18 billion lire, that meant up to 18 billion lire of shareholder loans could be received. Your proposal was approved on December 2nd 1977.

Unofficial records at SAF (one of the BNL trust companies) show that between February 1977 and August 1978, Fininvest Srl received interest-free shareholder-loans of 16.94 billion lire on account of the capital increase. These came in 25 tranches, sometimes on successive days. The obvious inference is that the money was received in cash or cash equivalent, such as bank cheques. SAF got the information from Giovanni Dal Santo, an ?interlocutor? and director of several Fininvest-related companies. Mr Dell?Utri?s technical consultant confirmed the accuracy of the list, but added that some of the funds may have come by ordinary current-account cheque.

In November 1978 Fininvest Srl decided to repay its shareholder loans of 16.94 billion lire and a 500m-lire convertible bond that had been issued in November 1976. What happened next is complicated?it is best understood by looking at steps 2-4 in table 1.



Your cousin, Mr G Foscale, told the BNL trust companies of the proposed redemption of shareholder-loans. The trust companies would be initial beneficiaries of three uncrossed bank cheques for a total of 16.94 billion lire, to be drawn on Fininvest Srl?s account with Banca Popolare di Abbiategrasso (BPA). He asked SAF to endorse the cheques in Mr L Foscale?s favour (ie, his father?s favour).

At the end of November, Mr Dal Santo, acting as interlocutor, picked up the three endorsed cheques from the trust companies. Mr Dal Santo gave the three cheques to Mr L Foscale, who was acting on your behalf. A negotiable cheque (ie, no named beneficiary) was also obtained for 500m lire. So there were four cheques in total.

On December 7th 1978 Mr L Foscale cashed the negotiable cheque and one of the three bank cheques. This came to 1.01 billion lire. So he had 1.01 billion lire in cash and 16.43 billion lire in cash equivalent (ie, the two remaining bank cheques)?17.44 billion lire in total. Thus 17.44 billion lire had left Fininvest Srl?s coffers.

That day, there was receipt from an unknown source of 17.5 billion lire into Fininvest Srl?s bank account at BPA. And on the same day, Fininvest Roma paid 17.5 billion lire to another party, whom the investigators were unable to identify from banking records, at the same BPA branch (see steps 1 and 8 of table 1). Since the Palermo investigators? inspection of BPA?s records precluded the introduction of funds by a third party, the money must have gone round in a circle. (The investigators deduced this because the total movements shown in BPA?s daybook for December 7th 1978 were 78 billion lire. The four bank account movements of around 17.5 billion lire accounted for 70 of the 78 billion lire. If a third party had introduced funds, there would have been movements of at least 95.5 billion lire (ie, 78 plus 17.5)).

As 17.5 billion lire had gone in and 17.44 billion lire had gone out of Fininvest Srl?s bank account at BPA, the shareholder-loans and the convertible bond together totalling 17.44 billion lire could not have been repaid. So Fininvest Srl still had 17.44 billion lire outstanding, even after this bank-cheque shuffling (steps 2 to 4).

In other words, the 17.44 billion lire needed to disappear from its balance sheet. The merger, effected by Mr U Previti and based on balance sheets drawn up as at December 27th 1978, was the answer.

Mr U Previti said there would be an interest-bearing receivable, due from Fininvest Srl, of 17.69 billion lire in Fininvest Roma?s balance sheet at December 27th 1978 (ie, the payment made by Fininvest Roma at step 8 of table 1 must have been included in that balance). When Mr Previti merged the two companies, he literally merged the two companies? balance sheets. The receivable of 17.69 billion lire in Fininvest Roma?s balance sheet simply netted off against the liabilities of 17.44 billion in Fininvest Srl?s balance sheets. Two of the equal and opposite accounting balances that had in effect arisen from the circular flow of funds had been eliminated.

The Holding Italiana companies

These operations were part of an even wider transaction involving 19 companies called Holding Italiana 1 (and so on sequentially to 19). Steps 6 to 7 in table 1 show how these companies were involved in the circular flow of funds.

The Holding Italiana companies have become synonymous with your family?s wealth as the owners of Fininvest, yet you are absent from these companies? filings until 1990, and even then you do not appear in all of them.

Acting on your own behalf and/or on behalf of someone else, by December 4th 1978 you had bought 10% of 23 holding companies and had given a mandate to Par.Ma.Fid, a little-known trust company, to act as the registered shareholder. By December 5th 1978 you had bought the remaining 90% and had mandated SAF.

As at December 5th 1978, the holding companies had combined share capital of 420m lire. As there were 23 holding companies, their combined share capital could reach 46 billion lire without any ministerial approval (ie, 2 billion lire apiece).

You appointed Mr L Foscale, your uncle, as the companies? sole director and mandated signatory for their bank accounts with BPA. Mr Dal Santo was appointed to their boards of statutory auditors.

You seemed to know the share issue was going to happen. By December 7th 1978 you had written to SAF to state that a total of 17.98 billion lire would be paid in as share capital to 19 of the holding companies ?presso le casse sociali? (at the companies? treasuries).

On December 7th 1978, the 19 holding companies received a total of 17.98 billion lire into their accounts at BPA. The source of nearly all the cash must have been the 17.44 billion lire (?46.8m in today?s money) in Mr L Foscale?s possession that day.

The 17.98 billion lire inflow was accounted for as share capital in the books of the 19 holding companies. These companies injected this amount as share capital into Fininvest Roma, thereby becoming the collective owners of Fininvest Roma. This transaction brought Fininvest Roma?s share capital to exactly 18 billion lire, all paid up.

In effect, a convertible bond of 500m lire and 16.94 billion lire in shareholder loans?received by Fininvest Srl, according to Mr Dal Santo?s information, in 25 tranches from February 1977 to August 1978?were recycled in December 1978 as fresh share capital for the 19 holding companies. The money had appeared all at once, as well.

However, the only new funds were 540m lire sitting in Fininvest Roma?s and Fininvest Srl?s bank accounts (see table 1).

As at December 26th 1978, Fininvest Roma had paid-up capital of 18 billion lire, all held by the 19 holding companies. The merger with Fininvest Srl had not yet happened. Fininvest Srl had paid-up share capital of 2 billion lire at that date. As part of the merger, its shareholder(s) must have exchanged his/their Fininvest Srl shares, which had been mandated to SAF, for 10% of the shares in the holding companies. This may explain why you mandated 10% of the holding companies? shares to Par.Ma.Fid.

