ILF Models: Deposits Come Before Loans
The most basic, and also the most naïve, objection to a critique of the ILF view is that, surely, when I make a cheque deposit in a bank, the bank will use that deposit to fund loans to other households or firms. In other words, the bank intermediates my savings. What else would it do with “my money”? This objection exhibits both a confusion of microeconomic with macroeconomic arguments, and a confusion about the principles of double-entry bookkeeping.
Figure 1 illustrates this with an example. In the four steps shown in that figure, a cheque with a value of 4 is deposited in Bank A, whose balance sheet is shown in the left column. But the deposited cheque, if it has any value, must be drawn on a deposit that already exists elsewhere in the banking system. In our example, it is drawn on Bank B, whose balance sheet is shown in the middle column.
The right column shows the consolidated banking system, which is for simplicity assumed to consist of just Banks A and B. Also for simplicity, banks are assumed to have no net worth, and to keep central bank reserves of 10% against their deposits, much more than they would keep in practice.
The confusion of microeconomic and macroeconomic arguments becomes immediately obvious by considering the balance sheet of the consolidated banking system rather than of Bank A. It is entirely unaffected by this transaction. Deposits have been moved within the banking system, but this does not mean that the banking system as a whole has any more aggregate deposits to “fund loans”. In a macroeconomic sense, this is clearly not what must be meant by the intermediation of savings.
But the fallacies go deeper than that. To begin, even Bank A does not have any additional funds to lend after it has received the deposit. At the moment the cheque is deposited, Bank A creates a new entry, the deposit, on the liabilities side of its balance sheet. But, by double-entry bookkeeping, there has to be a simultaneous matching entry elsewhere, which in this case is an accounts receivable entry on the asset side.
This entry represents the liability of Bank B to deliver central bank reserves corresponding to the value of the cheque (this step is not shown in Figure 1). In other words, the funds are lent as soon as they are received — to Bank B. Bank A therefore has no additional funds to lend following the deposit.15 The next step in Figure 1 is that Bank A sends the cheque for clearing, and clearing is settled using central bank reserves, with Bank B’s central bank reserves decreasing by 4 and Bank A’s reserves correspondingly increasing.
One could now try to argue that Bank A can lend these additional central bank reserves to non-banks. But this would be a very elementary mistake. Central bank reserves simply cannot be lent to non-banks under the present split-circulation system, they are exclusively used to make payments between banks.
However, it might be argued, Bank A now has more reserves than it needs to support its deposit base, so there will be more lending by Bank A, and thus also more lending in aggregate. Notice that now we are no longer discussing lending by the bank of the funds represented by the original cheque deposit, because this is impossible, we are rather discussing indirect effects.
But even this is incorrect. First, even if it was true that the additional reserves in Bank A cause it to lend more, Bank B faces the opposite situation, so it would lend less. We care about the aggregate outcome, which is unlikely to change because the overall quantity of reserves has not changed.
Second, if Bank A cannot lend central bank reserves, and if it cannot create deposits through lending (under the ILF view of banking), how exactly can it lend more?
Certainly not by attracting yet more deposits from Bank B, which will end up as yet more central bank reserves for Bank A, which cannot be lent. Bank A therefore, if it cannot create deposits through lending, has no ability to increase lending to non-banks after it receives the cheque deposit and the corresponding central bank reserves.
In the real world only fairly small settlement transactions in central bank reserves are typically required, because incoming and outgoing cheques approximately balance for Banks A and B. We nevertheless continue with our example.
Given that Bank A does not need the additional central bank reserves to support its deposits with central bank liquidity, and because it cannot lend central bank reserves to non-banks, what it will do in the normal course of business is to lend them back to Bank A by way of an interbank loan. This is illustrated in the third row of Figure 1.
Interbank loans are a way of reallocating central bank reserves to where they are most needed within the banking system. Once this transaction is complete, Bank A has therefore used the central bank reserves that came along with the additional deposit to make an interbank loan to Bank B.
The deposit never enabled (or encouraged) it to lend more to non-banks, its only options were a loan of central bank reserves to Bank B or higher holdings of central bank reserves, which cannot be lent to non-banks.
A claim that a cheque deposit represents or leads to the intermediation of loanable funds is therefore a fallacy based on microeconomic or partial equilibrium arguments. But a large number of macroeconomic models exist in which banks do intermediate loanable funds in a general equilibrium setting. What do they have in mind?
This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the story implicitly told by such models. Here we only need a single bank that represents the aggregate banking system. The story starts with the saver making a deposit. But we have just seen that this cannot be a cheque deposit.
It can also not be a cash deposit, for two reasons. First, cash is never “lent out”, in the sense of a pure exchange of assets, loan against cash, on the bank’s balance sheet. Cash can only be withdrawn against a pre-existing electronic deposit that has first been created in some other way.
That other way is the subject of our inquiry here. Second, cash represents an extremely small fraction of the overall stock of money in modern economies, and banking transactions would proceed in exactly the way they proceed today if cash no longer existed at all.
A model that would not be valid if this minor and non-constitutive element of our monetary system did not exist could therefore not be more than a theoretical exercise with no practical value.
It turns out that the only possible way to tell the story of ILF banks is that the saver makes a deposit of neither cheques nor cash but of goods. These goods must in turn have been accumulated through some combination of additional production of goods and foregone consumption of goods.
A quick examination of the budget constraints used in modern general equilibrium models of banking shows that this is indeed, and to our knowledge almost without exception, the implicit assumption.
It is very important to try to understand what this would mean in practice, and we do so in Figure 2 by way of a concrete example. In this figure an agent called Saver approaches the bank to deposit a specific good that he happens to own, in this example gravel. In return the bank records a new deposit for Saver.
At the moment of recording this deposit, by double-entry bookkeeping, the bank needs to record a matching entry elsewhere. This entry, on the asset side of its balance sheet, is an addition to its inventory of gravel. We now assume that an agent called Investor A17 has approached the bank for a loan for the purpose of buying a machine, and that the bank has considered his proposal and decided to approve the loan.
Continuing with our example, this loan must take the form of the bank exchanging the gravel against a loan contract with Investor A, in other words the loan is a portfolio swap on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet.
Investor A drives away with gravel, and then negotiates a barter transaction with Investor B, whereby Investor B accepts the gravel in exchange for the new machine whose purchase Investor A wanted to finance.
The bank is left with a deposit by Saver, and a loan to Investor A. It has intermediated loanable funds, in this example in the concrete form of gravel. These funds were the prerequisite for bank lending, and therefore for the physical investment of Investor A.
This story is fundamentally non-monetary, as the original bank deposit represents a receipt for goods, the loan represents a claim by the bank for future delivery of goods, and the ultimate purpose of the loan transaction can only be satisfied through barter of goods against goods.
We are therefore left with a model where banks, who provide close to 100% of any modern economy’s monetary medium of exchange, are modeled as institutions of barter.18 Model economies that are constructed in this way are therefore entirely fictitious representations of reality, as such institutions simply do not exist.




Rispondi Citando
