La penso piu' o meno come te, quantomeno a livello di analisi della situazione.
Questo dopo aver visto il grafico che segue:
con la domanda che segue: se "bruciare" il 30% del PIL (1929) ha prodotto la grande depressione, come e' possibile che avere bruciato il 70% del PIL (2001) possa passare come acqua fresca?
Poi ho letto un documento interessante, sempre preso da
www.pimco.com, “TROUBLE AHEAD—TROUBLE BEHIND”
Restructuring the Global Economy—A New Marshall Plan, di Chris Dialynas, managing director. sostanzialmente un banchiere.
Il quale dice, in estrema sintesi, alcune cose:
1. l' america ha un deficit impossibile da colmare: che i cinesi comprino prodotti USA in maniera tale da colmare il deficit commerciale USA e' impossibile;
2. il deficit americano e' legato "anche" al fatto che l' america ha i costi che derivano dall' essere il poliziotto del mondo, ed il suo banchiere (il documento e' della fine 2004); quindi, chi trae i benefici dalla polizia e dalla banca (Francia e Germania), che paghi i prezzi. se serve con una guerra.
3. chi ha un credito commerciale enorme con gli USA (India e Cina in primis) dovra' accettare la rinegoziazione del debito, la rivalutazione di rupia yuan e rublo del 40% almeno, ed eventualmente la rinuncia ai crediti;
4. the Fed would need to absorb more than $1.0 trillion of securities held by foreigners, representing a 20 percent expansion of the total supply of money presently
outstanding. The consolidation of trade into a few Asian countries has increased the risk that a global
rebalancing will not occur and that policy shifts outside the U.S. will force Fed’s hand. The policy shift
in one or both of these countries will result in a very hard landing here. Thus, the likely outcome to
the “bid wanted” by foreign holders of debt would be the following:
1. Rapid increase in U.S. interest rates
2. Rapid depreciation of the U.S. dollar
3. Fall in the stock market
4. Rapid reduction in global trade
5. Probable global reconfiguration of alliances away from the U.S.
5. cio' che da potere agli USA e' la capacita' militare;
6. il WTO e' una minaccia alla difesa delle risorse strategiche (agricoltura, armamenti, alta tecnologia per la difesa), e quindi occorre difendere i campioni nazionali, secondo le teorie di Friedrich List (economista tedesco della meta' dell' 800);
7. What might motivate some members of the cartel of Asian central banks that hold massive dollar
reserves to sell these assets, or buy fewer of them? Perhaps it is their belief that U.S. policy makers
will be foolish enough to take them out of their positions as they choose to protect themselves.
Perhaps they will determine that their industrial development is well enough advanced that they no
longer need to support the U.S. dollar to maintain their exports. The analogy of a game of musical
chairs is appropriate.
8. Summary of Policy Recommendations
There is a need to immediately implement a number of important structural measures affecting the
global participants. Included in this Category I list of critical adjustments to increase savings, reduce
debt and improve current account deficit are:
1. Cut by 15% across the board all U.S. social spending programs.
2. Increase U.S. tax rates.
3. Increase incentives to save in U.S. – consumption taxes.
4. Devise capital controls such that capital cannot be exported out of the U.S.
5. Debt renegotiation/forgiveness by countries with cumulative high trade surplus with
the U.S.
6. Change the Federal Reserve Bank objective function to include a constraint on the size of the
trade deficit.
7. Prohibit sale of highly sensitive technology and defense to any and all foreign countries.
8. Revalue Chinese currency to U.S. dollar by 40 percent.
9. Targeted protective tariffs if needed.
10. Renegotiate WTO.
11. Prohibit the Fed from purchasing bonds from foreign holders of U.S. debt.
All of the above measures are of great and equal importance and need to be implemented as a
package. Piecemeal implementation violates the requirement that all participants must contribute to
the readjustment of the global economy.
Category I initiatives need to be followed by a second set of policy measures that we will call Category.
These initiatives are crucial to the long run political-economic stability of the U.S. economy.
1. Increase U.S. defense spending.
2. Develop incentive-based programs for youth, education and health. Take funds from
programs for elderly.
3. Reduce minimum wage in U.S. by 50%.
4. Repeal regressive Prop 13 in California.
5. Tax prosperous countries that have benefited from prior IMF bailout recipient
6. Proceeds disbursed to IMF “equity” holders.
7. Tax holders of Iraqi debt for invasion “appreciation” and ultimate “occupation” appreciation value.
8. U.S. Treasury needs to extend average maturity of the debt issued.
Finally, a few additional measures are necessary to help safeguard U.S. national interests. These
measures include:
1. Conflict of interest disclosure by any person providing policy advice.
2. Prohibit consulting contracts for any public official leaving office for two-year period.
Il documento non e' piu' accessibile dal sito Pimco, io ne ho una copia in pdf da cui ho tradotto alcune delle cose e copiato delle altre.
E' della fine del 2004, ma e' l' elaborazione di idee maturate nel 2003.
se un banchiere (la PIMCO, controllata adesso da Deutsche Bank, ha 100 miliardi di dollari in bond in portafoglio) arriva a dire certe cose, c'e' in effetti da essere un po' preoccupati.
anche se io non credo alla fine dello stato nazione, a la cipherpunks circa 1995-1997.