It is reasonable to surmise that the provider(s) of the shareholder-loans to Fininvest Srl between February 1977 and August 1978 owned the other 90% of the holding companies.

1979 and 1980

In 1979, 45.4 billion lire (about ?104m in today?s money) flowed into the holding companies (see table 2). Nearly all of it involved money that had been sent round in a circle through companies under your control. The largest transaction of 27.68 billion lire is explained in the section below on Anna Maria Casati Stampa di Soncino?s legacy.

The holding companies put 32 billion lire in 1979 into Fininvest Roma by way of share capital, thereby apparently increasing its paid-up capital to 52 billion lire by December 31st 1979. But this money went straight out of Fininvest Roma, too, in effect whence it came. Therefore 32 billion lire of Fininvest Roma?s paid-up share capital of 52 billion lire were phoney.


In 1980, 20.05 billion lire was put into the holding companies in cash or equivalent, including 19.2 billion in late December 1980 (see table 2). This money was for Fininvest.

On December 22nd 1980, you wrote to the trust companies to say that 19.2 billion lire would be paid in as interest-free shareholder loans, with 90% going via SAF and 10% via Par.Ma.Fid. According to the holding companies? books, the funds came in four tranches of 4.8 billion lire in the last week of December.

Yet the investigators from Palermo found trace of only one transaction in banking records at Banca Rasini, the little-known bank with one branch, which was another banker to the holding companies. They found that 4.3 billion lire (ie, SAF?s 90% share of 4.8 billion lire) had been recorded in a transit account at Banca Rasini and so had the payment for the same amount to Fininvest. The receipt was in cash (or equivalent), and so was the payment. The receipt must have been in cash. If you had funded 4.3 billion lire from your personal account at Banca Rasini, there would have been a withdrawal from your account that day for that amount. There was not.

The transaction had been recorded in a transit account. In those days, some banks used transit accounts to record very short-life transactions (ie, one week maximum to maturity). Recording a transaction in a transit account indicated that it was for a customer who was not a client of the bank. There was therefore a serious anomaly ? for you were a Banca Rasini customer.



Banca Rasini

Banca Rasini acted as a bank to you, your brother, Mr Dell?Utri and his brother, your Swiss alter egos (the ones behind Edilnord and Italcantieri), and also Par.Ma.Fid. It was also very close to the Holding Italiana companies.

Armando Minna, a Milanese accountant, and his wife had founded Holding Italiana 1-23 in June 1978. Mr Minna, who was a member of the board of statutory auditors of Banca Rasini, set up bank accounts for the holding companies with Banca Rasini. You bought the 23 holding companies? shares in December 1978 in franco valuta transactions with Mr and Mrs Minna. Mr Minna was appointed a member of the board of statutory auditors of the holding companies.

In the bank?s internal records, each Holding Italiana company was categorised as ?hairdresser and beauty parlour?. Bank of Italy inspectors use this categorisation as one of the criteria for determining which bank accounts to inspect. The categorisation could have been a mistake, but there is no doubt that 23 ?hairdressers? would have been far less susceptible to inspection than 23 financial holding companies.

At the time, Giuseppe Azzaretto, a Sicilian, appointed in 1973, was Banca Rasini?s managing director. Mr Azzaretto was one of the banks? largest shareholders with 29.3%. Three Liechtenstein-registered companies held a further 32.7%, represented by Herbert Batliner, who runs one Liechtenstein?s leading trust companies.

Doubtless Mr Batliner represents many people who have valid reasons for privacy. Some clients did not. A court case in America in 1971 resulted in the conviction of two American citizens for evading taxes in the 1960s. They had done so through a Liechtenstein-registered front company that Mr Batliner had run on their behalf. Another court case from America (in 1998) revealed that Mr Batliner?s firm had acted for the common-law wife of a Latin American drug-trader. In 1989 the drug-trader had transferred $8m into a Swiss bank account. The account was held in the name of a Liechtenstein-registered company, represented by Mr Batliner who had been mandated by the common-law wife. The court case arose because the US government wanted to sequester the money, the alleged proceeds of narcotics trading and money laundering.

Anna Maria Casati Stampa di Soncino?s legacy

By November 1979, you had been living in a 17th century mansion, called Villa San Martino, for over five years. This beautiful house is in the town of Arcore, just north-east of Milan. You were not the legal owner; Anna Maria Casati Stampa di Soncino was. In September 1970, aged 19, Ms Casati Stampa became heiress to the family?s large fortune in tragic circumstances after Count Camillo Casati Stampa di Soncino, her father, shot her step-mother, her step-mother?s lover and then turned the gun on himself on August 30th 1970 in Rome.

As Ms Casati Stampa was under 21, the court appointed Giorgio Bergamasco, a senator and friend of the late count, as Ms Casati Stampa?s legal guardian. Cesare Previti, based in Rome and who had acted for Ms Casati Stampa?s step-mother, won Ms Casati Stampa?s confidence and became her lawyer. His role was to dispose of the estate, whereas Mr Bergamasco?s was to sign all the necessary legal paperwork in Ms Casati Stampa?s name. So Mr Bergamasco had legal control of her assets, while Mr Previti had practical control.

Traumatised, Ms Casati Stampa left Italy in 1970, briefly returned in 1972 and has lived abroad since. When she became 21 she gave Mr Bergamasco power of attorney over her affairs. Ms Casati Stampa declines to comment.

The Casati Stampa estate, mainly in Lombardy, included large tracts of land. As well as Villa San Martino and its parkland, the family owned about 250 hectares of land at Cusago. With effect from November 11th 1979, a company called Immobiliare Coriasco Spa (Coriasco) bought Ms Casati Stampa?s land at Cusago.

Mandated by Mr L Foscale, SAF were the registered holders of Coriasco?s shares, so Coriasco?s beneficial owners were anonymous. However, in Fininvest Srl?s 1976 accounts Coriasco was included as a wholly owned subsidiary. Coriasco?s only director was Giuseppe Scabini, who later became Fininvest?s treasurer.

Coriasco did not pay money for Ms Casati Stampa?s land. Instead, 800,000 shares, valued at 1.7 billion lire, in a company called Cantieri Riuniti Milanesi (CRM), a small property company, one of whose directors was Mr Dell?Utri, were given to Ms Casati Stampa. These shares represented a 40% stake in CRM. Around the same time 400,000 CRM shares were given to a trust company called Unione Fiduciaria, a subsidiary of an Italian bank. It is not known who the beneficial owner of these shares was.


Ms Casati Stampa was unhappy that she had been given shares in a company she knew nothing about in exchange for her land. She wanted the shares to be turned into cash. What followed next is best understood by referring to table 3.



The essence of what happened is that you arranged for a shell company of yours, Palina, fronted by a 75-year old stroke victim, to buy the 800,000 CRM shares from Ms Casati Stampa, and the 400,000 CRM shares from Unione Fiduciaria. Palina paid 1.7 billion lire to Ms Casati Stampa and 860m lire to Unione Fiduciaria. The investigators from Palermo did not find out where this money came from, as there was no trace of it at BPA. However, they found a bill from Unione Fiduciaria and a stamped share-transfer form signed by Mr Bergamasco, which strongly suggest that 2.56 billion lire was paid.

On December 19th 1979, Palina sold the 1.2 million CRM shares to Milano 3 Srl, another shell company. Milano 3 Srl paid Palina 27.68 billion lire (ie, more than ten times as much as Palina had paid weeks earlier). Palina was a cut-out company; it was incorporated in October 1979 and placed in liquidation in May 1980. There was nothing in its accounting records about the CRM share deals, or the sale of the CRM shares to Milano 3 Srl.

The transaction was a sham because Milano 3 Srl indirectly got the money to pay Palina from Palina. As table 3 shows, on December 19th 1979, Palina sent 27.68 billion lire to the trust companies, which then transferred this sum to holding companies? bank accounts at BPA. From there, the funds went through Fininvest Roma?s BPA account, and then, through Milano 3 Srl?s account to an unknown beneficiary.

Since the Palermo investigators? examination of BPA?s records precluded the introduction of funds by a third party, the funds must have gone round in a circle. This is because on the same day there was a receipt of 27.68 billion lire in Palina?s current account (ie, from Milano 3 Srl).

You seemed to have known what was going on. You had written to the trust companies on December 13th 1979 to advise them that a forthcoming payment of 25.68 billion lire was to be treated as shareholder loans to certain of the Holding Italiana companies. In the event you paid 27.68 billion lire. (Holding Italiana 18-19, not mentioned in your letter, received 2 billion lire.)

Milano 3 Srl was incorporated in November 1979, as a subsidiary of Fininvest Roma. Mr Dal Santo was its only director. The anti-Mafia investigator and the Palermo magistrates' technical consultant did not gain access to Milano 3 Srl?s books and records. However, Milano 3 Srl must have been the source of the 27.68 billion lire received by Palina on December 19th. It must also have recorded the 27.68 billion lire as an investment in CRM in its books. This investment was ?funded? by the 27.68 billion lire that it had received from Fininvest Roma the same day.

CRM merged (literally) into Milano 3 Srl in July 1980. Milano 3 Srl, the surviving company, renamed itself Cantieri Riuniti Milanesi. It was the same manoeuvre once again?elimination of two equal and opposite accounting balances that had arisen from the circular flow of funds. When the two balance sheets were merged, the balances in Milano 3 Srl?s books relating to the Palina transaction disappeared. Its investment in CRM shares would simply have been netted off against the related financing received.

It needed to be. Fininvest could not possibly have spent 27.68 billion lire on buying the 1.2 million CRM shares that you already owned (through Palina) since precisely the same amount of money had gone in and out of Palina?s bank account on December 19th 1979. And CRM?s shares had little value since CRM did not even own the land at Cusago? Coriasco did.

Mr Dell?Utri?s technical consultant told the Palermo court that, if this transaction had taken place after anti-money laundering rules were introduced in 1991, ?it would have had to have been reported? because of the amount of money involved.

Routing the funding for the Palina transaction through Fininvest Roma had the effect of puffing up this company?s assets and liabilities by 27.68 billion lire. As a part of the operation, Fininvest Roma?s share capital increased by 15 billion lire, treated as fully paid up. This share capital was phoney, as were the rest of the accounting entries relating to this operation. In other words, manufactured bank-account movements, made possible by Palina, which completed the circle, lent spurious credence to hollow accounting entries.

Immobiliare Coriasco

Coriasco (the company that acquired the Cusago land) also made a share issue in 1979 that was not what it seemed.

As noted above, in 1976, Fininvest Srl had owned 100% of Coriasco?s 200,000 shares of 1,000 lire each (ie, Coriasco had paid-up share capital of 200m lire in total), but SAF was Coriasco?s registered shareholder under a mandate from Mr L Foscale.

According to official SAF records, in mid-March 1979, Mr L Foscale had written to SAF to say that on March 22nd 1979 there would be a 2 billion lire increase in the share capital of Coriasco (ie, 2m shares would be issued).

He said the transaction would be franco valuta (ie, the money would bypass the trust companies). Instead, according to unofficial records at SAF, on March 20th 1979, Mr Dal Santo phoned to say he would give them the mandate to underwrite a 2 billion lire share capital increase. Again, according to SAF?s unofficial records, on March 21st 1979, Mr Dal Santo brought the mandate for SAF to sign, and made available 2 billion in cash. SAF paid that money to Cariplo and Banca Popolare di Novara and obtained two uncrossed bank cheques for a total of 2 billion lire.

SAF endorsed these cheques to Coriasco, which therefore looked as though it had received a 2 billion lire share capital increase paid by two bank cheques. It had not?the money for the shares was really in cash. In other words, Mr Dal Santo had laundered 2 billion lire through SAF with help from the trust company itself.

To any inspector of the official paperwork for the share issue (ie, Mr Foscale?s letter), it would have looked as though the money had bypassed the trust company. This is because there would have been no immediate reason to suppose that the deal had not been done as set out in Mr Foscale?s letter.

According to Fininvest?s accounts for 1979, its stake in Coriasco was by then only 9.09% (ie, the 200,000 shares it held in December 1976). It was not therefore clear who had provided the 2 billion lire in cash in March 1979. Mr Dell?Utri?s technical consultant told the Palermo court that Coriasco was ?absolutely marginal and irrelevant?.

After getting planning permission, another company called Cantieri Riuniti Milanesi (ie, not the same company as involved in the Palina operation) later carried out a large development on land that Coriasco had acquired in 1979.

In 1980 Immobiliare Idra, a company fronted by Mr Dal Santo, became the legal owner of Villa San Martino (and its parkland, collection of books, pictures and so on) when it paid Ms Casati Stampa 500m lire (about ?960,000 in today?s money). At some point Immobiliare Idra must have belonged to Fininvest because Fininvest later sold this company to you.

Giovanni Dal Santo

A number of influential figures in your early career?Mr C Previti, Mr G Foscale, Mr Scabini, Mr Dell?Utri, and Mr Berruti?later rose to positions of prominence with you. Like you, they were all charged in the 1990s with criminal offences. Far more enigmatic is Mr Dal Santo.

Born in Sicily in 1920, by the 1970s, Mr Dal Santo was working in Milan as a book-keeper. He was the only director of a number of companies at crucial points in their existence: for instance, of Milano 3 Srl when it acquired CRM from Palina, and of Immobiliare Idra when it bought Villa San Martino. He was also the ?interlocutor? between Mr L Foscale and the BNL trust companies. He was the person who supplied the information found in SAF?s unofficial records (ie, information that the 16.9 billion lire of shareholder loans to Fininvest Srl were received in 25 tranches between February 1977 and August 1978). He served on the board of statutory auditors of the Holding Italiana companies. You certainly knew him.

Mr Dal Santo laundered 2 billion lire (about ?5.1m in today?s money) through SAF and Coriasco in March 1979. From the date of its acquisition by Fininvest Srl in 1976 until January 1978, ISTIFI?s only director was Mr Dal Santo. This firm, a finance company, was to become the financial lung of the group.

He was obviously an uomo di fiducia (trusted man).

Our questions

Do you have any alternative explanations for the above transactions?

Who put 4 billion lire into Edilnord and SOGEAT by way of share capital in 1967-75?

Who put the 16.94 billion lire into Fininvest Srl as shareholder loans in 1977-78, and where did the money come from?

Why was this money injected in 25 tranches over a 20-month period?

On whose behalf was Mr Dal Santo an uomo di fiducia?

Do you think Ms Casata Stampa got a fair deal for Villa San Martino and her land at Cusago?

Who was the beneficial owner of the 400,000 CRM shares registered in the name of Unione Fiduciaria and who therefore received the 860m lire paid by Palina?

Who put 2 billion lire into Coriasco in March 1979 and where did the cash come from?

Why did you transact so many share deals franco valuta?

Why did you avail yourself of the right to silence when prosecutors wanted to question you at Palazzo Chigi on November 26th 2002 about these and other matters?

Your membership of P2

In October 1990 the appeals court in Venice found that you had perjured yourself while giving evidence in 1988 in an unsuccessful libel case that you had brought against Giovanni Ruggeri and Mario Guarino, both Italian journalists. They are the joint authors of ?Inchiesta sul Signor TV?, a thoroughly researched book on your early business career, first published in 1987.

You were found guilty but your perjury was commuted by a general amnesty. Among other things, in the libel proceeding you said that you had joined the P2 lodge only shortly before it was uncovered in 1981 and that you had not paid your subscription. The court in Venice ruled that these statements were not true. You were initiated into the P2 lodge in early 1978 and paid your 100,000 lire subscription.

After Mr Berruti questioned you about Edilnord and SOGEAT in November 1979, Salvatore Gallo, a superior officer in the Guardia di Finanza in Rome, wrote the following month to the Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi. He recommended no further action be taken. Mr Gallo was initiated into the P2 lodge in July 1980.

BNL had more top managers who were members of P2 than any other Italian bank. At least six senior BNL executives had been initiated into the lodge, including Gianfranco Graziadei, chief executive of one the BNL trust companies.

During the 1970s your companies received generous support from Italian banks, including Monte dei Paschi di Siena whose general manager, Giovanni Cresti, was a member of P2. Later Monte dei Paschi di Siena?s statutory board of auditors concluded that: ? The risk profile towards [your group] was altogether exceptional. Inspectors who have looked at the loan book have made an accurate analysis of it that allows the conclusion that there was significant favouritism towards [your group].?

Our questions

Why did you lie about the date on which you were initiated into the P2 lodge?

Did you use your membership of the P2 lodge to obtain things that you would not otherwise have done?



*We have compiled this sub-section from the reports on your companies by an anti-Mafia investigator and by the Palermo magistrates? technical consultant from the Bank of Italy. An allegation from a pentito (supergrass) that 20 billion lire of Mafia money had been used to build up Fininvest?s television interests triggered their investigation. The two investigators spent 18 months combing records of companies at the top of the Fininvest corporate hierarchy in the period 1975?1985 (and companies connected to those, and so on), of trust companies connected to you, and of bank accounts belonging to you and the companies examined. They have both given evidence in relation to their findings in the trial of your close friend, Marcello Dell?Utri, who was charged in 1996 with aiding and abetting the Mafia.

Apart from a short spell in the late 1970s, Mr Dell?Utri, a Sicilian, worked with you from the mid-1960s to 1994. A member of the Italian parliament, he was a co-founder of Forza Italia, and acted as your campaign manager in the 1994 election.


An Italian story

Apr 26th 2001
From The Economist print edition


After next month?s election, Silvio Berlusconi, Italy?s richest businessman, is expected to become prime minister again. Yet he is still locked in a string of legal battles. His companies have used money from untraceable sources?and he even faces allegations of links to the Mafia


AP

Hoping for leniency

Get article background

ON APRIL 20th, in a drab courtroom in Milan, three judges met to hear evidence in a big trial. The case involved the alleged bribery of judges. Taped to the door was a handwritten list of the accused. At the top was Silvio Berlusconi?s name.

This case illustrates vividly that Mr Berlusconi has not put his legal problems behind him. Shortly before he first became Italy?s prime minister, in May 1994, his business empire, Fininvest, became a subject of the mani pulite (clean hands) investigations. This operation, launched by magistrates in Milan in 1992, had exposed deep-rooted corruption in Italian politics, the bureaucracy and business.

When Mr Berlusconi founded his political party, Forza Italia, in 1993, little was known about his business methods. He portrayed himself to Italians as a self-made man who had built up a powerful television empire by breaking the monopoly of Italy?s state-owned broadcaster, RAI. He told them that he represented a clean break with Italy?s corrupt past.

Since 1994, however, magistrates have investigated many allegations against Mr Berlusconi, including money-laundering, association with the Mafia, tax evasion, complicity in murder and bribery of politicians, judges and the finance ministry?s police, the Guardia di Finanza. Mr Berlusconi, who strongly denies all the allegations, maintains that left-wing magistrates dominate the judiciary, and that the mani pulite investigations were politically motivated. Not surprisingly, his closest associates echo these assertions. ?Mr Berlusconi has been persecuted since 1993. There is something rotten in the judicial system,? says Fedele Confalonieri, an old friend and chairman of Mediaset, Fininvest?s television group.

A senior British judge, Lord Justice Simon Brown, took a rather different view in 1996. The case involved an unsuccessful attempt by Mr Berlusconi to stop Italian magistrates getting their hands on some documents seized by the Serious Fraud Office in Britain. The magistrates needed these documents as evidence in a case of illegal party financing, whereas Mr Berlusconi claimed the alleged offence was political. It was a misuse of language, Lord Justice Brown said,

to describe the magistrates? campaign as being for ?political ends?, or their approach to Mr Berlusconi as one of political persecution...the magistracy are demonstrating...an even-handedness in dealing equally with the politicians of all political parties. It is, indeed, somewhat ironical that the applicants here are seeking to be regarded as political offenders in respect of offences committed in part whilst Mr Berlusconi himself was actually in office...I just cannot see corrupt political contributors...as ?political prisoners?.

But Mr Berlusconi has a second line of defence. ?Italy is not a normal country. Even an anomaly like Mr Berlusconi must be understood in the context of the country. He has done nothing worse than any businessman in Italy,? pleads Mr Confalonieri.

Indeed, many Italians, by no means all of them on the right, echo this defence. Mr Berlusconi, they say, did only what all businessmen had to do to get ahead: pay off anybody, politicians and judges included, who was in a position to help. Mr Berlusconi?s fault, they say, is simply that he was cleverer, and became richer, than his rivals. Besides, they add, what were the magistrates themselves up to, before the mani pulite campaign, when they were notably inactive in pursuing bigwigs?

Others disagree. ?He went beyond the acceptable way of doing business in Italy,? comments a top Italian banker.

Wheels of justice

Three things are important if the full background to Mr Berlusconi?s legal entanglements is to be understood. First, once an allegation of a crime is made in Italy, magistrates have a legal duty to investigate. They can investigate the allegation for a maximum of two years without bringing charges. Second, once charges are brought, the justice system moves slowly: a trial can last for years, as can the appeal process. Third, in Italy, the accused are not considered guilty before definitive conviction in the final appeals court.



Mr Berlusconi has had no definitive convictions so far, but only three of nine criminal proceedings against him have reached the final appeals court (click to see the charge sheet). In the one case where the result is known, concerning illegal political donations, this court did not find him innocent. It upheld the verdict of the first appeals court which, because of the lapse of time since the offence, had applied the statute of limitations. Under the Italian penal code, this extinguishes the crime.

Mr Berlusconi?s legal problems all stem from his business career, which started in the 1960s. When he entered politics, he gave up the directorships of all his Fininvest companies, except AC Milan, a football club. However, he remains the controlling shareholder, and one or both of his grown-up children sit on the board of each of the main companies in the empire.

The structure of that empire is not straightforward even now, and has been far more convoluted in the past. Twenty-two holding companies, each of them beneficially owned by the Berlusconi family, control around 96% of the main private holding company, Fininvest.

Fininvest?s biggest asset by far is a controlling stake, worth 13.1 trillion lire ($6.0 billion), in Mediaset. Terrestrial television in Italy is dominated by two groups: Mediaset, and the state-owned RAI. Between them, Mr Berlusconi?s three TV networks (Canale 5, Italia 1 and Retequattro) have a 43% share of the national audience and over 60% of total TV advertising sales.

Television is only one part of Mr Berlusconi?s media empire. He has a controlling stake in another quoted company, Mondadori, which is Italy?s largest publishing group. Mondadori?s books division has almost 30% of the domestic market; its magazine division, with around 50 titles, 38%. The Berlusconi family also owns one of Italy?s leading national newspapers, il Giornale.

Fininvest also has a 36% stake in Mediolanum, a fast-growing financial-services group that Ennio Doris founded in 1982 with Mr Berlusconi?s financial backing. Mediolanum was floated on the stockmarket in 1996. And Fininvest has a clutch of loss-making businesses (see table below), such as its Internet portal, Jumpy, launched just as the dotcom party was finishing, and Pagine Utili, a struggling telephone-directories firm.




The money trail

Mr Berlusconi cut his business teeth on property development in and around Milan. In the late 1960s, he had the idea of developing Milano 2, a garden city of around 3,500 flats. It was built on the eastern outskirts of Milan beneath the flight path of aircraft taking off from nearby Linate airport. The appeal of the development was enhanced after the aircraft were mysteriously diverted over other residential areas.

This was not the only mystery. Companies in Switzerland, where beneficial ownership is impenetrable, injected 4.1 billion lire (33.5 billion lire in today?s money) in equity into the Italian companies responsible for Milano 2. So, on paper, this project belonged not to Mr Berlusconi, but to anonymous third parties.

Officials at the Bank of Italy suspected that Mr Berlusconi was behind the Swiss companies. At the time, holding capital abroad without telling the authorities was a criminal offence. A team from the Guardia di Finanza, led by Massimo Berruti, investigated in 1979, but concluded, despite evidence that Mr Berlusconi had personally guaranteed bank loans to the Italian companies, that he was not the beneficial owner of the Swiss companies. Mr Berruti?s boss signed the official report. Like Mr Berlusconi, he belonged to the infamous P2 masonic lodge. Immediately after his investigation, Mr Berruti left the Guardia di Finanza and worked as a lawyer for Mr Berlusconi. He is now a Forza Italia member of parliament.

Milano 2 gave birth to Mr Berlusconi?s television empire. In 1978, he launched a local cable-television station for Milano 2, called Telemilano. This scheme became far grander. Mr Berlusconi?s ambition was to challenge RAI?s monopoly on national television advertising, for which there was huge pent-up demand. Telemilano became Canale 5 in 1980.

There was one major snag: only RAI was permitted by law to broadcast nationally. Although private commercial television was unregulated in most respects, a court ruling in 1980 allowed private television stations to broadcast only on a local basis.

But Mr Berlusconi soon found a way round this ruling. He bought programmes, especially American films and soaps, and offered them at very low prices to small, regional television stations. Mr Berlusconi collected the revenue from pre-recorded advertising slots that he inserted. Each station in the Canale 5 circuit agreed to broadcast the same programmes at the same time. In this way, he secured his national audience.

How did Mr Berlusconi finance his budding television empire? Part of the answer is with bank debt. He had a large helping hand from public-sector banks, which provided bigger loans than Fininvest?s creditworthiness seemed to merit. But the rest of the answer is not clear at all. In 1978, at the birth of his television group, Mr Berlusconi set up the 22 holding companies that control Fininvest. From 1978 to 1985, 93.9 billion lire (387 billion lire in today?s money) flowed into the 22 companies, ostensibly from Mr Berlusconi.

In 1997, a financier with links to the Mafia alleged to magistrates in Sicily that Mr Berlusconi had used 20 billion lire of Mafia money to build up his television interests. The magistrates asked the Bank of Italy to help the anti-Mafia division investigate. Two officials spent 18 months combing the shareholder, banking and accounting records of the 22 companies. The Economist has a copy of their reports, which run to over 700 pages. The two main findings are startling.

The first is Mr Berlusconi?s lack of openness with the two trust companies that he instructed to be the registered holder of his shares in the 22 companies. The trust companies were subsidiaries of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), a large bank. Mr Berlusconi put money into the holding companies through two little-known Italian banks, rather than through BNL itself. Thus, BNL?s trust companies had no clear picture of the ultimate source of these funds. In 1994, BNL?s managers were so concerned about this that they carried out two inspections of BNL?s relations with the 22 companies.

These inspections revealed other anomalies, such as share sales that were registered solely on Mr Berlusconi?s word, and with no documentary evidence. For instance, when he sold shares in one of the holding companies to a Fininvest subsidiary for 165 billion lire, the funds bypassed the trust companies altogether. So they had no idea how, or even whether, the buyer had paid for the shares.

The second finding is that the ultimate source of the money put into the 22 companies cannot be traced. There were three reasons for this. First, 29.7 billion lire had been paid in cash, or cash equivalents. Second, the investigators had found no extant supporting documents in the records of the trust companies, banks or holding companies for 20.6 billion lire. Third, Mr Berlusconi had been adept at sending funds round in circles.

Why did Mr Berlusconi want to do this? The investigators were baffled. One company, Palina, ostensibly a third party, had sent 27.7 billion lire to the trust companies, which had then transferred this sum to the holding companies. From there, the funds went to Fininvest, and then, through a Fininvest subsidiary, back to Palina. All these transactions took place on the same day and at the same bank. The investigators found that hidden behind Palina was Mr Berlusconi. He had used a 75-year-old stroke-victim to front for him. Soon after the transactions took place, Palina was liquidated. Its books had been kept blank.

So the true source of the 93.9 billion lire that flowed into the 22 companies in 1978-85 remains a mystery that only Mr Berlusconi can solve. We have sent him questions about this, in writing, but he has declined to answer. A close reading of the reports suggests that the possibility of money-laundering in the 22 companies cannot be ruled out. Banca Rasini, one of the little-known banks used by Mr Berlusconi and once his father?s employer, cropped up in trials of several money-launderers in the 1980s. But the anti-Mafia investigators found no evidence to support the allegation that had triggered their work. They clearly hoped to produce a second report, but the time limit for the investigation had by then expired.

A friend in need

After he bought his two largest private competitors, Italia 1, in 1983, and Retequattro, in 1984, Mr Berlusconi had secured a virtual monopoly in private television. To skirt round the law and broadcast nationwide, he needed help from political friends. None helped more than Bettino Craxi, who became leader of the Socialist Party in 1976 and prime minister in 1983. Mr Berlusconi, through his two main networks, had a powerful political weapon to offer.

In October 1984, officials in several Italian cities shut down his television stations for broadcasting illegally. This spelled potential disaster for the heavily indebted Fininvest group. Within days, Craxi, who died in Tunisia last year after being sentenced in absentia to prison for corruption, signed a decree that allowed Mr Berlusconi?s stations to stay on air. After some parliamentary tussles, this decree became law.

Craxi?s decree did nothing to prevent concentration of ownership. But neither did the Mammi law (named after Oscar Mammi, the telecoms minister), passed in 1990. Tailor-made to suit Mr Berlusconi with his three national networks, it said that no single group could own more than three out of the 12 networks that would be licensed. The coalition government of the day, which depended heavily on Craxi?s Socialist Party, pushed through this controversial measure despite the resignation of five ministers in protest. In effect, this law entrenched the duopoly between Mediaset and RAI. In 1991 and 1992, Mr Berlusconi paid a total of 23 billion lire into Craxi?s offshore bank accounts from a clandestine part of his Fininvest empire, known as All Iberian.

Following leads from their investigation of Craxi?s bank accounts, prosecutors discovered a secret and substantial network of Fininvest companies, incorporated in such jurisdictions as the British Virgin Islands and the Channel Islands. These companies were not disclosed as subsidiaries in Fininvest?s accounts. According to prosecutors, in 1993 Mr Berlusconi signed a letter to his auditors falsely stating that these companies were not part of the Fininvest group.

The prosecutors claim to have found a wide-ranging international fraud, perpetrated under the direction of Mr Berlusconi, to siphon off huge amounts from Fininvest into the secret offshore companies. According to them, Fininvest used various fraudulent financial techniques. The offshore companies, the prosecutors claim, used these funds for all sorts of illegal activities, such as the offshore companies purchasing:

through a third party, quoted shares in companies in the Fininvest group, the apparent intention being to inflate the price of the shares. That this operation was a sham was clear from the fact that the shares, which were bearer shares, remained at all times in the possession of the same fiduciary.

A genuine buyer of bearer shares in a quoted company would hardly have left them in the safe keeping of the same person used by the seller.

Offshore interests

Another leg of the prosecutors? case is that the offshore companies were used to warehouse secret stakes in television companies in Italy and Spain. The prosecutors say they have strong documentary evidence of this. The Mammi law required Mr Berlusconi to sell 90% of his interest in Telepiu, a pay-TV network that he set up in 1990. However, according to the prosecutors, Mr Berlusconi kept control of this stake until 1994 through his offshore companies. He arranged contracts with associates who agreed to act as fronts for him. Under these contracts, while legal ownership of the shares passed to the investors, beneficial ownership remained with Mr Berlusconi?s offshore companies.

The magistrates also uncovered a similar alleged warehousing operation for a 52% stake in Telecinco, a Spanish television station. At the time, Spanish antitrust legislation did not allow anyone to own more than 25% of such companies. Baltasar Garzon, an anti-corruption magistrate in Spain, wants Mr Berlusconi?s immunity as a member of the European Parliament lifted. He is likely to have to wait. For eight months, Spain?s foreign and justice ministries have been locked in a strange wrangle about which is the competent authority to submit a request to the European Parliament.

Mr Berlusconi is currently on trial for falsifying the accounts of the Fininvest holding company. The effect of the alleged falsification of the accounts was to hide all the alleged illegalities. False accounting is a serious offence in Italy, punishable by up to five years in jail. Magistrates have recently applied for a case to be brought on equally serious charges of false accounting relating to the group accounts of Fininvest.

However, Mr Berlusconi may be planning an escape. On March 17th he told a meeting of Italian businessmen that, if elected, his government would decriminalise most cases of false accounting. So the magistrates? work may have been in vain. Yet although they have been unable to trace the ultimate destination of the tens of billions of lire paid out by various parts of Mr Berlusconi?s secret offshore empire, they have discovered where some payments went.

Mr Berlusconi gained control of Mondadori, the publishing group, in 1991 after a bitter battle with Carlo De Benedetti, a wealthy Italian businessman who was himself briefly imprisoned in the mani pulite period. Mr Berlusconi is alleged to have bribed an appeal-court judge, Vittorio Metta, with 400m lire to rule in his favour in a case that decided the battle with Mr De Benedetti.

When magistrates started investigating the case, they discovered that Mr Metta had paid 400m lire in cash in 1992 towards the cost of a flat. In February 1991, the month after Mr Metta?s ruling, one of Fininvest?s secret offshore companies paid 3 billion lire into a Swiss bank account of Mr Berlusconi?s close associate and lawyer, Cesare Previti, who was defence minister in his government in 1994. From Mr Previti?s account, magistrates traced a payment of 425m lire to a Swiss bank account of another lawyer, Attilio Pacifico, who withdrew this amount in cash in October 1991. Mr Pacifico allegedly handed over the bribe to Mr Metta.

Although the magistrates found no direct proof of the payment in cash to Mr Metta, they believed they had a strong case based on indirect proof. Scrutiny of Mr Metta?s bank accounts revealed no cash withdrawals amounting to 400m lire in the relevant period. Neither did investigation of the Italian and Swiss bank accounts of a retired Italian judge who, according to Mr Metta, had given him the 400m lire in wodges of cash?though the accounts did contain several million dollars.

So the magistrates believed they had established that Mr Metta had received 400m lire in cash from the money that Mr Berlusconi paid to Mr Previti in February 1991. Last June, a judge at a preliminary hearing took a different view. He believed Mr Metta and ruled, therefore, that Mr Berlusconi and the other defendants, who included Mr Previti and Mr Metta, had no case to answer. The magistrates have appealed.

Dealings with judges

Mr Berlusconi is also on trial for alleged bribery of judges. His co-defendants, who all deny the charges, include Mr Previti and Mr Pacifico, and, again, the case involves Mr De Benedetti as the offended party. In 1985, Mr De Benedetti signed a contract to buy SME, a food and catering conglomerate, from IRI, a large state-owned group. Mr Berlusconi and another businessman formed a company to mount a higher bid for SME. After a court ruling in 1986 that his contract was not valid, Mr De Benedetti?s deal with IRI fell through. He then took the case to the highest appeals court, where he also lost.

One charge against Mr Berlusconi, which he denies, is that he induced judges to find in his favour by promising them money. Whether this is true or not, there is a clear trail of money from Mr Berlusconi to Renato Squillante, a judge, via Mr Previti. The Economist has documents that show a transfer, on March 6th 1991, of $434,404 from one of Mr Berlusconi?s Swiss bank accounts to one of Mr Previti?s, and on March 7th, a transfer of the same amount from Mr Previti?s account to the Swiss bank account of Rowena Finance, a Panamanian company. Court evidence shows that Rowena Finance?s account is Mr Squillante?s. Mr Berlusconi had wanted to appoint his chum, Mr Previti, as justice minister in 1994, but the president of Italy refused to approve this.

Mr Berlusconi has been absent from the 26 hearings scheduled to date in this trial?some recently postponed, as his lawyers are standing in the election. He has applied for the judges to be replaced, as he claims they are prejudiced.

If he is eventually found guilty of the crime in the final appeals court, he could receive a prison sentence; the statute of limitations will not kick in until 2008. Unlike the crime of false accounting, it will be very difficult for his government, if he wins the election, to decriminalise the offence of bribing judges. This trial could also be unique in Italian judicial history. No serving prime minister of Italy since the war has yet been a defendant in a criminal trial.

Cosy with Cosa Nostra?

Mr Berlusconi?s problems with the magistracy have not been confined to Milan. In Sicily, Mafia pentiti (supergrasses who have ?repented?), especially Salvatore Cancemi, whose evidence has helped prosecutors secure several convictions against Mafia bosses, have made very grave allegations against Mr Berlusconi and his close friend, Marcello Dell?Utri. Mr Cancemi alleged in 1996 that both were in direct contact with the Mafia boss who ordered the bombing which killed an anti-Mafia magistrate, Paolo Borsellino, in 1992.

After a two-year investigation, magistrates applied last year for the inquiry to be closed without charges. They did not find evidence to corroborate Mr Cancemi?s allegations. Similarly, a two-year investigation, also launched on evidence from Mr Cancemi, into Mr Berlusconi?s alleged association with the Mafia was closed in 1996.

A parallel investigation resulted in charges against Mr Dell?Utri of aiding and abetting the Mafia, which he denies. With the exception of Mr Berlusconi, nearly all the prosecution witnesses in the trial, which started in 1997, have been heard. According to Ennio Tinaglia, the lawyer for the province of Palermo, a civil party in the case, the prosecution has ?presented strong evidence of Mr Dell?Utri?s very close links with the Mafia.? Mere mention of the Mafia makes Fininvest?s managers twitch. ?Mafia is second only to paedophilia as a crime. It is a terrible, shameful thing,? says Mr Confalonieri, one of Mr Dell?Utri?s former colleagues.

So who is Mr Dell?Utri? Apart from a short spell in the late 1970s, Mr Dell?Utri, a Sicilian, worked with Mr Berlusconi in Fininvest from 1974 to 1994. As chief executive of Publitalia, Mediaset?s advertising wing, he was responsible for the cash generator of the Fininvest group. Mr Dell?Utri, a member of the Italian parliament, was a co-founder of Forza Italia, and acted as Mr Berlusconi?s campaign manager in the 1994 election.

Magistrates have also applied for Mr Dell?Utri to be brought to trial on charges of conspiracy to slander their colleagues. And he is currently under investigation for allegedly attempting to bribe a prosecution witness at his trial. A court case in 1996 revealed that Mr Dell?Utri received donazioni (gifts), often in cash, of 4 billion lire from Mr Berlusconi between 1989 and 1993.

While Mr Berlusconi is not obliged to testify in his own trials, even as prime minister, he cannot escape giving evidence in Mr Dell?Utri?s. Prosecutors will probe him about his long-standing friendship with Mr Dell?Utri. And he will have to answer other questions that he has hitherto avoided. These include how and why he employed Vittorio Mangano, a convicted mafioso from a powerful clan in Palermo, on his country estate near Milan for two years in the 1970s.

High on the prosecutors? list will be questions on the anti-Mafia investigators? reports about the 22 holding companies. Not least, they will ask him where the 22 companies got their funds. There will also be questions about a Sicilian television company that he owned with a Mafia-related figure.

Despite his claims that he is the shining archetype of a self-made man, Mr Berlusconi has needed a lot of help from insalubrious quarters. Though he says he wants to replace the old corrupt system, his own business empire is largely a product of it. His election as prime minister would similarly perpetuate, not change, Italy?s bad old ways.

Fit to run Italy?

Apr 26th 2001
From The Economist print edition


The known facts about Silvio Berlusconi, never mind the unanswered questions, rule him out for high office, even though his countrymen seem poised to make him prime minister


AP

Get article background

IN ANY self-respecting democracy it would be unthinkable that the man assumed to be on the verge of being elected prime minister would recently have come under investigation for, among other things, money-laundering, complicity in murder, connections with the Mafia, tax evasion and the bribing of politicians, judges and the tax police. But the country is Italy and the man is Silvio Berlusconi, almost certainly its richest citizen. As our own investigations make plain (see article), Mr Berlusconi is not fit to lead the government of any country, least of all one of the world?s richest democracies.

Many of Mr Berlusconi?s supporters, who include most of Italy?s businessmen, decry such criticism as born of naivety, ignorance and malevolence. They say that it is he, not the Italian people, who is the victim of dishonesty. They say that ever since he entered politics, only seven years ago, he has been persecuted by left-wing magistrates, journalists and politicians, all jealous of his wealth and fearful of his intention to renovate Italy and do away with the old guard. They add, moreover, that even if Mr Berlusconi did pay off tax inspectors (under duress, of course), what of it? That was the way that business in Italy was done when he made his fortune. He was no worse than anyone else?only cleverer, and a bigger target. Why pick on the man who has the vision, flair and courage to offer his services so magnanimously to the nation?

Besides, the excusers? mantra goes on, it has become clear that most Italians, including many on the left, have grown bored with the long-running saga of Mr Berlusconi?s legal travails. Many of his countrymen have a not-so-sneaking regard for the way in which he has cocked a snook at the tax laws?and at the authority of the state. If he can do so well for himself, surely he is all the more qualified to help Italians at large.

Plausible but wrong

Alas, nothing in this barrel of casuistry holds water. The questions and concerns about Mr Berlusconi are voiced not just by opponents on the left. The notion that he was himself the main victim of dishonest tax inspectors and malign magistrates is fanciful. Never do those who defend him mention the losses to the state?in other words, the Italian people?that would result from the waiving of taxes by the tax inspectors he is said to have bribed. Besides, Mr Berlusconi is under investigation for crimes that are not mere peccadillos committed in the face of red tape and nitpicking taxmen. True, under Italy?s tortuous judicial system, in only one case against him has a final verdict been handed down: this case involved illegal political donations and the court did not find him innocent. But our investigation shows that he has a compelling case to answer on a string of grave charges. In addition, his strange and long-standing reluctance to explain the origin of his earliest sources of wealth casts a pall over his entire business reputation.

In any event, in any normal country the voters?and probably the law?would not have given Mr Berlusconi his chance at the polls without first obliging him to divest himself of many of his wide-reaching assets. The conflict of interest between his own business and affairs of state would be gargantuan. Worth perhaps $14 billion, he is intricately involved in vast areas of Italian finance, commerce and broadcasting with ramifications into almost every aspect of business and public life; his empire includes banks, insurance, property, publishing, advertising, the media and football. Even during his ill-fated earlier stint as prime minister, in 1994, he issued an array of decrees that impinged heavily on his commercial activities. If he wins again on May 13th, he will control a good 90% of all national television broadcasting. He has made not the slightest effort to resolve this clear conflict.

Why so little concern in Italy?

There are historical reasons why so many Italians are unswayed by the case for keeping Mr Berlusconi out of high office. It is a sad truth that for years they had little cause to respect the institutions or rules of the state. Until a decade ago, Italy was run according to a corrupt arrangement under which all the supposedly respectable parties, usually led by the Christian Democrats, ruled in perpetual but oft-changing coalition to keep communists and fascists out of office. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, centrists and refashioned ex-communists filled the gap that opened up on the left, while Mr Berlusconi?s movement jumped into the vacuum on the right. The mani pulite (clean hands) campaign against corruption after 1992 was enthusiastically taken up by the people and, all in all, venality is less pervasive than it was. But the same old attitude of disrespect for laws, institutions and the courts lingers. And Mr Berlusconi, peddling amiability and showmanship, has persuaded many Italians that he at least stands for something new. We show that in the central matter of probity that is not so.

Which is far from saying that Mr Berlusconi does not offer some sensible policies, or that Italy has no need of reform. The judicial system might well benefit from an overhaul. Indeed, the entire constitution is ripe for change. The executive is too weak, the legislature too prone to indecision, the voting system too proportional. But these problems are of a different order to the one of suspected criminality at the top.

Mr Berlusconi?s strongest claim is that many of the charges against him?whether of conflict of interest or of much greater crimes?have been known for years, and yet most Italians seem untroubled. In other words, though the judiciary may not agree, the court of public opinion finds him innocent. If the judiciary is indeed politically motivated, that is a terrible condemnation of the Italian state. If, on the other hand, the judiciary is independent, the public?s acquittal is a terrible condemnation of the electorate. Either way, the election of Mr Berlusconi as prime minister would mark a dark day for Italian democracy and the rule of law.

[ago]

In Origine Postato da Il Condor
E' l'effetto dell'ultimo 'raid' pirata operato da uno sconosciuto 'hacker' sulle pagine web.

Ci avete messo solo 17 ore e 18 primi per capirlo!

[Il Condor]

In Origine Postato da Ago
Ci avete messo solo 17 ore e 18 primi per capirlo!

Cosa stai blaterando ?

Ci ho messo tre secondi, il tempo di leggere il post. Mica penserai che stia fisso su Pol a leggere "in tempo reale" le masturbazioni mentali di Oasis & co